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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) because this
is a civil appeal not within the original jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES, PRESERVATION, AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Did the district court err in ruling no genuine issues of material fact
existed for USA Power's1 seven claims for relief because PacifiCorp's statements of material
fact were "undisputed," when:
a.

The district court deemed the vast majority of PacifiCorp's statements of

material fact admitted based on USA Power's purported failure to comply with Rule 7 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, despite the fact USA Power folly complied with Rule 7 by
restating PacifiCorp's facts verbatim, explaining the grounds for USA Power's dispute of
those facts or the inferences PacifiCorp sought drawn in its favor based on those facts, and
providing supporting record citations to admissible evidence for such explanation;
b.

The district court failed to draw all reasonable inferences from disputed and

undisputed facts in favor of USA Power, despite that those facts were susceptible to two
equally reasonable inferences and the reasonableness of the inference in USA Power's favor
was supported by record citation to admissible evidence; and
c.

The district court found USA Power's evidence speculative - that is, not

credible - despite the fact that, on summary judgment, the district court was precluded from
weighing the evidence, making credibility determinations, and disregarding USA Power's

*Except where indicated, Plaintiffs/Appellants USA Power LLC, USA Power Partners,
L.L.C., and Spring Canyon Energy, LLC are collectively referred to as "USA Power."
1

admissible evidence? (R5966, 5913-65, 5976 at n. 13, 8167 at 200-01)
Issue No. 2: Did the district court err in ruling USA Power's trade secret and breach
of the Confidentiality Agreement claims failed, as a matter of law, on the grounds:
a.

USA Power's trade secret claim failed because it did not produce evidence that

could establish at trial the existence of a trade secret, when: (1) the existence of a trade
secret is a fact-intensive issue properly determined by a jury, (2) USA Power presented
evidence that its "Spring Canyon" electrical generation power plant project was a unique and
undisclosed combination of elements, which had independent economic value derived from
not being readily ascertainable by proper means, and (3) the district court instead considered
only whether each individual, constituent element of that combination was a secret, or readily
ascertainable, and did not consider whether the combination of elements could be ascertained
by proper means in the specific time constraints involved in the bidding process; and
b.

USA Power's trade secret claim failed because it did not demonstrate evidence

of misappropriation sufficient to withstand summary judgment, when USA Power presented
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation by PacifiCorp and, in the absence of governing
Utah case law, under persuasive authority, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to withstand
summary judgment? (R5968-89, 5913-64)
c.

USA Power's claim for breach of the Confidentiality Agreement failed because

it did not provide evidence PacifiCorp used its confidential information, when USA Power
presented circumstantial evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer PacifiCorp used
USA Power's confidential information to develop Current Creek, including that PacifiCorp
could not, in the limited time available, have sited Current Creek at Mona, Utah as a dry2

cooled, combined-cycle project. (R5913-64, 5989-91)
Issue No. 3: Did the district court err in ruling USA Power's claim against
Williams/HRO2 for breach of their fiduciary duty of confidentiality failed, as a matter of law
on the grounds:
a.

USA Power failed to present "actual" evidence Williams/HRO disclosed USA

Power's confidential information, when USA Power presented direct evidence they disclosed
and used USA Power's confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit;
b.

Shaw Res. Ltd.. L.L.C. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.C.. 2006 UT App 313,

% 29,142 P.3d 560, barred USA Power from establishing use or disclosure by circumstantial
evidence, when that decision does not preclude use of circumstantial evidence and USA
Power presented circumstantial evidence Williams/HRO disclosed and used USA Power's
confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit; and
c.

Utah law would not recognize the rule persuasively adopted in other states that

an attorney's representation of directly adverse parties may alone support an inference, which
may be drawn by the fact finder, that information was used or disclosed by the attorney, even
though such a rule is necessary due to the inherent difficulty of obtaining direct evidence of
disclosure and to further the policy goal of not shielding attorneys from the legal
consequences of their breaches of fiduciary duty? (R3930-88, 8167 at 29-34, 39-42)
Issue No. 4: Did the district court err in ruling USA Power's breach of the fiduciary
duty of loyalty claim failed, as a matter of law, due to a lack of evidence establishing the

2

Except where indicated, Defendants/Appellees Jody L. Williams and Holme, Roberts &
Owen, LLP are collectively referred to as "Williams/HRO."
3

element of causation, when (1) USA Power presented evidence it reached an agreement with
PacifiCorp in March 2003 for PacifiCorp to purchase the Spring Canyon project and, but for
Williams/HRO's breach by representing PacifiCorp, there is a reasonable likelihood that sale
would have closed; (2) USA Power presented evidence its Spring Canyon project was the
only viable project that could meet PacifiCorp's power need, as stated in the 2003 RFP, in
the necessary time frame and, but for Williams/HRO's breach by representing PacifiCorp as
USA Power's competitor and using for PacifiCorp's benefit their unique knowledge gained
in representing USA Power, there is a reasonable likelihood PacifiCorp could not have
developed a viable, competing project in time to award itself, rather than USA Power, the
contract; and when (3) the district court's reasoning that USA Power could not show
causation, as a matter of law, if other qualified lawyers in the area might have provided the
services Williams/HRO provided in breach of their fiduciary duty of loyalty, is bad public
policy because it effectively immunizes lawyers from civil liability for damages resulting
from conflicting representation and encourages lawyers to breach their duty of loyalty to
existing clients? (R6083-98, 6121-29, 8167 at 89-99)
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment
for correctness, granting no deference to the district court's legal conclusions, and determines
only whether the district court erred in applying the governing law and whether the district
court correctly held there were no disputed issues of material fact. Wayment v. Clear
Channel Broad. Inc., 2005 Utah 25,f15,116 P.3d 271 (alteration in original). Further, this
Court reviews the ruling regarding whether a party has failed to comply with the
requirements of a Rule of Civil Procedure for correctness, affording no particular deference
4

to the district court's determination. Avila v. Winn. 794 P 2d 20, 22 (Utah 1990).
CITATION TO DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The rules and statutes determinative of this appeal are set out verbatim in the attached
Addendum at Tabs 1-3, respectively: (1) Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c); (2) Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 7(c)(3)(A) & (B); and (3) Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
USA Power filed an action against their lawyers, Williams/HRO, in the Third District
Court for the State of Utah on February 18, 2005, alleging they breached their fiduciary
duties of loyalty and confidentiality by simultaneously and adversely representing PacifiCorp
on a competing electric power project in Mona, Utah, and disclosing and/or using USA
Power's confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit. (Rl-21) On October 26, 2005,
USA Power filed a Second Amended Complaint joining PacifiCorp as a defendant, alleging
PacifiCorp: (1) violated the Uniform Trade Secrets Act by misappropriating USA Power's
trade secret regarding USA Power's power project in Mona; (2) breached a confidentiality
agreement with USA Power regarding their trade secret; (3) breached its implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing; (4) intentionally interfered with USA Power's existing
contractual relations with Williams/HRO; and (5) was unjustly enriched. (R759-87)
Between January 30 and April 30, 2007, PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO moved for
summary judgment on all USA Power's claims, which USA Power opposed. (R1690D-Aa,
1698A-1717, 4086-127, 4392-94, 8555-98; 3878-98, 3927-89, 6004-130, 5904-95) After
oral argument, the district court, on October 15,2007, issued a Memorandum Decision and,
on October 24,2007, Orders granting PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's motions for summary
5

judgment.3 (R7599-624, 7625-32) USA Power timely appealed the summary judgment
rulings.4 (R8147-48)
STATEMENT OF FACTS5
I.

USA Power's Development of its Spring Canyon Project
USA Power LLC was formed in 1996, under a previous name, for the purpose of

locating, acquiring and developing electric power generation sites, Le^, developing power
projects.6 (Rl 865-80) Development of a power project is "a complex, costly and timeconsuming undertaking," and a natural gas fueled project "generally require[s] anywhere
from eighteen to twenty-four months to develop from site selection to the point of initial
construction." (R3721) In this process, a developer, such as USA Power, must engage in
the time consuming and difficult tasks of site analysis and acquisition; studies, modeling and
evaluations of plant design and configuration; obtaining necessary permits and approvals;
and preparing financial proformas. (Id) The creation, conclusions and combination of such
materials "are considered confidential and proprietary in the power industry because of the
competitive edge it gives the developer." (R3723)

3

The district court's Memorandum Decision and Orders are in the attached Addendum at
Tabs 4 through 6. All other record papers cited are contained in the accompanying continued
Addendum, Volumes I through V, by record page number.
4
The district court did not grant summary judgment on a disgorgement remedy under USA
Power's breach of fiduciary duty of loyalty claim against Williams/HRO, but that remedy
was later resolved rendering the summary judgment rulings final. (R8095-111)
5
USA Power, the non-movant below, states the following, viewing facts and reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to its claims, just as this Court views
them. Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr., Inc.. 2003 UT 23, ^ 2, 70 R3d 904.
6
A power project is generally understood in the industry as the collection of assets necessary
to construct an economically viable plant; it does not include the actual construction and
operation of a plant. (R3 721)
6

A.

USA Power's Decision to Develop a Power Project in Mona, Utah

USA Power spent years researching and evaluating different site locations, particularly
in the West, to determine where to develop a power project. (Rl 962-63) Its methodology for
site selection included, first, evaluating electrical transmission systems in place, assessing
whether sites would have access to fuel (such as natural gas) and water (for cooling), and
assessing whether a local community would be receptive to a power plant. (Rl963-64)
After considering a number of locations, USA Power, in early 2001, decided to
develop a power project in Utah.7 (R2903-05,1965-66) USA Power ultimately focused on
Utah because its principals Ted, Lois, and David identified a favorable power market due to
Utah's increasing population and the comparatively easier regulatory regime of the western
United States. (Rl 955-56,1960-61) In addition, the state electricity provider had not taken
advantage of the situation: "PacifiCorp had done a . . . lousy job of developing . . .
generation resources in the State of Utah." (R1956) Further, there were other geographic
advantages: a power plant in Utah could sell power to that market or to other adjoining
markets, such as California, where prices would be higher, (Rl956-57) and it could take
advantage of natural gas which was cheaper in the Rocky Mountain area. (Rl961-62)
Finally, an electrical transmission substation (also referred to as a "switching station") owned
by PacifiCorp Transmission was located in Mona, Utah, which was accessible from the
7

At all times relevant to these proceedings, Ted Banasiewicz ("Ted"), Lois Banasiewicz
("Lois"), and David Graeber ("David") were the three principals of USA Power, who were
engaged in the business of developing power projects. (R1951-52, 6062) The plaintiffs'
corporate structure is not material to review of the district court's disposition, except that
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC, is a wholly-owned subsidiary of USA Power Partners, L.L.C.,
that was formed in February 2002 for the purpose of holding assets relative to the Spring
Canyon project being developed in Mona, Utah. (R2851-53, 10000-04)
7

different sites USA Power was considering. (R2011-13, 9983, 10130-32, 10140)
USA Power spent months researching and consulting with their Utah lawyer, Williams
(as discussed below), to determine which Utah site it was considering would be best.
(Rl 961 -64) In addition to an initial visit to potential Utah sites in 1998, Ted, Lois, and Dave,
beginning in 2001, made regular visits to Utah to select and ultimately develop a site.
(R1876, 1965-66) They met with local officials, including those of Juab County, to gauge
whether those officials and communities would be receptive to a power plant. (Rl967-68)
USA Power ultimately decided Mona, Utah was the most desirable site. (R2903-07,
1966-72,1981-83) USA Power named the development in Mona the Spring Canyon project.
Ted, in developing the Spring Canyon project, made over twenty visits to Mona. (R1978)
B.

USA Power's Creation of Basic Design, Configuration and Resource
Requirements for Spring Canyon

USA Power had a multitude of potential plant designs from which to choose in
developing the Spring Canyon project. For example, USA Power had to determine the size
- iJL, generation capacity for the plant - for the most efficient plant (highest generation
capacity by cost of a single facility) that would serve the specific needs of the market for
which it was targeted, such as an ability to provide power during peak demand periods vs.
an ability to provide around-the-clock sustained "base load" power. (R2022) It had to
choose from a variety of fuel options, including coal or natural gas. (R2020-21) Once a fuel
source was chosen, USA Power had to choose the operating components. With a gas-fired
plant, there are "lots of manufacturers of gas turbines and each of those manufacturers have
several, various models of gas turbines... [that] operate differently and operate for different

8

functions. " (R2021-22, 2033) USA Power also had to determine whether the plant would
be designed as a wet or dry cooled plant.8 (R2051-52) Additional considerations were
whether the plant would be combined or simple cycle,9 whether it would be a "2x1" or " l x l "
configuration10 and whether the plant would use zero discharge technology. (R2028, 2055,
2197-2200)
USA Power designed and configured the Spring Canyon project, on a Mona sitespecific basis, as an approximate 55011 megawatt ("MW").12 a*r ( n o t water) cooled, gasfired,13 combined cycle plant14 in a 2x1 configuration with 7FA GE turbines,15 duct firing,16
8

The differences between wet and dry cooling are discussed below.
In a gas-fired plant, natural gas is taken into a combustion turbine and combined with air.
When ignited, this combination expands and turns an electrical generator that, in turn,
produces electricity. (R2025-27) If the plant is limited to such a process, it is referred to as
a "simple-cycle" plant. (R2027-28)
A combined-cycle plant is far more complicated than a simple cycle plant. (R2027)
It incorporates combustion turbine(s), but uses the 1,000 degree exhaust from that
combustion to create additional generation capacity. This is done through a heat recovery
steam generator, which converts incoming water into steam, using the pressure from that
expansion to turn a steam-turbine connected to another generator. (R2026-27) By adding
a steam cycle, a combined-cycle plant requires much more rotating equipment, systems to
handle the flow of water, and emission sources that are not present with a simple-cycle
design. (R2027-28)
10
A " l x l " design matches a single steam turbine for each gas turbine whereas in a "2x1"
design, two gas turbines are connected to a single steam turbine. (R10135)
1
* The Spring Canyon proj ect planned for a maximum capacity of 53 9 MW (R3 73 3,10127),
but the actual output varies with temperature. (R10135-37) For convenience, the capacity
has been referred to as 550 MW.
12
USA Power determined a 550 MW capacity was optimal for at least two reasons. A 550
MW facility would require the same number of individuals to operate as a 250 MW facility
and, therefore, the larger facility would be more economically efficient. (R2023) Also, a
capacity larger than 550 MW was not feasible due to the difficulty in obtaining an air permit
for a larger plant at that specific location based on the geological characteristics and its
proximity to Salt Lake, a non-attainment area. (R2023-24, 2061-63)
13
USA Power determined that Spring Canyon would be designed as a gas fueled plant
because a coal fueled plant would create air permit problems due to the site's location near
Salt Lake and Provo. (R2035-36,2061-63) There were two primary sources of natural gas
9

9

and zero water discharge technology. USA Power spent almost two years performing the
tests, evaluations and modeling to determine the design and configuration of the project.
(R2022, 2036, 2055-56, 2299-2303)
In reaching its decision as to the specific design of the Spring Canyon project, USA
Power commissioned and engaged in detailed studies that specifically evaluated the
feasibility of siting a power plant in Mona. First, USA Power commissioned an analysis
from Waldron Engineering (uWaldron") regarding whether a combined-cycle design should
be a lxl or 2x1 design. (RIO 135-37) The analysis explained and compared the relative
costs, advantages and disadvantages.

(R10135-36)

Further, the analysis included

performance data for the 2x1 configuration based upon various ambient temperatures at an
elevation of 5100 feet above sea level (Mona's approximate elevation). (R10137) In
in the area from a Kern River or a Questar pipeline. (R2037) USA Power evaluated the
topography relative to both pipelines and other pertinent characteristics, such as possible
interconnection points and pathways, and conducted discussions with the gas suppliers and
Nephi city officials. (R2037-40) After engaging in "a long analysis of a variety of different
ways of moving gas," USA Power eventually determined to proceed with Questar as its
supplier, connecting to Questar's "Mainline 104" pipeline. (Id.)
14
USA Power chose a combined-cycle design, rather than a simple-cycle design, because
it is more efficient, could be operated more often, and would provide generation capacity for
a base load, and not just peaking capacity. (R2029-30) Simple-cycle plants are relatively
easy to design and quick to build, but are inefficient and operated to provide "peaking"
capacity — jLe., electricity during those times of day when there is higher demand by
electricity users. (R2027-30)
15
There were many manufacturers of possible gas turbines and each had multiple models
from which to choose. (R2033) USA Power determined to use two General Electric, model
Frame 7FA gas turbines based on Utah's unique topography and the need for it to emit fewer
pollutants since it would frequently be started and stopped. (R2022, 2034-35)
16
USA Power chose to include duct firing, which uses ignited natural gas to quickly increase
the temperature of the gas turbine exhaust to create more steam that, in turn, increases
electrical output from the steam turbines almost instantaneously. (R2031) Of the many
possible types of duct burners available in the industry, USA Power opted for the largest size
possible without requiring one to be custom designed. (R2032)
10

particular, the performance data showed that, by using a duct burner with a chiller, the 2x I
configuration could still maintain output at 516.2 MW at Mona's elevation during summer
temperatures of 100 degrees. (RIO 137) Waldron also provided the technical engineering
and conceptual designs of the power plant (R1992, 10222-27)
USA Power and Waldron also engaged in lengthy, site-specific analyses as to the
appropriate cooling technology17 to use in a plant at Mona which had an elevation of 5100
feet and an arid climate with summer daytime temperatures that average above 90 degrees.
(R10260, 2050-55, 9244, 10275-80) The two types of cooling technology available - wet
cooling18 and dry cooling (also known as air cooling)19 - each had characteristics that
significantly impacted the cost and performance of a plant operating at the altitude and
ambient air temperatures of Mona, necessitating the extensive analysis of the two systems.
Wet cooling required a significantly lower capital investment in the equipment but required
ten times the water of dry cooled technology. (R2154-55, 5155-56) The time needed to
acquire sufficient water rights would significantly delay such development and increase the
cost of the project due to the scarcity of water in Mona. (R2051-53) Dry cooling, however,
could cost tens of millions of dollars more in capital investment for the equipment, but the
I7

In a combined-cycle plant, after steam has been used to turn a steam turbine, the steam
needs to be cooled so that it condenses into liquid form and then recycles back to the gas
turbine exhaust to repeat the steam-generation process. (R2050, 3706)
18
In a wet cooling system, water is used to absorb the heat through vaporization into the
surrounding air. (R2050,3704) Virtually all steam-electric plants built before 1990 used wet
cooling systems. (R3706)
19
Dry cooling technology carries the steam through a condenser on which a fan blows air
that transfers the heat from the steam into the ambient air without loss of water through
evaporation. (R2050, 3704, 8167 at 139-40) After 1990, dry cooling technology was
developed but was unusual for a 550 MW power plant operating at the altitude of the Mona
site. (R3705-06, generally, 4666-79)
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cost of and time to acquire necessary water rights would be significantly less, enabling the
development to be completed in a shorter time period. (R2051-53, 3706, 5155-56)
The decision whether to use dry cooling at a high altitude and ambient temperature site,
such as Mona, requires intense analysis due to the "energy penalties" associated with dry
cooling.20 "[T]he magnitude of this energy penalty is an important consideration in the
selection and design of a cooling system for a new power plant, especially . . . at a site with
high summertime temperatures." (R3705) Moreover, using a dry-cooling system is more
complicated and "minor changes in the size of the dry cooling system can produce major
changes in the power plant economics based on capital, operating and energy penalty costs."
(R3706) "[Mjeaningful energy penalty estimates are an essential element in economically
optimizing and comparing possible cooling system design alternatives." (R3706) "Without
this type of site specific analysis, the economic viability normally presented in the pro forma
of a proposed plant project would be incomplete." (Id.)
For these reasons, USA Power for over a year analyzed the appropriate cooling options
in connection with possible gas turbines21 and available configurations. (R4668-69) USA
Power analyzed, on a site-specific basis, both dry and wet cooling, the potential costs with

An energy penalty is the decline in electrical generating output resulting from a cooling
system's inability to maintain the desired steam condensate temperature for steam turbine
generator performance. (R3 704-05) The energy penalty resulting from dry cooling increases
with altitude. (R5155-56, 4669)
21
"[G]as turbine performance varies with altitude as well as ambient temperature" due to
the density of the air. (R4666, 4670, 6748) Indeed, gas turbines operate differently at Salt
Lake's elevation than they do at sea level. The evaluation of a gas turbine's performance is
"a site-specific evaluation which is not available to the public." (R2103)
12

each and the projected output and calculation of energy penalties.22 The energy penalties
were done with site-specific calculations in 2001 and 2002 by Ray Racine, Waldron's lead
engineer. Racine's calculations determined that a dry cooled plant with Spring Canyon's
configuration could nearly match wet-cooled performance even on the hottest days at Mona.
(R5155-56; 2153-59, 4667, 4669-70)

Those calculations and related information

demonstrated that dry cooling was economically viable in Mona, enabling USA Power to
acquire the water needed in a reasonable time and be prepared for online operation in 2005.
(R2051-53, 2157-59, 5155-56) Waldron's calculations and resulting conclusions were
considered by USA Power and Waldron to be confidential and proprietary. (R2103-05,
6400)23
C.

USA Power's Determination the Spring Canyon Project Would Be
Economically Feasible

USA Power commissioned, from Navigant Consulting, a study of the energy markets
in the western United States to confirm the economic feasibility of siting a power plant in
Mona. (R10138-10202) That study determined USA Power's planned development of a
plant in Mona would have access to power markets in at least seven western states and
confirmed it could provide electricity to at least two primary markets: the Utah and the
22

Waldron also specifically evaluated the potential water usage for a plant by modeling
"water tables" which demonstrated the amount of water that would be annually utilized either
by a dry-cooled or a wet-cooled plant of the size of Spring Canyon and the means of
discharging its effluent. This testing was particularly critical for a large industrial project in
a county with minimal water. (R1978-79, 3699-3714, 4676-78, 10391-403)
23
In addition to these efforts, USA Power hired a consultant team named ABB, which
performed a Fatal Flaw Analysis assessing the capacity of the existing substation in Mona.
(R1970) That analysis was specific to USA Power's planned 550 MW plant in Mona,
connected to the Mona substation, and a planned in-service date by the end of 2003.
(R10203-10221)
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Southern California Markets. (R10140-41) Navigant confirmed there was an ever-growing
demand for power in the Utah power market and the Mona substation had the capacity to
accommodate transmission of the needed power, but there were no planned or existing
facilities that could serve this growing power need in Utah. (R2103, 10138-55, 10191) It
provided similar analyses with regard to the Southern California Market. (RIO 148-54)
Navigant determined that the Utah market offered the best opportunity because of its
identified need for additional power that could not be met by PacifiCorp's or any other
developer's existing or planned power plants. (RIO 138-202) The study further estimated
fuel costs and market prices (RIO 182-89), concluding that Spring Canyon would have an
average annual "spark spread" (i.e., operating revenue after accounting for fuel costs) "of
$12.50 to $13.50 [per megawatt hour] during non-emergency market conditions." (Rl0189)
Accordingly, Navigant concluded that the Spring Canyon site had an "excellent opportunity"
to "strategically target markets," including the Utah market. (R10131, 10140)
USA Power used that analysis and extensive research regarding costs, including the
cost of using dry cooling, to develop economic proformas and cost studies over two years.
(R2187) Those proformas and studies demonstrated the project it designed and configured
on a site-specific basis for Mona was economically viable. (R3721-29, 3732-33)
D.

Acquisition of Assets for Spring Canyon Development

As of October 2001, there were major tasks that needed to be completed for the Spring
Canyon project, including the identification and purchase of water rights; preparation and
submission of documents to change the point of diversion for water rights with the Utah State
Engineer's office; preparation and submission of an application for an air quality permit;
14

assessment of the needs of local communities; identification of the plant's wastewater and
gas line transmission requirements; determination of the power transmission corridor and
route; and the preparation of development plans. (R1996, 1999, 2913-17, 3859)
By the beginning of 2003, USA Power, with Williams' assistance and advice, had
acquired the most critical assets for the development of the power plant which USA Power
had configured. USA Power had an option to purchase property .75 miles from the Mona
substation on which a power plant could be constructed and operated (Jan. 2002) (R985063), it had applied for an air permit for operation of a power plant (Feb. 2002) (Rl 0230-74),
USA Power had obtained a zoning variance to permit the operation of a power plant (July
2002) (R10235), the Utah Division of Air Quality ("UDAQ") had issued an air permit for the
operation of a 280 MW plant (Nov. 2002) (R9954-82), USA Power had options to purchase
the water rights necessary to operate a power plant at the Spring Canyon site (Aug. 2002)
(R2011, 2014-19, 9909-52), the Utah Division of Water Rights had approved a change
application for the water rights to be used at the Spring Canyon site (Jan. 2003) (Rl 0032-39),
USA Power had an interconnection agreement with PacifiCorp Transmission to interconnect
a power plant at the Spring Canyon site with the Mona substation (Sept. 2002) (R9983-86),
USA Power had a commitment from Questar to provide natural gas to the Spring Canyon
project (Sept. 2002) (R9988); and USA Power had obtained a final FERC determination that
Spring Canyon was an exempt wholesale generator. (R6842)
E.

USA Power's Spring Canyon Project Was Confidential.

Consistent with industry standards, USA Power took reasonable steps to keep the
compilation of information it created and obtained confidential (R3720, 3723), because the
15

secrecy of a project is "the life blood of a developer." (R1998) During discussions with
local officials, USA Power's principals spoke only in general terms but maintained the
secrecy of the details of their project. (R1972) While USA Power was required to disclose
general information about its project in its air permit application submitted to the UDAQ in
February 2002, it did not disclose USA Power's confidential information. (R1992-93,
10230). Indeed, as Rand Thurgood, PacifiCorp's director of Resource Development
testified, even though PacifiCorp had obtained a copy of the air permit in September 2002,24
it did not then have sufficient information to determine the validity of the Spring Canyon
Project. (R6383)
The critical aspects of the Spring Canyon project that would be necessary for a
competitor to create a competing project were never publicly disclosed. These included the
Project Performance Analysis (R3727, 10129-34); the analysis by Waldron as to a lxl vs.
2x1 configuration, their conceptual designs, and analysis of the energy penalty (R2102-03);
the power market study conducted by Navigant (R2103, 3726); the Fatal Flaw analysis by
ABB (R2103, 3727); the analysis of water requirements for the combined-cycle dry-cooled
plant (R2105,3728); sales contract showing location, price and option terms for water rights
in Juab County, with accompanying due diligence performed by Williams/HRO (R98719908, 2113,3728,9909-53); proforma economic assumptions, preliminary cost breakdown

24

The permit application, a publicly available document, disclosed general information
about USA Power's planned plant as was necessary to inform of the likely "impact that the
facility will have on the air quality in the area." (R2060, see 10232-274) This information
included the likely emissions, model of turbines that would be used, the maximum generation
capacity, and the site location. (R10235, 10240-43) Likewise, an ordinance to change the
zoning of the planned location for the Spring Canyon was a public record. (R2102, 10285)
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and detailed economic analysis amortizing initial investment and factoring the cost of fuel
supply, financing for a long-term power purchase agreement for Spring Canyon; and
financial proformas that showed the economic viability of the Spring Canyon project.
(R3726-29, 10041-10091,9990-93)
USA Power, moreover, required third parties to sign a Confidentiality Agreement
before USA Power disclosed its confidential information. That agreement prevented the
third party from using or disclosing the confidential information except for the purpose of
evaluating whether to enter into a business transaction with USA Power. (R2621-24) In
addition, USA Power designated its information as "Confidential." (R2107-08, 2178)
Confidentiality Agreements are standard in the industry to protect the competitive advantage
a developer has gained through their hard work and expenditure of resources. (R3723)
II.

Panda Energy.
During the time USA Power was developing its Spring Canyon project, Panda Energy

("Panda") was a competitor pursuing its own project with regard to the Mona substation.
However, Panda had a different approach than USA Power and was targeting a different type
of development. For example, Panda used a "merchant" development strategy without an
identified market before construction,25 and Panda's business model was to develop
extremely high-capacity generation projects, including gas-fired plants that would produce
more than 2,000 MW. (R1973, 3774-75) Panda's project for Mona targeted a 1,000 MW
25

A "merchant" project is high risk, in that the developer builds a large generation asset
without first identifying a guaranteed market for the additional power before construction,
based on the unspecified assumption the power will be sold on the wholesale market. The
Spring Canyon project was not a merchant project but instead had strategically targeted
markets. Indeed, its would-be equity investors did not invest in merchant plants. (R3 774-75)
17

wet-cooled plant26 (R2266,4602); Panda had determined dry cooling was not economically
viable in Mona. (R4608, 4616, 8615-16) Such large plants using wet cooling require an
enormous amount of water for cooling that would not likely be obtainable in arid Mona.
(R1976, 2267) Indeed, Panda's project would have required substantial capital investment
because the existing substation lacked capacity to handle a plant that large. (R1976)
Unlike the Spring Canyon proj ect, Panda's progress was limited. Panda never obtained
water rights, an air permit, rezoning, or a transmission agreement for the Mona substation,27
and never developed a financial analysis. (R3302-08,4709-20,4723-24,4728-29,5458-89,
7215-16, 10401-02) The only tangible assets held by Panda were options on land located
near the substation and meteorological data ("met data"). (R4728-29, 4709-20, 4723-24)
III.

USA Power Hires Williams as its Attorney to Serve on its Development Team.
In April, 2001, after deciding to develop a power project in Utah, but before its

selection of the exact site, USA Power began searching for a Utah attorney who specialized
in obtaining water for power generation facilities and who could provide comprehensive
representation concerning all aspects of the development and marketing of USA Power's
power project. (R1980-85, 1990)
That month, Ted and David met with Jody Williams, who was then a partner at the law
firm of Kruse, Landa & Maycock ("KLM") where Ted and Dave generally described the
nature of their power project, the need for comprehensive legal representation in the

26

Panda had no experience with dry-cooled projects. (R4616)
Spring Canyon's transmission agreement made it first in "queue," meaning it had priority
for transmission capacity over later developments, and a new project connected to the station
would be significantly disadvantaged due to the increased usage cost. (R2046-47, 3723)
27

18

development, and the need for all work to remain confidential and "under the radar/'28
By the end of April, Williams agreed to represent USA Power on all aspects of the
development of its power project. The scope of that representation is reflected in the "Client
Information Sheet" (R2691-92), the written retainer agreement (R2694-98), and the
statements for legal fees and costs. (R2818-64,2897-901, 2980-86, 2992-3039). Williams
never indicated or even suggested that she considered her representation to be limited in any
manner or that she was terminating her representation of US A Power. (Rl 9834,2280,256162,2571,3 746-48) Williams never advised USA Power that she had any conflict or potential
conflict of interest in representing it with regard to Spring Canyon. (R1750,1983-84,2069,
2091) In fact, USA Power would not have retained Williams had she indicated she had any
conflict of interest or attempted to limit her representation in any way. (R2331)
Williams actively represented USA Power from April 2001 through November 2003
on a broad range of matters dealing with the development of Spring Canyon. (R2694-98,
2801, R2 5211) Williams advised USA Power about "all of the issues associated with the
project that were then current and... how [USA Power] would move on to the next step with
each issue." (R2000-01) USA Power "did not make a move in Utah without asking Ms.
Williams for her opinion." (R1994) Williams'representation included: (1) being a member
of and regularly meeting with the USA Power Development Team regarding strategy and
planning (R2000-05); (2) the creation and registration with the State of Utah of the entity
Spring Canyon Energy, LLC to hold development assets of Spring Canyon (R2 851-53,313640, 3142-65, 2469-72); (3) negotiating and drafting an option agreement to purchase real
28

R1745-46, 2001-02, 2510-11, 2913-2920, R2 2911, 4636-37; see also R3748, 3767-68
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property in Mona (R2848-53, 2921-39, 3116-20, 5821, 3748); (4) assisting with the
necessary permits and studies to allow USA Power to build a power plant on its optioned real
property including annexation agreements, a zoning variance, and air permits and air credits29
(R2821,2831-35,2841-43,2859-64,2940-62, 3116-20, 3748, 2903-05, 2980-86, 3190-91,
2384-88); (5) obtaining the water rights required for Spring Canyon, including the time
consuming task of identifying and contacting possible sellers, researching the ownership and
priority of the potential seller's water rights, advising USA Power in the negotiations,
drafting the Option and Purchase Contracts for water rights, obtaining state approval of the
change in ownership of the water rights and change in the usage from surface water to
ground water;30 and (6) other related services, including assisting USA Power in contacting
PacifiCorp to obtain an interconnect study and interconnection agreement for the Mona
substation, keeping USA Power informed of the development of its competitor, Panda, and
working with local government to create public support for the project.31
Williams represented USA Power with regard to the Spring Canyon project while she
was a partner at KLM and after she became a partner at HRO in July 2002. When Williams
joined HRO, she brought Steve Vuyovich, who had been an associate at KLM and worked
on USA matters, with her where he continued to work on USA Power matters.32 Williams
requested that USA Power agree she could continue to represent it with regard to the Spring
29

Because USA Power's original air permit allowed a plant with only a 280 MW capacity,
USA Power intended to purchase air credits which would allow it to develop and operate a
525 MW plant. (R7347, 2070-75)
30
R2818-35,2841-43,2855-64,2907,2972-86,3000-06,3012-14,3167-91,5825-33,3748
3l
R2834-39, 2044, 2907-11, 3041-42, 2510-12, 2513, 2845-46, 2913-21, 2565-66, 2567,
2568
32
R2481-82, 2525-26, 2973-3005, 4854-57
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Canyon project and take USA Power files with her to HRO. USA Power agreed and its files
were transferred from KLM to Williams at HRO. (R2524-27, 2724)
HRO's representation of USA Power with regard to Spring Canyon began before
Williams joined HRO. In May 2002, Williams referred USA Power to a lawyer at HRO,
Blaine Rawson, to assist USA Power with air modeling issues for the air permit application.
Rawson represented USA Power on those issues, HRO was paid for those services (R27022717,3193-96), and Rawson continued to represent USA Power on various matters through
September 2003. (R2385-86, 2389-91, 2392-95, 2399, 2407-08, 2897-901)
USA Power paid nearly $100,000 for the legal services Williams/HRO provided in
their representation of USA Power on the Spring Canyon project. (R2818-64, 2897-901,
2972-86,2992-3019,3679)
IV.

USA Power and Williams/HRO's Marketing of the Spring Canyon Project.
In late Spring 2002, USA Power began to market Spring Canyon. Those efforts

included attempts to secure construction financing and an equity partner able to assist with
the development's completion, and finding a purchaser for Spring Canyon. (R10133)
To market the project, USA Power and Williams prepared a preliminary offering
memorandum in two binders that contained the confidential work product of US A Power and
its consultants.33 Williams/HRO discussed the confidential material in the binders with Ted,
Lois and Dave. (R2571-75, 2972-90, 3862-67)
Williams also was actively involved in USA Power's efforts to market the Spring
Canyon project to potential purchasers. She set up and attended meetings with third parties
33

R10127-291, 9848-10007; 2091-92, 2096-2102, 2106-2110, 4556-68
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such as UAMPS. (R1889, 2126-28, 2140, 2564, 4554-55, 3857-61) Williams, moreover,
was involved in and gave advice to USA Power in its negotiations with PacifiCorp regarding
the Spring Canyon project to PacifiCorp. For example, before USA Power's first meeting
with PacifiCorp on August 22, 2002, Williams provided Ted and Lois with advice about
negotiating strategies, the importance of having a confidentiality agreement, and the agenda
for USA Power and PacifiCorp's negotiations. (Rl 897-1901,2094-95,2339-42) After the
meeting with PacifiCorp, Ted and Lois again consulted with Williams. (R2139-40,2344-46,
1885-90,1893-96,1908) Before USA Power's next meeting with PacifiCorp on September
11, 2002, Williams agreed to call Rand Thurgood, PacifiCorp's director of Resource
Development, whom Williams knew from prior employment at PacifiCorp, and say "nice
things" about USA Power to facilitate negotiations. (R2089-91, 3041-42) In addition,
Williams encouraged USA Power to continue its negotiations with PacifiCorp. (R2345-46)
V.

PacifiCorp Contacts USA Power about Purchasing Spring Canyon and Obtains USA
Power's Confidential Information Pursuant to a Confidentiality Agreement.
In August 2002, Thurgood contacted USA Power and said he was interested in

discussing the Spring Canyon project. (R2079-80) At the time, Thurgood was investigating
opportunities for developing new power generation assets for PacifiCorp. (R8330-31)
Thurgood and his development team had never developed a combined-cycle or dry-cooled
power plant, and had experience only with minor power projects requiring minimal
permitting and site work. (R4699-70, 4701-02, 4828-29) PacifiCorp had not focused on
Mona as a site for a power plant. (R2118-19, 4514-15, 4705, 5088K-N)
USA Power's first meeting with Thurgood was held at PacifiCorp's Portland, Oregon
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office on August 22, 2002. USA Power described its basic vision for Spring Canyon, but
told Thurgood it would not divulge any further information until PacifiCorp signed a
Confidentiality Agreement.

It gave Thurgood a draft of a Confidentiality and Non-

Disclosure Agreement ("Confidentiality Agreement") to review with PacifiCorp*s corporate
counsel (R2082, 2084-86, 2621-24)
The parties met again on September 11,2002 at PacifiCorp's Salt Lake offices. At the
meeting, PacifiCorp signed the Confidentiality Agreement. In that Agreement, PacifiCorp
agreed it would be receiving confidential information about the Spring Canyon project:
[PacifiCorp] and USA Power will evaluate a . . . transaction relating to a power
project site development known as the Spring Canyon Energy LLC Generation
plant... and each will be receiving, reviewing, and analyzing information with
respect to the Potential Transaction that is confidential, proprietary, or otherwise
not publicly available. (R2621)
PacifiCorp further agreed not to use or disclose that confidential information for any purpose
other than evaluating a potential purchase of the Spring Canyon project or a partnership with
USA Power Partners. (R 2621-24, 4788-91)
After PacifiCorp signed the Confidentiality Agreement. USA Power shared Volumes
I (R10127-291) and II (R9848-10007) of its confidential information with PacifiCorp. Both
volumes were clearly stamped "Confidential." The confidential information in Volumes I
and II included the "site specific" reports and data from Waldron, including the "water
balance table" and "performance curves" for Spring Canyon, which made specific findings
regarding its cost, performance, water usage and any loss of efficiency for a dry-cooled plant
in Mona (Rl0275-84); Naviganf s Marketing Study addressing the need for a power plant
resource in Utah (R10131, 10138-202); a description of the project, including its land and
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water rights (R10129-30,10132-34,9850-953); engineering drawings of the proposed plant
layout (R10222-24); the Fatal Flaw Analysis (R10203-21); and a "marketing letter" from
Williams which described the acquisition and planned diversion of water (R9866-69).
At the September 11 meeting, Thurgood confirmed PacifiCorp's acute need for power
by April 2005 and its strong interest in acquiring Spring Canyon. (R2116-18, 10396-403)
Thurgood told USA Power it had a "competitive advantage" that would "take him 2-3 years
to duplicate and several million dollars." (R2116) Thurgood also confirmed PacifiCorp had
never considered using dry cooling in Mona until he saw USA Power's confidential
information showing it was viable. (R2114-15, 4517)
USA Power and PacifiCorp's negotiations and further disclosures of USA Power's
confidential information continued over the next six months. One of the main confidential
topics discussed during that time was USA Power's use of dry cooling. Beginning at the
September 11 meeting, Thurgood specifically asked USA Power to address his concerns
about the "loss in efficiency" - Le., the energy penalty - from using dry cooling at Mona.
(R2114-15) During these conversations, Thurgood was adamant dry cooling could not work
in Mona due to the energy penalty. (R 2141-43) The efficiency of dry cooling remained a
topic of conversation and resulted in further confidential disclosures by USA Power.
For example, Ted and Thurgood had a conversation for 96 minutes on November 21,
2002, which dealt with the specific issues of plant output and overall efficiency in light of
dry cooling. (R2141-43, 5843, 5902) On November 26, 2002, USA Power responded to
Thurgood's continued expression of doubt by delivering, subject to the Confidentiality
Agreement, a report commissioned by USA Power and conducted by Waldron, which
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specifically addressed loss of efficiency with dry cooling in Mona. (R2157-59,2664, 515556) In the report, Waldron stated the loss of efficiency from using dry cooling at Mona
would be less than 3%, even on the hottest days, and the additional capital cost to construct
the air-cooled condenser would be approximately $20 million. (R2141-43, 2153-59, 216465, 5155-56) These figures were not random or arbitrary; rather they were compiled after
more than a year of detailed testing by Waldron, which had evaluated and rejected various
options for the Mona site in order to find the correct plant combination in regard to output,
water usage and overall efficiency. (R2050-51, 2153-56, 4666-67)
The issue of dry cooling at the Mona site was again raised at a meeting on February
18,2003. Notes by Ian Andrews' (a principal engineer in Paci EiCorp' s resource development
group) of the meeting reflect direct communications with USA Power regarding its testing:
"air cooled vs. water cooled. . . looked at Hybrid. . . over 90 degree day almost mirror
water cool " (R5837) These notes reflect USA Power's February 18 statements that its
hybrid design (an air cooled condenser with inlet chiller) nearly matched the output of a
water-cooled facility even on the hottest days in Mona. (R5155-56)
At the February 18 meeting, USA Power also provided PacifiCorp with Volume III of
USA Power's confidential information- stamped "Confidential" -which contained detailed
cost information and financial proformas for their proposed combined cycle, dry-cooled plant
at Mona. (R10011-10090; 2172-73,4559-63) That work product represented years of work
by the principals of USA Power and its consultants in assessing costs and estimating
profitability. That information demonstrated Spring Canyon was financially viable. (R2159,
2181, 2223, 5155-56)

Volume III also contained a proprietary marketing study
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commissioned by USA Power indicating PacifiCorp would save "$20-$40 million per year'*
by building the Spring Canyon project at Mona, rather than buying power from independent
sources.34 (Rl0016-17)
After reviewing USA Power's confidential information, PacifiCorp, by early 2003,
acknowledged Spring Canyon was "the only viable project site that [was] capable of meeting
a 2005 online date" (Rl 0398,10400), and that "[ajbsent the USA Power site, [PacifiCorp is]
unaware of other entities capable of meeting an April 2005 date." (R10399) Thurgood also
acknowledged USA Power "had done so much work on the project that nobody stood a
chance to beat [it]." (R2217,4580)
VI.

PacifiCorp Decides to Build Its Own Power Plant in Mona. And Authorizes the
Purchase of Spring Canyon for that Purpose
PacifiCorp first memorialized its recommendation to build a plant in Mona in a January

9, 2003 memorandum. (R10391-95) The memorandum summarized the power need
identified by PacifiCorp's Integrated Resource Plan (the "IRP") and noted that "the single
most challenging aspect of the IRP, is the time frame in which the initial resources are
needed. The IRP requires 200MW of new peaking capacity in calendar year 2005 . . ."
(R10392) The memorandum further stated "[t]he only project that has any possibility of
meeting heavy load hour peaking for a 2005 or even a 2006 commercial date is the Spring
Canyon project." (R10394) The January 9 memorandum also recommended PacifiCorp
purchase the Spring Canyon project and represented that it could be acquired for $5 million

34

PacifiCorp's receipt and review of Volume III is confirmed by Ian Andrews' February 18
notes which referenced confidential financial data from Volume III, including "18% pre-tax
ROI" and "8% higher total cost for lxl vs. 2x1." (R5837-39)
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or less. There was no mention of Panda. (R10391-95)
In a later memorandum, dated February 5, 2003, PacifiCorp sought approval to
purchase Spring Canyon for up to $3.5 million and Panda's assets for $964,818.81.
(Rl 0396-403) The memorandum stated the purchase of Panda's assets was "expected to be
instrumental in negotiations with respect to the only known site that can accommodate
combined cycle construction to meet the April 2005 timeline" - Spring Canyon. (R10400)
Panda's assets included only two items of any actual value to PacifiCorp: one year of met
data and two real estate options. (R4710-20, 4728-29)
PacifiCorp's intent in purchasing Panda's assets was to gain a bargaining chip in its
negotiations with USA Power. (R2264,10400) The February 5 memorandum recommended
PacifiCorp utilize a combined cycle design, because it was "[t]he most cost effective resource
design for meeting the 2005 peaking need." (Rl 0400) PacifiCorp determined "[o] wning the
Panda position is critical to defining the limits of further negotiations with USA Power
because [owning Panda] provides PacifiCorp with a viable build option to meet the April
2005 peaking date (albeit with a simple cycle design.)" (Id., emphasis added) By
PacifiCorp's own admission, Panda's assets were not sufficient, alone, to permit PacifiCorp
to complete a more cost efficient combined-cycle power plant in time to meet the April 2005
deadline. (Id.) Rather, if PacifiCorp were to successfully acquire both Spring Canyon and
Panda, PacifiCorp could "combine the projects and immediately begin engineering to secure
a viable combined cycle build option for meeting the April 2005 target date for a peaking
resource." (Id.)
The recommendations in the February 5 memo were approved that same day. Bob
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Van Englehoven was selected to lead the development effort for the new plant to be built at
Mona - named "Currant Creek/5 (R4798,4811-13,4840) On February 24,2003, PacifiCorp
finalized its purchase of Panda's assets. (R5458-5489)
VII. PacifiCorp Agrees to Purchase Spring Canyon, Abruptly Reneges on its Agreement
Announces the Issuance of an RFP, and PacifiCorp's Reasons for Doing So.
At the February 18 meeting, PacifiCorp - which had already contracted with Panda verbally offered $5 million to purchase Spring Canyon's project, a fact confirmed in
Andrews' notes stating, "go on record with offer. USA Power asks that the offer be put in
writing." (R5837; 2173-76,4561-63) A series of written offers and counter offers followed
and, on March 14, 2003, PacifiCorp agreed to purchase Spring Canyon for $3 million and
a five-year development agreement, under which USA Power's principals would be
employed to assist in the development of other generation projects. (R2210-13,3259,3669,
4564-68)
PacifiCorp and USA Power agreed the parties would meet in Portland on March 17 to
finalize the deal. That very day, however, after USA Power's principals had already arrived
in Oregon to sign the agreement, PacifiCorp reneged via voicemail. (R2210-16, 4565-68)
PacifiCorp informed USA Power that it would issue a Request For Proposals ("RFP") to
"request and evaluate proposals from third parties to fulfill a portion of the supply-side
resource need identified in PacifiCorp's [IRP]." (R2 675, R2217-18, 4565) PacifiCorp
assured USA Power the RFP bid was "yours to lose" since it was the only project that could
be operational in time to satisfy PacifiCorp's projected power shortage in 2005. (R2217-18)
PacifiCorp and Thurgood had their own reasons for reneging on the agreement with
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USA Power and issuing an RFP. Scottish Power, the sole shareholder of PacifiCorp, was
unhappy with PacifiCorp's financial return through the Utah rate base, and constructing its
own plant in Mona based on its own development after winning the RFP would ensure
PacifiCorp would be allowed a return on the entire capital investment for development and
construction. (R3678-79) In addition, obtaining a return on a wholly-owned plant would
enhance PacifiCorp's assets if Scottish Power decided to sell PacifiCorp, which it did shortly
after Currant Creek was constructed. (R3331,3679) The Utah Public Service Commission
("PSC"), moreover, made it clear public utilities, such as PacifiCorp, could only earn a return
through rate base and not as independent power producers, which would be achieved if
PacifiCorp built its own plant after winning the RFP. (R3678-79, 3801-02) Thurgood also
had a personal stake in the matter. He was embarrassed that another company had developed
a power project in his backyard, and feared he may lose his job if PacifiCorp did not
"develop" and construct the plant in Mona. (R2115, 2303) Buying USA Power's project
would not meet PacifiCorp or Thurgood's objectives. (R3678-79, 3801-02)
VIII. Williams/HRO's Adverse Representation of PacifiCorp, Use and Disclosure of USA
Power's Confidential Information and Crucial Role in Obtaining Firm Water Supply
for Currant Creek.
Thurgood, with his and PacifiCorp's objectives firmly in mind, retained USA Power's
lawyers Williams/HRO to accomplish their objectives. Two weeks before PacifiCorp
reneged on its agreement with USA Power, Thurgood retained Williams/HRO to acquire
water rights for Currant Creek using the Panda location. (R2732) As both PacifiCorp and
Williams admitted, PacifiCorp could not win the RFP bid and be awarded the CC&N without
a firm water supply. (R3639, 6483 at n.7, 6484) PacifiCorp charged Williams/HRO with
29

the responsibility of acquiring the necessary water rights. PacifiCorp knew Williams/HRO
was representing USA Power and there may be a a conflict of interest but never considered
retaining any other water lawyer.35 Williams, based on the work she had done as USA
Power's lawyer, could quickly evaluate potential sellers and secure the necessary water for
PacifiCorp's competing project so PacifiCorp could be awarded the RFP. (R2334,3748; see
R2886-95)
Williams/HRO, before they were formally retained by PacifiCorp, disclosed some of
USA Power's confidential information to PacifiCorp. In February 2003, Williams, in a
conversation with PacifiCorp, disclosed the identity of the small pool of potential sellers of
water rights in Mona, the range at which these potential sellers may sell their water rights,
and the confidential purchase price that USA Power had purchased its water rights for Spring
Canyon - all confidential information Williams/HRO had acquired while representing USA
Power. (R7137, see also 2280-81, 2890, 8167 at 29-34)
Once Williams/HRO fomally began representing PacifiCorp, they used and disclosed
USA Power's confidential information to benefit PacifiCorp. Williams contacted the very
pool of potential sellers that she had developed on USA Power's dollar to attempt to
purchase water rights for PacifiCorp, including Noreen Harper (R2740-47, R2 2919); Don
Jones (R2744-47, 3061-63,2837-43,2848-57,2919); Nephi Irrigation (R7137,2837, 8167
at 33); and Michael Keyte (R3044-47, 2845-65). Williams helped Thurgood draft a
memorandum seeking approval from PacifiCorp to purchase water rights in which the
confidential range of potential purchase prices were disclosed. (R 2886-95, 8167 at 30)
35

R1831-32, 2334-35, 2423-24, 4737-40, 4775-76, 9832, 9866-69
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PacifiCorp offered exactly the same purchase price for water rights for Currant Creek that
USA Power had confidentially paid for its water rights. (R2280-81)
Williams also became a member of PacifiCorp's development team, just as she had
been a member of USA Power's development team. She attended the development group
meetings where all aspects of PacifiCorp's Currant Creek competing project were discussed,
such as Currant Creek being the cost based alternative to the RFP bids, including USA
Power's; the tight timeline for submitting competing bids; the critical need for water for the
competing project; water needs for wet versus dry cooling; the decision to use dry cooling;
the suitability of Mona as the site for the power plant; and the design of the Currant Creek
plant and the Spring Canyon project.36 Williams/HRO drafted documents to acquire water
rights for Currant Creek; reviewed change applications, including USA Power's; and advised
on matters relative to the development of Currant Creek. (R2550, 2732-2816 (2740-42,
2754-80), 2878-79,2886-95,3065-67) Williams testified she did not know whether she had
disclosed USA Power's confidential information to PacifiCorp. (R2543)
Williams/HRO's role in acquiring a firm water supply for PacifiCorp was pivotal.
Based on the work Williams had done and knowledge she had gained while representing
USA Power, Williams/HRO were able to "duplicate[] efforts for PacifiCorp in 20% of the
time that it took her to perform those efforts for [USA Power]." (R2334) By May 2003,
Williams/HRO was able to determine that there were no sellers of large quantities of water
rights that could be used in Mona. (R6762; 4835-36, 4966-74) Williams then devised a

36

R2462-63,2534-35,2544,2577,2580,2777-80,2782-83,2807-11,2866,2868-71,287879, 2886-95, 3044-47, 3055-59, 3643, 8167 at 30, 81-82.
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strategy to obtain water by drilling a new well at Mona (rather than piping it there) by relying
on water rights from a Utah Lake point of diversion.37 She also determined that this plan was
viable, as she told PacifiCorp, based on "Juab hydrology" and information from the "Ut.
Dept Nat. Res" showing Juab was only using a portion of its potential water. (R5839)
Williams/HRO was aware that placing a new well in Mona for Currant Creek threatened the
existing water rights owners in Juab County, including USA Power, by adding a new user
to the aquifer from a different point of diversion that had priority over existing users.
(R5506-08, 2580, 6421-23)
Mark Wangsgard and Bill White, the landowners who sold the water to PacifiCorp
from a remote site, gave Williams credit for being pivotal in the success of the unique
transaction to acquire water rights for PacifiCorp. They stated that Williams "saved the day"
because she "single handedly" overcame local opposition and regulatory obstacles. (R306567) From their perspective, the deal "would not have been possible without her." (Id.)
Williams/HRO never told USA Power they were representing PacifiCorp on its
competing power project or sought its consent. (R2279-80,2559,3749) PacifiCorp was the
more lucrative, long-term client for Williams/HRO. (R2732-816)
IX.

PacifiCorp" s Preparation and Submission of a Competing RFP Bid in an Unrealistic
Time Frame and Use of USA Power's Confidential Information to Win the RFP.
In connection with its intention to issue the RFP, PacifiCorp began preparing its

competing project to submit a bid in the RFP. PacifiCorp called it the Next Best Alternative
("NBA") - Currant Creek - which ostensibly was to be a virtual bid to evaluate the cost of
37

0n May 12, 2003, according to the notes of Ian Andrews, Jody Williams first suggested
that PacifiCorp "[d]rill @ Mona use Utah Lake water" (R5839)
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each submitted proposal. (R684)
The standard in the industry for developing the type of power project for which
PacifiCorp was going to submit an RFP bid is 18 to 24 months.

PacifiCorp had

approximately 4 months in which to develop its project and submit a bid. (R2686, 6378-79,
3729-31) PacifiCorp, when it began, did not have three of the four critical components
necessary to develop a power project and win the RFP - a firm water supply, an air permit
and a fuel supply. (R3732, 5088X; see 3705) PacifiCorp also had not done any site specific
testing to site a plant at Mona or to verify dry cooling was viable at Mona. (R4518-20; 370709, 3730-32, 4831-32, 4844-45) At the time, PacifiCorp had no guaranty it could acquire
sufficient water rights for a wet-cooled plant in arid Mona and only had USA Power's
confidential information that a dry-cooled plant there was economically viable. PacifiCorp
nonetheless moved forward with the RFP requiring a connection to the Mona substation and
took significant steps developing its own project sited at the Panda site in Mona. (R3730-31)
PacifiCorp relied on USA Power's analyses of dry cooling in moving forward with
developing Currant Creek. Andrews, two days after meeting with USA Power on February
18, sent an email to Robert Van Englehoven, who was charged with selecting an engineer
to develop Currant Creek, telling Van Englehoven in the Scope of Work for engineers to
"stress dry cooling experience " and u experience with inlet chillers on F class machines. "
(R4841-42, 5012) Both of these were unique characteristics of Spring Canyon project.
PacifiCorp did not interview engineers for the Mona project until April 17, 2003.
After it selected Shaw, Stone & Webster ("Shaw"), Shaw met with Thurgood's
development team, on April 24, 2003, to "kick off' the development effort of the Mona
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project. An initial task list was passed out at that time as "a first attempt to bring
organization" to the project. Thurgood, in discussing the future organization of the "Mona
Project/' told his development team that "we need a very clear trail of how we arrived at the
Mona site" (R4962; 4824-26) As of April 24, PacifiCorp still had not performed any onsite modeling or testing at the Mona site, had not yet independently calculated the "energy
penalty" for developing a dry-cooled plant at this site or at this elevation, and had not done
a detailed water balance study. All of these are critical tasks that are done prior to the
selection of a site - not afterwards. (R4518-20, 4831-32, 4844-45, 3707-09)
On May 16, 2003, PacifiCorp formally switched Currant Creek to dry cooling.
(R4966-74, 4976-77, 9131) At the time, however, PacifiCorp had not obtained the tests
ultimately required to evaluate wet vs. dry cooling to determine if dry cooling was
economically viable in Mona. (R4131,6993-99) The initial decision to pursue a proj ect with
dry cooling, before the formal approval, was made when PacifiCorp possessed only USA
Power's site-specific performance evaluations.38 Only preliminary calculations had been
requested of PacifiCorp's engineers before May 16 and Shaw's performance evaluations
regarding dry cooling and the proposed Currant Creek plant, including performance curves,
were not received until well after May 16. (R4128-32, 4967-73, 6993-7000) Thurgood's
request that the Current Creek project be switched to dry-cooling does not rely upon any site-

38

PacifiCorp's request on May 7, 2003 that the engineering firm Burns & McDonnell
("Bums") do an "independent valuation" of wet vs. dry cooling (R4833-34, 4964) was
pretextual. Bums did not do a detailed, site specific evaluation of the different possible plant
configurations, and PacifiCorp did not rely on the preliminary testing in making its decision.
(R9159) As Thurgood testified regarding that preliminary testing, "it was a very cursory
study done very quickly, [in] a week or two's time frame." (R9159)
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specific studies of the economic feasibility in Mona from any engineer retained by
PacifiCorp. (R4966-73) From May 16 forward, Currant Creek was pursued as a dry-cooled
plant requiring approximately 400 a/f of annual water use, as opposed to a wet-cooled plant
requiring 4,000 a/f. (R4966-74, 4976-77)
On June 6,2003, PacifiCorp issued the RFP seeking a resource with base and peaking
power using the Mona substation that could be online by spring 2005. (R2 673-78, 679-99)
All bids were required to be submitted by July 22, 2003. The RFP expressly stated
PacifiCorp would "maintain the confidentiality of all bids." (R2 678; R681) The RFP also
noted that u[a]ffiliate companies of PacifiCorp may not respond to this RFP." (R681)
PacifiCorp indicated it would use the NBA to evaluate the cost of each proposal. (R684)
PacifiCorp would "award weighting based upon how the bid cost compares to the cost of the
NBA." (Id.) PacifiCorp, however, stated it was "unlikely that any 'virtual' project will win,"
because a virtual bid has no real assets and is used to evaluate other bidders. (R2231-32)
USA Power, on July 18,2003, submitted four pricing proposals in response to the RFP
using its Spring Canyon project as the site for the generation facility. (R5196-210) The
pricing proposals were for both peaking (with duct burners) and baseload (without duct
burners) production that could be online by May 1, 2005. (R5199-200) At the time of the
submission, USA Power was the only bidder that had already developed a power project to
interconnect with the Mona substation. (R5200)
PacifiCorp submitted its competing bid - Currant Creek - on July 22. It was identical
in all material respects to Spring Canyon. (R2294-97, 3733) The most noteworthy
similarities (and change from the prior Panda project) was that the project was now 525 MW
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and dry cooled. The identical items include the size and capacity of the plant; the location
of plant (Juab County: one mile west of Mona); the use of a dry-cooled condenser; the
combined-cycle combustion design; the size and brand of gas turbines (GE 7FA);
configuring the turbines in a 2x1 design; source of fuel (natural gas) that was connected to
Questar's Mainline 104, rather than Kern River's, pipeline; using "zero discharge" waste
technology; peaking capability through the use of duct burners to increase capacity of the
steam turbines to a level that "is approximately the same"; the cost of project (approx.
$340M); and the use of the same lawyers William/HRO. (R2294-2312, 3733)
As USA Power's expert opined: "It is unreasonable for PacifiCorp to claim it
independently performed the work within 4 months when development of a similar project
typically requires (at minimum) 18 to 24 months." (R3729) PacifiCorp used USA Power's
confidential information (and lawyer) to develop its competing project. (R3729-34)
PacifiCorp did not return USA Power's confidential information before it prepared its
competing bid for Current Creek. Despite USA Power's request for PacifiCorp to return its
three binders of confidential information, PacifiCorp only returned Volume I on March 26,
2003. (R2238-44, 6645) PacifiCorp did not return Volume II until the day it submitted its
competing RFP bid. (R2344, 6283) PacifiCorp never returned Volume III. (R2242-45)
In addition, to ensure there was no trace of PacifiCorp's use of USA Power's
confidential information, Thurgood deleted all emails regarding Spring Canyon. (R4802-03)
Moreover, Thurgood's notebook which detailed his work from September 2002 to September
2003 was conveniently "lost" even though all his other work notebooks were available.
(R4799-4800)
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X.

PacifiCorp Awards Itself the Contract, Spring Canyon Is Ranked Second, and There
Is No Room for Another Plant in Mona.
The PacifiCorp Board of Directors in September 2003 approved the Currant Creek

project for construction.39 (R3326-28) USA Power's bid came in second. (R2 4265, 5842,
5847, 5337, 4695-96) PacifiCorp did not announce that it had awarded itself the RFP bid
until November 3, 2003 when it filed an application with the PSC for a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity ("CC&N") to construct the Currant Creek plant. (R2275-76)
During the course of the proceedings before the PSC, Thurgood admitted to Ted "we
learned a lot from you guys." That comment was in response to the observation by Ted that
PacifiCorp's Currant Creek project was materially identical to Spring Canyon. (R2303-04)
The PSC awarded PacifiCorp the CC&N to construct Currant Creek on March 5,2004.
(R5283-309) It is not technically or economically viable to have more than one power plant
in Mona. (R2328, 2866, 2907, 3643, 3723, 3787)
XL

USA Power Discovers Williams/HRO's Secret Representation of PacifiCorp.
Sometime between November 4 and November 6, 2003, Keyte, from whom USA

Power had purchased its water rights, phoned Ted to inform him that he had witnessed
Williams publicly appearing as counsel for PacifiCorp at a meeting with hostile owners of
water rights in the Mona area. (R2281-82) Williams/HRO's representation was confirmed
shortly thereafter by newspaper press releases, fid.)
On November 6, 2003, USA Power emailed Williams demanding an explanation for

39

Even though PacifiCorp secretly accepted its own bid in September, it continued to have
discussions with USA Power about two of its bids until late October. (R2271-75, 2688-89,
3229-31)
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her representation of PacifiCorp, expressing "grave disappointment" at the representation,
and expressly noting USA Power's concern that Williams/HRO's representation of
PacifiCorp would inevitably and irreparably harm USA Power's interests and existing water
rights. (R2 5211) Williams/HRO never responded to USA Power's email - instead, they
informed PacifiCorp that USA Power was mad about Williams/HRO representing a
competitor and continued to represent PacifiCorp on the Currant Creek project in its efforts
to have a CC&N issued. (R2782-84, 3076, 2589-91, 7147 (at "6)"))
XII. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and the District Court Decision.
On February 18,2005, USA Power filed suit against Williams/HRO, and on October
26, 2005 filed its Second Amended Complaint joining PacifiCorp as a defendant. (Rl-21,
759-939) USA Power alleged claims against PacifiCorp for (1) violation of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act, (2) breach of contract, (3) breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, (4) intentional interference with existing contractual relations, and (5) unjust
enrichment (R779-87). USA Power alleged claims against Williams/HRO for breach of (1)
the fiduciary duty of loyalty and (2) the fiduciary duty of confidentiality. (R783-85).
On April 30, 2007, PacifiCorp moved for summary judgment on all USA Power's
claims against PacifiCorp.40

(R8555-98) On January 30, 2007 and April 30, 2007,

Williams/HRO filed motions for summary judgment on USA Power's claims for breach of
the fiduciary duties of loyalty and confidentiality. (R1690A-1690C, 4392-94) USA Power

40

USA Power disagrees with the independent and alternative grounds on which the district
court granted summary judgment on the intentional interference, unjust enrichment, and
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing claims, but does not seek reversal of
this part of the ruling, or revival of these three claims.
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opposed PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's motions for summary judgment with memoranda,
an extensive record, and in oral argument. (R3927-89, 5904-95, 6004-130, 8167-68)
On October 15, 2007, the district court released a memorandum decision granting
PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO *s motions for summary judgment on all USA Power's claims,
leaving only a breach of the fiduciary duty of loyalty claim to the extent it sought the remedy
of disgorgement. (See generally R7599-7624) As an initial matter, the district court ruled
USA Power failed to "specifically controvert" the vast majority of PacifiCorp's statements
of "undisputed fact" ("Statement") as required under Rule 7 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. (R7603-05) The district court ruled USA Power's identification of disputed
inferences flowing from PacifiCorp's "undisputed material facts" did not "specifically
controvert" those facts as contemplated by Rule 7. (Id) Based on that ruling, the district
court deemed substantially all of PacifiCorp's "undisputed material facts" admitted. (Id.)
Based on the "deemed admitted" ruling, the district court granted summary judgment
on the claims against PacifiCorp by concluding: (1) for the trade secret claim, that it was
undisputed USA Power did not have a trade secret and PacifiCorp did not misappropriate a
trade secret of USA Power and (2) for the breach of the confidentiality agreement claim, that
it was undisputed PacifiCorp did not use USA Power's confidential information. (R7606,
7611-12)

The district court also granted summary judgment on the claims against

Williams/HRO by concluding: (1) on the breach of the duty of confidentiality claim, it was
undisputed Williams/HRO did not use or disclose USA Power's confidential information and
(2) on the breach of the duty of loyalty claim, it was undisputed that no breach of the duty
of loyalty caused USA Power damage. (R7618-21)
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the district court's summary judgment in favor of PacifiCorp
and Williams/HRO and against USA Power on the grounds there are disputed issues of
material fact with regard to each element of each claim on which the district court
erroneously ruled the facts were not disputed and found defendants were entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. In reaching its conclusion as to each claim, the district court erroneously
ruled PacifiCorp's statement of facts were not disputed, failed to draw reasonable inferences
in USA Power's favor, weighed the evidence, determined credibility and ignored the
voluminous record USA Power submitted demonstrating there were disputed issues of
material fact precluding summary judgment.
As a general and broad sweeping error infecting the district court's entire ruling, the
court erroneously deemed PacifiCorp's statement of purported "facts" admitted under Utah
Rule of Civil Procedure 7 and, based on that error, concluded PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO
were entitled to summary judgment. USA Power, in compliance with Rule 7, stated verbatim
each of PacifiCorp's purported "facts" it disputed, explained the grounds for the dispute and
cited admissible evidence demonstrating the dispute. In addition, USA Power, as authorized
by Rule 7, presented by paragraph with record citation, additional disputed facts
demonstrating there were disputed issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.
The district court compounded that broad, sweeping error by erroneously failing to
draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to USA Power. Based on the
disputed and undisputed facts, reasonable inferences could be drawn in USA Power's favor
which demonstrated there were disputed issues of material fact on each element of each
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claim on which the district court granted PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO summary judgment.
The district court, contrary to Utah law, also weighed the evidence and made credibility
determinations between the evidence presented by defendants and by USA Power, ruling that
PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's evidence was more credible than USA Power's admissible
evidence, which the district court completely disregarded by labeling it "speculative."
The district court, moreover, erred with regard to its specific rulings on each of USA
Power's primary claims against PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO.
Trade Secret Claim Against PacifiCorp. The district court erroneously ruled, as a
matter of law, that there was no evidence USA Power had a trade secret. USA Power
demonstrated, with citation to admissible evidence, it had a trade secret consisting of the
whole of its secret and proprietary compilation of elements of the Spring Canyon project,
which took years and millions of dollars to create. The Spring Canyon project, as a whole,
derived great value from not being generally known or ascertainable by proper means, and
demonstrated a 550 MW power plant designed as an air (not water) cooled, gas-fired,
combined-cycle plant in a 2 x 1 configuration with F7 A GE turbines and duct firing was both
technologically feasible and economically viable at Mona, Utah.
The district court also erroneously ruled, as a matter of law, that there was no evidence
PacifiCorp misappropriated a trade secret of USA Power. USA Power, with citation to
admissible evidence, demonstrated PacifiCorp misappropriated its trade secret, including
based on evidence that PacifiCorp had access to the trade secret and that PacifiCorp's
Currant Creek development was similar in all material respects to Spring Canyon.
Breach of Confidentiality Agreement Claim Against PacifiCorp. The district court
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erroneously ruled there was no evidence PacifiCorp breached its Confidentiality Agreement
with USA Power.

USA Power, with citation to admissible evidence, demonstrated

PacifiCorp used USA Power's confidential information for its own benefit in violation of the
Confidentiality Agreement based on the same evidence which demonstrated PacifiCorp
misappropriated USA Power's trade secret.
Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Confidentiality Against HRO/Williams. The district
court erroneously ruled there was no evidence Williams/HRO used and/or disclosed USA
Power's confidential information.

USA Power, with citation to both direct and

circumstantial evidence, demonstrated Williams/HRO used and disclosed USA Power's
confidential information, including the confidential purchase price USA Power paid for its
water rights, the refined pool of potential sellers of water rights, and the range of prices for
water rights that Williams/HRO had learned and developed while representing USA Power
and for which USA Power paid over $100,000. USA Power also demonstrated that wellreasoned authority from other jurisdictions would permit a jury to infer use and/or disclosure
from the sole fact that Williams/HRO simultaneously and adversely represented USA
Power's direct competitor, PacifiCorp.
Breach of the Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty Against HRO/Williams. The district court
erroneously ruled there was no evidence any breach of Williams/HRO's duty of loyalty
caused USA Power to suffer any damage. USA Power, with record citations to admissible
evidence, demonstrated that, but for Williams/HRO's breach of fiduciary duty, there is a
reasonable likelihood PacifiCorp would have purchased the Spring Canyon development
from USA Power for $3 million and a Joint Development Agreement or, in the alternative,
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but for Williams/HRCT s breach, there is a reasonable likelihood USA Power would have won
the RFP and been awarded a long term power purchase contract.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY APPLIED
STANDARDS GOVERNING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

THE

LEGAL

As a general and broad sweeping error underlying the district court's entire ruling, the
district court erroneously applied summary judgment standards. First, the district court
erroneously deemed admitted virtually all PacifiCorp's statements ofpurportedly undisputed
facts when USA Power, in compliance with Rule 7, directly disputed those facts by
explaining the basis of its dispute and providing supporting record cites. Second, the district
court erroneously failed to draw all reasonable inferences concerning issues of material fact
in USA Power's favor. Third, the district court erroneously made credibility determinations
and weighed evidence in favor of PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO, disregarding USA Power's
admissible evidence as "speculative."
A.

The District Court Erroneously Applied Rule 7.

Under Rule 7, to dispute a summary judgment movant's purported statement of fact,
the non-movant must include in its opposition memorandum: (1) a "verbatim restatement
of each of the moving party's facts that is controverted;" (2) an "explanation of the grounds
for any dispute;" and (3) "citation to relevant materials" in support of the dispute. Utah R.
Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). The requisite explanation of the dispute is satisfied when a party
identifies the evidence necessary to facilitate the district court's assessment of genuine issues
of fact for trial. Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp.. 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994). Only
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when a nonmovant fails to controvert a statement in this manner will a statement properly
be deemed admitted. Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(A). Indeed, as applied in Utah, a statement has
been held to not have been controverted only in the clearest cases, such as when a nonmovant
wholly fails to respond to a movant's statement,41 does not explain the dispute,42 does not
even refer to the movant's statement of uncontroverted facts,43 or provides no evidence or
citation to any evidence.44
Not one of these deficiencies is present in this case. USA Power quoted verbatim each
of PacifiCorp's statements, explained the grounds for its dispute, and provided citation to
admissible supporting evidence. (R5913-35) USA Power also presented additional disputed
and undisputed statements of material fact ("Disputed and Undisputed Facts"), by numbered
paragraph with record citation, in accordance with Rule 7(c)(3)(B), further demonstrating
genuine issues of material fact that must be decided by the jury. (R5935-64) Consequently,
USA Power complied with Rule 7, and the court's contrary ruling was error.

41

See Lovendahl v. Jordan Sch. Dist. 2002 UT 130, If 50, 63 P.3d 705 (finding failure to
controvert where plaintiff failed to discuss defendant's argument or supporting facts in its
opposition to summary judgment).
42
See Bluffdale City v. Smith, 2007 UT App 25,ffl[10-11,156P.3d 175 (upholding district
court's finding of failure to controvert because defendants "did not include a coherent
explanation of the grounds for the dispute as required," and largely failed to provide any
supporting citations); Fannen v. Lehi City. 2005 UT App 301, n. 1,2005 WL 1530517, at * 1,
n.l (upholding deemed admission of facts where plaintiff did not respond to defendant's
motion for summary judgment).
43
See Fennell v. Green. 2003 UT App 291, H 7, 77 P.3d 339 (finding failure to controvert
where plaintiff "did not refer to Defendants' statements of uncontroverted facts, but instead
included only his own statement of undisputed facts. As a result, it was unclear what facts
[plaintiff] contended were disputed.").
^See Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.. 2003 UT 23, f 41, 70 P.3d 904 (plaintiff
"did not provide any evidence to contradict or rebut the properly supported fact in
[defendant's] motion for summary judgment....").
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The district court's conclusion that USA Power improperly "argu[ed] about the
implication of the facts asserted instead of 'specifically controverting' them with the factual
record" in violation of Rule 7 is erroneous. Rule 7 does not require the nonmovant to
"specifically controvert" the movant's statement of facts.45 Rule 7 only requires the nonmovant to dispute the statement of fact, with explanation and evidentiary support, which is
what USA Power did.
Moreover, even to the extent some of Pacificorp's statements only contained "facts"
in the true sense of the word,46 it was nonetheless proper under Rule 7 for USA Power to

5

The district court gave no indication of what was required to "specifically" controvert a
fact separate and apart from the explanation of the grounds of a dispute as actually required
by Rule 7, nor upon what authority it relied to impose such a requirement. The district court
appears to have borrowed this language from PacifiCorp. Although PacifiCorp cited to Rule
7(c)(3)(A) as the basis for this quote (R6679), in actuality Rule 7(c)(3)(A) has never
contained any requirement that a statement of fact be deemed admitted if not "specifically"
controverted.
46
In some instances, PacifiCorp expressly, rather than implicitly, included self-serving
nonfactual assertions and inferences in its statements of fact, including in Paragraphs 1, 2,
4, 5, 7, 8, 16, 17, 22, 23, and 25. (R8560-71)
For example, in paragraph 2, PacifiCorp stated its characterization of Mona as "ideal
for a combined cycle plant." (R8561) Using the term "ideal," played into PacifiCorp5s
argument that USA Power's analyses of the feasibility of siting a plant in Mona were not
valuable because Mona was an obvious location for a power plant. USA Power responded
to paragraph 2, without contesting the undisputed portions of the paragraph (i.e., that (1)
Panda secured options to purchase land; (2) natural gas pipelines existed in Mona; and (3)
the substation was in Mona). USA Power did, however, dispute the inference that the Mona
site was an "ideal" and, therefore, obvious and cited to extensive evidence to that effect,
including that in September 2003 PacifiCorp was skeptical of the suitability of Mona as a
power plant site (R2114) and that Mona's temperate climate and scarcity of water created
obstacles for a power plant developer in (a) obtaining sufficient water rights to use traditional
wet-cooling methods, or (b) determining whether dry-cooling methods would be
economically feasible in Mona's high-altitude, temperate conditions (R3705-09, 2050-52).
(R5914) Nonetheless, the district court ruled USA Power failed to "specifically controvert"
Paragraph 2, and deemed it admitted in its entirety, including PacifiCorp's disputed
inferences and argument that Mona was an ideal (obvious) site. (R7603-04)
45

explain its dispute of the inferences PacifiCorp implicitly sought drawn in its favor based on
those facts. This is true because, even where a particular fact may be undisputed, a genuine
issue of material fact exists when the reasonable inferences to be drawn from that particular
fact are disputed. Ellsworth Paulsen Constr. Co. v. 51-SPR-L.L.C. 2008 UT 28,ffif17,21,
183 P.3d 248; Wasatch Oil & Gas. L.L.C. v. Reott 2007 UT App 223,ffif31, 35, 163 P.3d
713. USA Power had no choice but to identify and dispute the inferences PacifiCorp sought
drawn from particular undisputed fact, or risk those inferences being deemed admitted as
undisputed fact.
For example, in Paragraph 13, to support the inference that the Spring Canyon project
did not consist of any confidential information, PacifiCorp stated that Spring Canyon's
public air permit application (entitled a "Notice of Intent" or "NOI") "laid out many of the
details of [Spring Canyon]," and listed some disclosed elements. (R8565-66 (emphasis
added)) In compliance with Rule 7, USA Power responded by expressly stating that
Paragraph 13 was "[n]ot disputed, except for the material omissions," and listed eleven of
the confidential elements of Spring Canyon neither disclosed by the NOI nor identified in
Paragraph 13, with citation to supporting evidence. (R5924-26) These omitted facts were
also set forth in detail and with record citations in USA Power's Disputed and Undisputed
Facts. (R5940-48, 5952-53, 5963) USA Power, therefore, presented evidence that all its
confidential information had not been publicly disclosed, which directly disputed the
inference that PacifiCorp sought the district court to draw from Paragraph 13.
Despite USA Power's compliance with Rule 7, the district court deemed Paragraph 13
admitted, ruling that the "undisputed material facts demonstrate that plaintiffs' concept,
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vision and claimed confidential information were of public record, and were disclosed to
PacifiCorp by the public record."47 (R7605) Thus, the district court improperly drew in
PacifiCorp's favor the exact inference USA Power expressly disputed, because the district
court ruled that all USA Power's confidential information, not just the information described
in Paragraph 13, was disclosed to the public.48 Ellsworth. 2008 UT 28,ffi[17, 21; Wasatch
Oil, 2007 UT App 223,ffif31, 35.
Similarly, in Paragraph 20, to support its argument that Panda, not Spring Canyon, was
the foundation of Currant Creek, PacifiCorp stated: "PacifiCorp utilized the project assets
that Panda had started assembling in late 2000 and early 2001, . . . to . . . construct the
Currant Creek power plant on the Panda site." (R8567-68) In response, USA Power
disputed the inference that the limited assets PacifiCorp may have utilized would, by
themselves, have enabled PacifiCorp to develop Currant Creek without utilizing USA
Power's trade secret:
The only value acquired from Panda was the land options and the Met data. See
Response to paragraphs 3, 4 and 7. . . . Currant Creek [] was a much different
resource based upon size and cooling technology [Exs. 10, 294; Koltick Rpt at
18 (Ex. 429) In fact, PacifiCorp did not submit an NOI for Currant Creek until
47

Notably, such a ruling is internally inconsistent with facts that the district court did not
deem admitted. In its dispute of PacifiCorp's paragraph 14, which the district court did not
deem admitted, USA Power expressly stated, with supporting citations, that the "details"
disclosed by USA Power's application for an air permit were not "laid out with sufficient
specificity to permit any reverse engineering of the plant. Nor did the description show the
technical feasibility or financial viability of the project." (R5926) Nonetheless, regarding
Paragraph 13, the district court ruled that all USA Power's confidential information was part
of the public record based on PacifiCorp's identification of USA Power's "public filings and
application for an air permit." (R7605)
4g
Significantly, the district court drew this inference even though PacifiCorp did not provide
an evidentiary basis to establish anything other than what was expressly described in
Paragraph 13.
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August 2003, six months after it purchased Panda's assets and well after it had
obtained USA Power's confidential information. [Ex. 4] (R5929)49
Despite USA Power's explanation of, and record support for, its dispute of Paragraph
20, the district court deemed paragraph 20 admitted, ruling that Panda's assets were "pivotal
to PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek" (R7604), and "the design, engineering and
construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was not based upon nor utilized any
information from or about [USA Power]." (R7605) In doing so, the district court again
improperly drew the exact inference in favor of PacifiCorp which USA Power disputed.
Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28,ffi[17, 21: Wasatch Oil 2007 UT App 223,ffif31, 35.
The district court repeated this pattern of deeming facts and adverse inferences
admitted regarding PacifiCorp's statements 1,2,3,5,6,7, 8,9,10,11,13,17,20,21,22,23,
24,25, 26, 27, 28, and 29. The court erroneously did so although USA Power, with respect
to each of those paragraphs, explained the dispute, cited admissible supporting evidence and,
in addition, provided specific facts in its Disputed and Undisputed Facts, showing genuine
issues of material fact on each of the critical issues the court found in favor of PacifiCorp.
As such, this Court should reverse summary judgment on all USA Power's claims.
B.

The District Court Erroneously Weighed Evidence and Failed to Draw
Reasonable Inferences in USA Power's Favor.

On summary judgment, a court must draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence
49

In addition, USA Power, in its Disputed and Undisputed Facts, detailed the facts
demonstrating why Panda was not the foundation for Currant Creek, including that (1) Panda
had concluded a dry-cooled plant was not economically feasible in Mona; (2) Panda's plant
was a 1000 MW plant that was wet, not dry, cooled; and (3) Panda had no air permit, water
rights, transmission agreement, site-specific preliminary engineering showing the feasibility
of a dry-cooled plant, or cost studies or proformas showing the financial viability of a 2x1
combined cycle, air cooled, 550 MW plant in Mona, Utah. (R4608,4616,5918-19,5950-52)
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in the non-movant's favor. Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 625 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991). A court must even draw reasonable inferences m the non-movanf s favor based
on otherwise undisputed facts if more than one plausible but conflicting inference can be
drawn from that fact and other evidence presented. Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy. 2008
UT 15, Tf 19, 179 P.3d 786; Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ^ 21; Wasatch Oil 2007 UT App 223,
1fl[ 31, 35; see 10A Charles A. Wright, et al., Fed. Practice & Proc. § 2725 (3d ed. Westlaw
2008) (summary judgment not proper "merely because the facts [movant] offers appear more
plausible than those tendered in opposition"). Such conflicting inferences give rise to a
genuine issue of material fact, precluding summary judgment. Uintah Basin, 2008 UT 15,
Tf 19; Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28,ffif19-21. It is only when the nonmovant fails to present any
evidence to refute a factual inference in favor of the movant that a court may grant summary
judgment. Ellsworth, 2008 UT 28, ^ 19.
On summary judgment, a court likewise cannot weigh the parties' evidence. Webster
v. SilL 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983); Wasatch Oil, 2007 UT App 223, If 35. A court
improperly engages in evidence weighing if, for example, it considers the persuasiveness of
one plausible inference versus another, even if those inferences are based on undisputed fact,
Wasatch Oil, 2007 UT App 223, ]f 35, or if it determines the nonmovanf s evidence is
speculative absent an evidentiary ruling that such evidence is inadmissible. See Fairview
Hosp. & Health Care Servs. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 535 N.W.2d 337,341 (Minn.
1995) (en banc). The latter is true because a non-evidentiary determination that such
evidence is speculative is tantamount to a determination it is not credible. Id.
Here, USA Power presented admissible evidence that directly contradicted many of the
49

inferences PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO sought drawn in their favor from their purported
statements of undisputed fact, requiring the district court to hold that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to the inferences to be drawn from those facts. Ellsworth, 2008 UT
28, Tf 19. However, contrary to Utah law, the district court compared the parties' conflicting
evidence and consistently concluded that USA Power's admissible evidence and the plausible
inferences based thereon were not persuasive or credible when compared to PacifiCorp's and
Williams/HRO's statements of undisputed fact.
For example, PacifiCorp urged the district court to draw the inference that Currant
Creek was entirely the product of PacifiCorp and Shaw's independent efforts, and, therefore,
not misappropriated from USA Power, based on the purported undisputed fact in Paragraph
21 that "Currant Creek was designed, engineered and constructed for PacifiCorp by
Shaw/Stone & Webster." (R8568) USA Power disputed this with evidence showing neither
PacifiCorp nor Shaw conducted the preliminary design steps of site-specific feasibility
studies, without which such a power project cannot be sited and developed. (R5929-30) In
addition, USA Power detailed facts giving rise to the reasonable inference that PacifiCorp
did indeed misappropriate its confidential information to develop Currant Creek, including
that (1) PacifiCorp decided to develop Currant Creek and committed millions of dollars to
its development before it ever hired Shaw (R3730-33, 4824-26, 4846, 5016); (2) Shaw did
not perform the critical tasks that are done prior to selection of a site and plant configuration,
such as calculating the site-specific energy penalty for a dry-cooled plant or creating a
detailed water balance test until after PacifiCorp made the decision to develop a dry-cooled
plant in Mona and after PacifiCorp had USA Power's confidential information (R3707-09,
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4128-32,6993-7000); (3) PacifiCorp did not hire Shaw until four months before the RFP bid
was due when it takes 18-24 months to develop a power plant project such as Currant Creek
(R3729-32); (4) the Apex Plant is not located in Mona, Utah or anywhere near Mona, Utah
and its site-specific modeling and evaluations have no application to Mona (R4827-28; 210205, 3705-09); (5) PacifiCorp itself did not have the experience or knowledge to develop a
combined cycle dry-cooled plant such as Currant Creek (R3707, 3729-32, 4699-702); (6)
PacifiCorp was motivated to issue an RFP and misappropriate USA Power's confidential
information to win the RFP (R3678-79, 3801-02, 3331); and (7) PacifiCorp concealed its
misappropriation (R4802-03, 4799-800).50
USA Power's evidence, and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn therefrom,
created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Currant Creek was entirely the product
of PacifiCorp and Shaw's independent efforts and not misappropriated from USA Power.
However, the district court ruled it was undisputed that "the Currant Creek Power Plant
represents PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work." (R7604)51 Stated another
Despite the evidence, including expert opinion, that PacifiCorp could not have determined
to develop a 550 MW plant in Mona and designed it as a dry-cooled plant in the four months
it had to submit a bid and without conducting the critical testing which was not performed
by it or Shaw before all decisions were made and put in motion, the district court disregarded
that evidence and inference and found in PacifiCorp's favor by ruling: "Plaintiffs' argument
that PacifiCorp could not have developed Currant Creek in four months without use of their
trade secrets, that PacifiCorp did not test for dry-cooling and therefore could not have made
the decision to go with dry-cooling until reviewing their claimed dry-cooling trade secrets
is nothing more than argument, opinion and theory." (R7609)
51
The district court also improperly ruled that it could not draw the inference in USA
Power's favor that PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's trade secret from the facts
PacifiCorp had access to the confidential information and the similarity of Spring Canyon
and Current Creek "because the undisputed facts establish the design development
construction, location and component parts and their arrangement are not secret, are all well
known in the industry and the similarities can be found in almost every combined cycle
51

way, the district court ruled not only that PacifiCorp's statement of fact was undisputed, but
also that the inference to be drawn therefrom was undisputed as well, despite USA Power
having "presented] evidence to refute the inference." Ellsworth. 2008 UT 28, ^ 19.
Indeed, the only way the district court could rule the absence of misappropriation was
undisputed was to wholly disregard USA Power's contrary evidence, which the court did by
labeling USA Power's evidence as speculative. Specifically, the court ruled USA Power's
evidence of misappropriation, a portion of which the district court set out in the better part
of three pages of its ruling, was "a stretch," "nothing more than argument, opinion and
theory," and "pure speculation" and "conj ecture" in light of the undisputed facts. (R7607-11)
The district court's determination that USA Power's evidence of misappropriation was
speculative was an improper determination regarding the credibility of that evidence, not an
evidentiary determination that such evidence was inadmissible. FairviewHosp.. 535 N. W.2d
at 341; see also Shaw Res. Ltd. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.CL 2006 UT App. 313. ^f 67,
142 P.3d 560 (Bench, J., dissenting) ("the main opinion holds that... the disputed facts are
merely speculative or conjectural. I respectfully suggest that, in so holding, my colleagues
have engaged in the process of weighing the evidence."). Indeed, the district court did not
rule any evidence preferred by USA Power was inadmissible, denied a motion to strike some
of that evidence, and, there being no cross-appeal filed, there is no question on appeal as to
the admissibility of any of USA Power's evidence.
In sum, USA Power presented admissible evidence from which the jury could

power plant built in the industry." (R7609 (emphasis added)) This was erroneous because
the district court disregarded USA Power's facts disputing that conclusion.
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reasonably infer, not speculate, that PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's trade secret.
See Scott v. HK Contractors. 2008 UT App 370,ffij17, 26, _ P.3d _ (reversing summary
judgment where plaintiff presented evidence from which jury could infer, rather than
speculate, causation of plaintiff s injuries). Based on that evidence, the district court should
have allowed USA Power the opportunity to present its case to the jury and allow the jury to
draw its own conclusions. Id. at If 16.
Instead, the district court continually rejected USA Power's evidence, and the plausible
inferences to be drawn therefrom in USA Power's favor, as speculative, finding no triable
issues of fact on at least one essential element of each of USA Power's claims. (R7603-21)
By simply discrediting USA Power's evidence and inferences that contradicted the
"undisputed" facts, rather than ruling such evidence and inferences created genuine issues
of material fact for trial, the district court erroneously weighed the persuasiveness of such
evidence and inferences to grant summary judgment against USA Power on all its claims.
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the grant of summary judgment.
II.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE DISTRICT COURT'S GRANT OF
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON USA POWER'S TRADE SECRET AND
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIMS BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED IN RULING USA POWER'S CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION WAS
NOT A TRADE SECRET USED BY PACIFICORP.
To recover under the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, USA Power only needs to

present evidence supporting: (1) the existence of USA Power's trade secret; (2) USA
Power's communication of that trade secret to PacifiCorp under an obligation that PacifiCorp
not use or disclose it; and (3) PacifiCorp's misappropriation of the trade secret. See Utah
Code Ann. § 13-24-2; Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co.. 505 F. Supp. 2d
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1178, 1184 (D. Utah 2007).52 Here, the district court erred in finding that USA Power failed
to show issues of fact on the first and third elements of the trade secret claim and regarding
PacifiCorp's use of confidential information in breach of the Confidentiality Agreement.
A.

The District Court Erred in Ruling USA Power Failed to Establish the
Existence of a Trade Secret Because USA Power Presented Evidence of its
Trade Secret on This Fact Intensive Issue and The District Court Focused
Exclusively on Whether Each Individual Constituent Element, Rather
Than the Compilation, Was Known or Generally Ascertainable.

USA Power set forth in detail, by paragraph and with citation, the information that
constitutes its trade secret. That information is more than sufficient for a jury to find USA
Power had a trade secret as defined by the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the "Act").
USA Power's trade secret is the collection of modeling, studies, evaluations, testing,
end results, and conclusions that USA Power spent almost two years and millions of dollars
performing and compiling, which demonstrated that, on a site-specific basis, a 550 MW plant
designed as an air (not water) cooled, gas-fired, combined-cycle plant in a 2 x 1 configuration
with GE F7A turbines, duct firing, and zero discharge technology was both technologically
viable and economically feasible at Mona, Utah. The totality of the development work,
conclusions and results which formed USA Power's trade secret were shared with PacifiCorp
pursuant to a Confidentiality Agreement from September 11,2002 to March 2003. (R2091 -

5

The law protects trade secrets against misappropriation by another "as a means to
encourage investment in research by providing an opportunity to capture the returns from
successful innovations." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39 cmt. a (1995).
Absent this protection in the law, there would not have been the same incentive for USA
Power to develop Spring Canyon. PacifiCorp, in turn, would not have been in a position to
construct a plant necessary to meet its 2005 power need, would have been required to
purchase power from independent sources and, therefore, would have incurred the additional
cost (likely passed on to Utah rate payers) of "$20-$40 million per year." (Rl 0016-17)
54

1225 2621-24) The confidential data included confidentially designated Volumes I-III
(R10127-291, 9848-10007, 10011-90) and written and oral information, including Ray
Racine's letter of October 29, 2002. (R5155-56) USA Powers trade secret disclosed to
PacifiCorp includes the site-specific modeling and performance curves developed by USA
Power's engineer, which demonstrated the output for a dry-cooled 550 MW plant at the
altitude, ambient air temperatures and water supply in Mona. The research by USA Power
and its engineer showed that dry cooling was feasible based on the specific findings
regarding the cost and despite the loss of efficiency of using dry cooling versus wet cooling.
(R3705-06, 4666-79, 4956-58, 10135-37) The trade secret included the water table tests
performed by Racine. (R4950, 4952-54,4676-79) USA Power's trade secret also included
the market and itemized cost analysis that showed the first in the queue position at the Mona
substation gave USA Power access to lucrative markets for which there were no planned or
existing plants for the new power requirements. (R2171-72, 3721-25, 4560-62, 10041-90)
The trade secret included pro forma financial information representing years of work in
assessing costs and estimating profitability. (R2187)
USA Power's expensive and time consuming work and resulting information was not
off-the-shelf information or information that could be simply superimposed from another
facility, such as Apex, located in a different area with different site conditions. (R3705-09,
2102-05,6312-13)
USA Power's trade secret fits squarely within the definition of a trade secret under the
Utah Uniform Trade Secret Act, which defines a trade secret as:
information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
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technique, or process, that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2 (West 2004).
First, the existence of a trade secret is a factually complex question that should be
decided by a jury; it should not normally be decided as a matter of law on summary
judgment.53 Indeed, "a 'trade secret' is one of the most elusive and difficult concepts in the
law to define." Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys. Inc.. 342 F.3d 714, 723 (7th
Cir. 2003) (quoting Lear Siegler. Inc. v. Ark-Ell Springs. Inc.. 569 F.2d 286, 288 (5th Cir.
1978)).54 "For this reason, the question of whether certain information constitutes a trade
secret ordinarily is best resolved by a fact finder after full presentation of evidence from each
side." Id (quoting Lear Siegler. 569 F.2d at 289).
In this case, the issue of the existence of a trade secret should have proceeded to trial.
USA Power presented substantial evidence that its trade secret provided to PacifiCorp,
pursuant to the Confidentiality Agreement, derived independent economic value from not
being generally known or readily ascertainable to PacifiCorp. That evidence included the
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See, e.g.. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co.. 505 F. Supp. 2d 1178, 1184-1187 (D. Utah 2007);
Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan. 872 P.2d 487, 494 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also Harvev
Bamett. Inc. v. Shilder. 338 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003) ("Trade secret status is a
question of fact.") (applying Colo, adopted Uniform Trade Secrets Act).
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Cases from other jurisdictions that have also adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act are
persuasive authority in Utah. See State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Utah 1993)
(interpreting Utah Uniform Securities Act and stating adoption of uniform law in Utah
includes a "mandate" to follow majority rule of other jurisdictions that have adopted the
uniform law.)
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following facts: (1) it took USA Power's engineers nearly two years to shape the essential
nature of Spring Canyon through evaluating various plant configurations and characteristics
to find the most successful combination of attributes, including feasibility of dry cooling, the
size and design of the turbines and their configuration, the size of the plant, the site for the
plant, and the amount of required water (R1970, 2051-55, 2105, 3724-25, 4666-79, 1013537, 10203-21); (2) it took USA Power over two years to compile the financial information
and proformas showing Spring Canyon was financially viable (R2187); (3) PacifiCorp had
never developed, designed or built a dry-cooled or combined-cycle project in Utah, and
PacifiCorp's development team, led by Thurgood, had never developed a combined-cycle
power project (R2141-43,2153,3707,3730,4699-702); (4) USA Power's work, evaluation,
modeling, testing and the results of that work were never revealed to the public (R2102-13,
3726-30, 8167 at 243-45); (5) PacifiCorp admitted that USA Power's air permit application
by itself did not contain enough information to even determine the validity of the project
(R6382-83); (6) PacifiCorp, after USA Power filed its application for an air permit, signed
a Confidentiality Agreement to gain access to USA Power's trade secret (R2621-24); (7)
PacifiCorp, after USA Power filed its application for an air permit and water change
application, and agreed to pay $3 million for the Spring Canyon project plus execute a Joint
Development Agreement with the principals (R2210-13, 4564-68, 3258-61, 10401); (8)
PacifiCorp, after USA Power filed its application for an air permit and water change
application, admitted that Spring Canyon was the only viable option to meet the projected
power shortage in 2005 (R10398); (9) PacifiCorp, when it approved the purchase of Panda,
admitted Spring Canyon was the only viable option to meet the 2005 deadline (Rl 0396-403);
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(10) PacifiCorp admitted that USA Power's work and results provided "a competitive
advantage that would take PacifiCorp two to three years and several million dollars to
duplicate" (R2116-17); (11) PacifiCorp was under a 4-month deadline to submit a bid for
a competing project at the Mona site when it generally took 18-24 months and millions of
dollars to complete such a development, particularly considering the elevation, water
availability and ambient temperatures of Mona (R2050-55, 2103, 2116-17, 3704-09,
3721-23,3729-31,4666,4670,4748,9244,10260,10275-80,10392); (12) PacifiCorp hired
Shaw, and Shaw did not perform any performance evaluations until well after PacifiCorp
made the decision to site Current Creek as a dry-cooled plant at Mona, after PacifiCorp had
USA Power's confidential information and one month before the RFP bid was due (R412832,4518-20); (13) the Apex Plant is not located in Mona, Utah or anywhere near Mona, Utah
and its site-specific modeling and evaluations have no application to Mona (R4827-28; 210205, 3705-09); (14) the only assets of any value PacifiCorp acquired from Panda were land
options and met data (R2264,4710-20, 4728-29, 5471, 10400), and Panda had determined
an air cooled plant at Mona was not economically feasible (R4608-09,4616, 8615-16); and
(15) a second power plant of Spring Canyon's size would not be economically viable or
technically feasible in Mona (R2328, 2866, 3723, 3786-88, 2045-48, 3643, 6448).
Second, the district court erroneously focused on whether each individual, constituent
element of the Spring Canyon project was known or readily ascertainable in the industry,
rather than the overall combination itself

Under the statute, compilations, formulas,

processes, and patterns can be trade secrets so long as the combination itself derives
economic value from not being readily ascertainable by others through proper means and is
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subject to reasonable efforts to keep it secret. Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4) ("Trade secret'
means information, including a . . . compilation . . . . " ) ; see Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v.
Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d 1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1994) (reversing summary judgment
on trade secret claim and holding it is error to examine whether the elements of a system,
rather than the "system as a whole," was trade secret).
A confidential combination remains a trade secret even if some of its constituent parts
are generally known. For example, "[t]he complete formula for Coca-Cola is one of the bestkept trade secrets in the world," even though "most of the ingredients are public knowledge
. . . . " Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. The Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del. 1985).
In fact, a trade secret can consist entirely of publicly known constituent elements.55
Here, the district court erred because it ignored whether the combination created by
USA Power was a trade secret, and evaluated only whether some parts of that combination
were known or readily ascertainable. (R7608-11, 8167 at 220-23) By basing its decision on
an analysis of Spring Canyon's constituent elements, rather than the project as a whole (and,
as previously described, finding it was undisputed some of those elements were known or
ascertainable when there is evidence to the contrary), the district court erroneously concluded
USA Power presented insufficient evidence of its trade secret. (R7605-11)
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As the Tenth Circuit has held "a trade secret can include a system where the elements are
in the public domain but there has been accomplished an effective, successful and valuable
integration of the public domain elements and the trade secret gave the claimant a
competitive advantage." Rivendell 28 F.3d at 1046; Harvey Barnett 338 F.3d at 1130
(reversing summary judgment due to issues of fact); see DSMC Inc. v. Convera Corp., 479
F. Supp. 2d 68, 78 (D.D.C. 2007) ("The ability to combine these elements into a successful
. . . process, like the creation of a recipe from common cooking ingredients is a trade secret
entitled to protection.") (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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Third, the district court erroneously disregarded the aspects of USA Power's trade
secret on the basis they might have been eventually ascertained by PacifiCorp without regard
to the time restraints of this case. (R7606, 7610-11) It is one thing to eventually ascertain
details of USA Power's Spring Canyon project; it is quite another thing to pull that
information together in time to build a dry-cooled, combined-cycle power plant in Mona that
must be on-line by April 2005. USA Power presented credible evidence that, because the
time frame to complete a project eligible to compete for the RFP contract was so short,
PacifiCorp could not have independently replicated USA Power's feasibility studies in time,
and hence, could only obtain the information by purchasing Spring Canyon or the improper
means of theft. See supra, Statement of Facts ("SOF"), Part IX.
Finally, the district court completely failed to account for PacifiCorp's admission that
it received non-public "confidential information" from USA Power regarding the Spring
Canyon Project. After PacifiCorp obtained USA Power's air permit application, it signed
the Confidentiality Agreement on September 11, 2002, in which it agreed that PacifiCorp
"will be receiving, reviewing and analyzing information with respect to the Potential
Transaction that is confidential, proprietary, or otherwise not publically available."
(R2621 (emphasis added)) The district court did not examine or explain that written
admission even though it, alone, negates PacifiCorp's argument that the Spring Canyon
information USA Power shared was readily ascertainable from public sources.
B.

The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment When USA
Power Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which a Jury Could Infer the
Fact of Misappropriation.

USA Power presented circumstantial evidence from which a jury could find that
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PacifiCorp misappropriated USA Power's trade secret.
A defendant misappropriates a trade secret when it uses or discloses another's trade
secret without express or implied consent. Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2). As the lower court
acknowledged, there will rarely be a "smoking gun" in cases of trade secret misappropriation
because "any direct evidence on this point would . . . be firmly in the defendant's control."
Sokol Crystal Prods.. Inc. v. DSC Commons Corp., 15 F.3d 1427, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994). As
such, "requiring direct evidence would foreclose most trade-secret claims from reaching the
jury because corporations rarely keep direct evidence of their use ready for another party to
discover." Stratienko v. Cordis Corp.. 429 F.3d 592, 601 (6th Cir. 2005).
While this Court has not directly addressed the issue, it should expressly adopt the rule
implemented by many other jurisdictions, including the United States District Court for Utah,
that aplaintiff/nonmovant must show only evidence of the defendant/movanf s access to the
trade secret and similarity in the product or design to survive summary judgment on the issue
of misappropriation.56 Stratienko. 429 F.3d at 600 (noting, in addition to the Sixth Circuit,
standard has been adopted by the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Federal
Circuits); accord Hammertoe No. 2:06-CV-00806 TS, 2008 WL 2004327, at *9 (applying
access and similarity rule to Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act, noting "courts generally allow
the use of circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation of trade secrets").57
56

This Court has also, implicitly, recognized the possibility of using circumstantial evidence
in this manner to prove misappropriation. See Hammerton. Inc. v. Heisterman. No. 2:06-CV00806 TS, 2008 WL 2004327, at * 10 (D. Utah May 9, 2008) (noting Utah Supreme Court
in Water & Energy Svs. Tech.. Inc. v. KeiL 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 1999), "implicitly recognized
the possibility of using circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation").
57
See. e.g.. Leggett & Piatt. Inc. v. Hickory Springs Mfg. Co.. 285 F.3d 1353.1361-62 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Pribvl. 259 F.3d 587, 596 (7th Cir. 2001); Sokol
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Here, although the district court correctly stated circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation could be used to withstand summary judgment, it reached the wrong
conclusion that a jury could not infer misappropriation from access and similarity. It is
undisputed that PacifiCorp had access to USA Power's trade secret information. (See
R6283, 9848-10007, 10011-10090, 10127-10291) USA Power also presented substantial
evidence of the similarity between Currant Creek and Spring Canyon, including the opinions
of multiple experts that the two projects were materially identical, and PacifiCorp's own
admission to USA Power that "we learned a lot from you guys." (R2303-04, 3733, 3784)
For example, PacifiCorp's Currant Creek plant is (1) located immediately adjacent to the
Mona Substation right next to the site USA Power selected for the Spring Canyon
development. The projects are "the same in all material aspects," including but not limited
to: (2) dry cooling; (3) zero wastewater discharge; (4) natural gas source is Questar's
Mainline 104; (5) same fuel transmission path; (6) same interconnection at the Mona
Substation; (7) same voltage for interconnect at 345 kV; (8) same capacity steam turbine
generator; (9) gas combustion turbines are GE Class 7FA frame-type; (10) "two on one"
combined cycle configuration; (11) each gas turbine's nominal rated capacity is 140 MW;
(12) additional duct burner capacity is approximately the same; (13) total plant capacity is
approximately the same; and (14) both projects used the same attorney and law firm. (See,
e.g.. R3733, 2293-302, 2732-34, 3025-27, supra. SOF, Part IX) Further, USA Power
presented evidence that PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek in four months would
not have been possible without misappropriating USA Power's trade secret. (R3724-25,
15F.3datl432.
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3729-32, supra. SOF, Part IX at 36)58
Moreover, the level of similarity shown need only be sufficient to support a reasonable
inference that a trade secret was used. In Hammerton. an employee received a copy of his
employer's customer list shortly before leaving the company. 2008 WL 2004327, at *2. The
former employee formed his own company and began manufacturing products, which
competed in the same small but lucrative market; his former employer filed suit claiming,
inter alia, misappropriation of its trade secret customer list. Id at * 1. The court ruled there
were issues of material fact regarding whether the employee misappropriated his former
employer's customer list, precluding summary judgment, even where only 27% of the
customers on the employee's new list were also on the plaintiffs list. Id. at * 10. Here, USA
Power has presented evidence well in excess of the similarity in Hammerton.59
Finally, even if this Court does not adopt the two part test for determining
misappropriation - access and similarity, USA Power presented additional compelling
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation requiring a jury to decide the issue, including:
1.

PacifiCorp did not have the experience or knowledge to develop Currant Creek:

(a) PacifiCorp had no prior experience developing a dry-cooled plant in Utah, and its
development team had no experience in developing a combined-cycle power plant of any
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A defendant's development of a similar project in a greatly expedited pace and at a greatly
reduced cost further supports the inference that the defendant has misappropriated a
plaintiffs trade secret. See, e.g.. Pribyl 259 F.3d at 596; Rivendell 28 F.3d at 1046;
Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation. 358 N.E.2d 804 (Mass. 1976).
59
Cf Computer Assocs. IntT v. Quest Software Inc.. 333 F. Supp. 2d 688, 696 (N.D. 111.
2004) (stating defendants' access to trade secret software source code "acted as a guide . . .
to develop a competing product [which] alone, even without actual copying, likely rises to
the level of misappropriation").
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type (R3707,3729-32,4699-702); (b) PacifiCorp did not complete the critical tasks that are
done prior to selection of a site and plant configuration such as calculating the site-specific
energy penalty for developing a dry-cooled plant or creating a detailed water balance test
until after PacifiCorp made the decision to develop a dry-cooled plant in Mona, after it had
committed millions of dollars to its development, after it had rejected all site alternatives, and
after PacifiCorp had USA Power's trade secret;60 (c) PacifiCorp did not acquire the assets
from Panda that would have enabled it to develop a combined-cycle, dry-cooled power plant
such as Currant Creek; Panda was a 1,000 MW wet - not dry - cooled power plant that had
no water rights, air permit, site specific testing for a diy-cooled power plant, zoning variance
or any other critical elements for the development of what became Currant Creek (R4602;
see supra. SOF, Part II); (d) PacifiCorp made the decision to develop Currant Creek and
was moving forward with its development before it hired Shaw, and Shaw did not perform
any critical testing, evaluating or modeling until after PacifiCorp made the decision to
develop in Mona and use dry cooling (R3730-33,4824-26,4962,4846, 5016); (e) 48 hours
after receiving USA Power's confidential proforma information demonstrating the economic
feasibility of Spring Canyon and taking detailed notes of the information, PacifiCorp issued
a directive that, in hiring an engineer for Currant Creek, "to stress dry cooling experience"
and "experience with inlet chillers on F Class machines," both of which were key and unique
characteristics of Spring Canyon (R5012; 2172-73, 4559-61, 4841-42, 10129); and (f)
PacifiCorp admitted it "learned a lot" from USA Power after the RFP process had concluded
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R3707-09, 3730-32, 4518-20, 4844-45, 4831-32, 5379-91, 3721-23, 6312-13, 3705-06,
2102-05, 8167 at 239-40, 9159, 10401-02; see supra, SOF, Part IX
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(R2303-4).
2.

PacifiCorp developed Currant Creek in an unrealistic time period: (a) a power

plant project such as Currant Creek takes 18 to 24 months to develop, yet PacifiCorp
developed its project and submitted its RFP bid within four months (R3729-32); (b)
PacifiCorp admitted in September 2002 that USA Power had a 2-3 year competitive
advantage over PacifiCorp (R2116); and (c) in January and February 2003, PacifiCorp
identified Spring Canyon as the only viable project that could meet an on line date of April
2005 to meet its projected power shortage (R10391-403).
3.

PacifiCorp was motivated to issue an RFP and misappropriate USA Power's

trade secret to win the RFP: PacifiCorp was pressured by the Utah Public Service
Commission to develop and build its own power plant in Utah (R33315 3678-79, 3801-02),
pressured by its shareholder, Scottish Power, to get a higher return on its investment from the
Utah Public Service Commission by developing and constructing its own power plant (id),
and Rand Thurgood was personally motivated not to have another company develop a power
plant project in PacifiCorp's backyard. (R2115, 2303)
4.

PacifiCorp covered-up its misappropriation: PacifiCorp destroyed all emails

relating to Spring Canyon, "lost" Rand Thurgood's notebook which described his work
during the critical period of time between Fall 2002 and Fall 2003, and its development team
leader emphasized "we need a very clear trail of how we arrived at the Mona site" when
(Spring 2003) PacifiCorp jettisoned its deal with Spring Canyon. (R4803, 4799-800)
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C.

Summary Judgment on USA Power's Claim for Breach of Contract Was
in Error Because USA Power Presented Evidence That PacifiCorp
Breached the Confidentiality Agreement.

The district court erred in concluding that USA Power "failed to present any evidence
that PacifiCorp used its confidential information" and, on that basis, granting summary
judgment on USA Power's claim for breach of contract. (R7611-12) As an absolute
precondition to divulging any of its confidential information to PacifiCorp, USA Power
required PacifiCorp to sign the Confidentiality Agreement. (R2082-86, 2106-07,2621-24)
Under the Confidentiality Agreement, PacifiCorp agreed not to use or disclose USA Power's
confidential information except solely for purposes of evaluating the potential sale of the
Spring Canyon project to PacifiCorp. (R2621)
PacifiCorp breached that contractual obligation. As described in subsection B above
regarding misappropriation, USA Power presented evidence from which a jury could
reasonably infer PacifiCorp used USA Power's confidential information to develop Currant
Creek. Because that evidence was unquestionably sufficient to create an issue for trial, this
Court should reverse summary judgment on this claim.
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE GRANT OF SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY
OF CONFIDENTIALITY BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT IGNORED
BOTH DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF
WILLIAMS/HRO'S DISCLOSURE AND/OR USE OF USA POWER'S
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION AND ESTABLISHED AN ERRONEOUS
RULE OF LAW.
To establish its claim for Williams/HRO's breach of the fiduciary duty of

confidentiality, USA Power must present evidence that Williams/HRO: (1) obtained
confidential information during its representation of USA Power; and (2) used and/or
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disclosed that information without USA Power's consent and for PacifiCorp's benefit. Shaw
Res. Ltd.. L.L.C. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.C.. 2006 UT App 3 1 3 4 29. 142 P.3d 560;
Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 60(1 )(a) (2000).
USA Power presented evidence that Williams/HRO obtained confidential information
during the approximately 2.5 years it represented USA Power with regard to all aspects of
its development of Spring Canyon, including the identity of viable sellers of water rights,
water options, and the price USA Power paid for Spring Canyon's water rights.61 The district
court properly ruled that the issue of whether Williams/HRO obtained confidential
information was an issue of fact for the jury. (R7617-18)
USA Power also presented evidence Williams/HRO disclosed to PacifiCorp and used
for PacifiCorp's benefit USA Power's confidential information without USA Power's
consent. The district court, however, erroneously granted Williams/HRO summary judgment
on the element of breach, ruling that USA Power failed to present "actual evidence" that
Williams/HRO disclosed or used USA Power's confidential information.62 (7618-19) This
Court should reverse that ruling because: (a) USA Power presented actual, direct evidence
that Williams/HRO communicated USA Power's confidential information to PacifiCorp and
used USA Power's confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit, creating a triable issue
of fact; (b) USA Power presented actual, circumstantial evidence that Williams/HRO
communicated USA Power's confidential information to PacifiCorp and used USA Power's
61

Williams/HRO's fiduciary duty of confidentiality to USA Power extends "to all
information relating to the representation, whatever its source." Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.6
cmt. 3; Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 59 (2000).
62
Although the district court did not clarify what "actual evidence" meant, the context of the
court's discussion indicates that "actual evidence" meant "direct" evidence. (R7617-19)
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confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit, creating a triable issue of fact; and (c) the
district court applied an erroneous rule of law requiring a showing of "actual evidence'* of
the disclosure and/or use of a client's confidential information to survive summary judgment,
even where Williams/HRO simultaneously represented USA Power's direct, adverse
competitor, PacifiCorp, for a single contract.
A.

USA Power Presented Direct Evidence That Williams/HRO Disclosed And
Used USA Power's Confidential Information

USA Power presented direct evidence that Williams/HRO disclosed to PacifiCorp and
used for PacifiCorp's benefit USA Power's confidential information that Williams/HRO
obtained in the course of representing USA Power. PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's
documents, as well as other evidence, demonstrated that, while Williams/HRO was
representing USA Power: (1) Williams, in February 2003, disclosed to PacifiCorp the
confidential purchase price USA Power paid for its water rights, the identity of the narrow
pool of potential sellers of water rights for PacifiCorp's competing power project, Currant
Creek, and the range of sale prices that Williams had obtained through the research and
negotiations she had done while representing USA Power (R2280-81,2890,7121-23, 7137,
8167 at 29-34); (2) Williams met, on PacifiCorp's behalf, with the narrowed scope of water
right sellers to obtain water rights for Currant Creek (R2740-41, 2744-45); (3) PacifiCorp
offered the exact same purchase price of $4,000 per acre foot for water rights for Current
Creek that USA Power had paid for water rights for Spring Canyon (R2280-81, 9770); and
(4) Williams assisted Rand Thurgood (PacifiCorp) in preparing a memorandum to obtain
PacifiCorp's approval to purchase water for Currant Creek, which recited that the market
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price of water at that time was $4,000 - $4,500 per acre foot, the confidential amounts
Williams learned while representing USA Power. (R2886-95, 8167 at 30).
That evidence is direct evidence of use and disclosure of USA Power's confidential
information, and the district court's ruling to the contrary should be reversed.
B.

The District Court Applied An Erroneous Rule Of Law Requiring An
Injured Client To Show Actual Evidence Of Disclosure and Use of Its
Confidential Information Even Where There Was Circumstantial Evidence
Of Use And Disclosure

USA Power also presented circumstantial evidence of Williams/HRO's use and
disclosure of USA Power's confidential information that created a triable issue of fact. The
district court wholly discounted that circumstantial evidence by misinterpreting Shaw Res.
Ltd., L.L.C. v. Pruitt Gushee & BachtelL P.C. 2006 UT App 313, If 29, 142 P.3d 560, as
requiring more than circumstantial evidence. The district court was wrong, and this Court
should clarify Utah law.
The district court erred in interpreting Shaw to require "actual" evidence that did not
include circumstantial evidence. In Shaw, the Utah Court of Appeals held that summary
judgment was appropriate on a claim by a client against a former attorney for breach of the
fiduciary duty of confidentiality because the plaintiff "failed to present non-speculative or
non-conjectural evidence" that the defendant attorneys obtained and had used or disclosed
the plaintiffs confidential information. Shaw, 2006 UT App 313 atffl[29-41. Shaw did not,
however, hold that circumstantial evidence of use or disclosure could not defeat summary
judgment, and the facts of that case are clearly distinguishable from this case.
The Shaw court, in fact, recognized reasonable inferences of use of and/or disclosure
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of confidential infomiation can defeat summary judgment, provided they are supported by
the evidence. Shaw, 2006 UT App 313 ^ 32-33. In stark contrast to this case, the Shaw
plaintiffs did not present relevant evidence from which such inferences could be drawn.
Rather, the plaintiffs did not include, as part of the record on appeal, a map which they
claimed contained the confidential information and produced only "sparse notations" and
invoices, none of which made any reference to the confidential information plaintiffs claimed
was obtained by the defendant attorneys. IdL at ^ 31-38. The plaintiffs presented no
evidence whatsoever that could even arguably support an inference that the defendant
attorneys used or disclosed any of plaintiffs' confidential information. IcL at ^ 30, 33, 3941. Hence, the court found plaintiffs5 inferences of possession, use and disclosure were pure
speculation. Id.63
Here, the district court simply labeled all USA Power's circumstantial evidence as
speculative and, thus, not "actual evidence" based on Shaw. Shaw does not stand for the
proposition that all circumstantial evidence is speculative, conjectural or otherwise not
"actual evidence." Indeed, circumstantial evidence constitutes "actual" evidence sufficient
to establish issues of fact to withstand summary judgment under Shaw. Circumstantial
evidence is evidence of "facts or circumstances from which the existence or nonexistence of
[a] fact in issue may be inferred." Wright v. Southland Corp.. 187 F.3d 1287,1293-94 (11th
Cir. 1999). "In a civil case, circumstantial evidence is competent to prove a fact in issue, and
it is unnecessary that such proof rise to the degree of certainty to support only one conclusion
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In Shaw, moreover, the representation at issue was not simultaneous or substantially
related, and plaintiffs had consented to the representation. Id. ^ 14-15, 44. 56.
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to the exclusion of all others/*
Here, USA Power presented non-speculative circumstantial evidence from which a
reasonable juror could find that Williams/HRO used and/or disclosed USA Power's
confidential information. That evidence included: (1) Williams/HRO simultaneously and
adversely represented PacifiCorp on a competing power project for a single contract;65 (2)
Williams/HRO was a member of USA Power's development team and obtained substantial
confidential information about all aspects of Spring Canyon's development, and then became
a member of PacifiCorp's development team where all aspects of PacifiCorp's competing
Currant Creek development were discussed and evaluated, including the critical need for
water for the competing project, the impact of wet versus dry cooling, the decision to use dry
cooling, the suitability of Mona as the site for the power plant, and the Spring Canyon project
which was a direct competitor for the same RFP slot;66 (3) Williams/HRO acquired the
critical component of water rights for PacifiCorp's competing Currant Creek project in 20%
of the time that it took her to acquire the same volume of water rights for USA Power's
Spring Canyon project, which enabled PacifiCorp to prepare and submit the winning bid and
construct Currant Creek (R2334, 3729-31, 3826-30, 5189-90; compare 5088X, with 2818,
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Alfieriv.Alfieri, 733 P.2d4,10-11 (N.M. Ct. App. 1987): accord Michalic v. Cleveland
Tankers. Inc., 364 U.S. 325, 330 (1960) (stating circumstantial evidence "may also be more
certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence"); Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co.,
574 F.2d 1027,1036 (10th Cir. 1978); cf, Gillmor v. Gillmor. 745 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah Ct.
App. 1987) ("[Ijnferences drawn from circumstantial evidence can be as probative as direct
evidence.") (citation and quotation marks omitted).
65
R2897-901, 2732-75, 2462-66, 2232-34, 4739, 4778, 3747, 3639, 2456, 3643, 7147
66
R2000-05, 2126-27, 2140-41, 2571-75, 2818-64, 3190-95, 2913-17, 2921-39, 2941-62,
2972-3039, 2967-70, 2988-90, 3041-42, 3116-20, 3341-50, 3748; 2232-34, 2462-63,
2534-35,2544,2577,2580,2732-816,2866,2868-71,2878-79,2886-95,2913-20, R2 2911,
3044-47, 3055-59, 3643, 3859, 8167 at 30 & 81-82
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3495); (4) Williams' sworn testimony that she did not know whether she had disclosed
confidential information to PacifiCorp (R2543); (5) PacifiCorp hired Williams/HRO, without
ever considering any other water lawyer, (R4737-38, 2423-24), even knowing there was a
conflict of interest because the representation was adverse to USA Power and Williams/HRO
possessed USA Power's confidential information that would be beneficial to PacifiCorp;67
and (6) Williams/HRO never informed USA Power that Williams/HRO was representing
PacifiCorp on its competing project or sought their consent (R2279-80, 2559, 3749, 5842).
This evidence regarding use and/or disclosure, must be viewed in light of the duty that
Williams/HRO assumed when they agreed to represent PacifiCorp with regard to the
competing Currant Creek project. In particular, when Williams/HRO began representing
PacifiCorp on Currant Creek, Williams/HRO assumed the duty of undivided loyalty to
PacifiCorp which, in turn, obligated Williams/HRO to use every fact of which they have
knowledge for the benefit of PacifiCorp.68

In this case, where Williams/HRO was

simultaneously and adversely representing PacifiCorp, Williams/HRO became ethically
obligated to disclose and use for the benefit of PacifiCorp any and all of USA Power's
confidential information that could benefit PacifiCorp, even if it may violate
Williams/HRO's duties to USA Power. See id.
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R1831-32, 2334-35, 2587-91, 2632-42, 3076, 3643, 4738-40, 4774-76
See Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996);
Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 1; see also Huber v. Taylor. 469 F.3d 67, 81 (3d Cir. 2006)
(noting attorney's duty to client includes "undivided loyalty, candor, and provision of
material information").
68
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C.

The District Court Erred in Rejecting Persuasive Case Law That Would
Permit a Jury to Infer Use and/or Disclosure of Confidential Information
Where the Lawyer Engages in Simultaneous Adverse Representation Such
As Occurred in this Case.

This Court should adopt a rule, similar to other jurisdictions, that simultaneous
representation by a lawyer of a client's direct competitor alone gives rise to, at minimum, an
inference that may be drawn by the jury that the attorney shared the plaintiffs confidential
information with its competitor.69
Jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have done so in the context of a former
client suing a lawyer for breach of the duty of confidentiality in representing an adverse party
on a substantially similar matter. In those cases, the majority ofjurisdictions have ruled that
evidence of the attorney's representation of a former and current client on substantially
similar matters, alone, may, at minimum, allow a juror to draw the inference that "the client's
confidences have been used against him in contravention of the attorney's continuing duties
of confidentiality and loyalty." Bevan v. Fix. 42 P.3d 1013, 1031-32 (Wyo. 2002); see
Chrysler Corp. v. Carev. 5 F. Supp. 2d 1023,1033-34 (E.D. Mo. 1998), affd, 186 F.3d 1016
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This Court has not addressed the issue of whether a jury can infer the use and/or disclosure
of confidential information solely from the fact there is simultaneous adverse representation.
That issue was not before the Court in Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107,
37 P.3d 1130. There, the only issue before the Court was whether the district court erred in
finding that, as a matter of law, there was an attorney/client relationship at the time of the
events at issue. Id at ^f 36. In reversing and remanding the case, the Kilpatrick court, in
dicta, discussed whether there was evidence of use or disclosure when the only evidence
presented was that the plaintiffs, not the lawyers, had given the other client financial
information which the plaintiff then claimed was confidential. Id at Ylf 66-68. The issue
also was not before the court in Shaw, where there was not simultaneous adverse
representation. 2006 UT App 313, ^ 14-15. Nor was the issue before the court in Gildea,
where the court simply ruled there was no attorney/client relationship between the plaintiff
and defendant. Gildea v. Guardian Title Co. of Utah, 970 P.2d 1265, 1270 (Utah 1998).
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(8th Cir. 1999).
Those cases and the rationale behind that rule apply with even greater force here,
where the attorneys engaged in simultaneous adverse representation.

Just as in the

analogous cases, if the plaintiff cannot point to a particular item of confidential information
used or disclosed that should not prevent a jury from inferring disclosure or use. Chrysler
Corp., 5 F. Supp. 2d at 1033-34. When an attorney engages in simultaneous adverse
representation, it may be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, for one client "to discover
precisely whether and how the attorney has used his confidential information to the benefit
of [one client] and to the detriment of the [other].5' Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1031. Moreover, the
privilege that attaches to the attorney's relationship with the other client "may make it
exceedingly difficult for the former client to discover precisely whether and/or how the
attorney has used his confidential information

" I d . Further, an inference of disclosure

is reasonable considering an attorney owes a duty to a new adverse client to use every fact
of which they have knowledge for that client's benefit. Kilpatrick. 909 P.2d at 1290; Utah
R. Prof. Conduct 1.7, cmt. 1; see also Huber, 469 F.3d at 81.
Finally, requiring an actual showing of disclosure and/or use in simultaneous adverse
representation cases is bad public policy because it facilitates and encourages an attorney,
at any time, to cast off her duties to a client in favor of a deeper pocket or bigger book of
business so long as the attorney and new client are able to keep evidence of disclosure from
surfacing. As a matter of policy, this Court should not allow unethical attorneys to evade the
consequences of their behavior so long as a client is unable to pinpoint the exact, and often
undiscoverable, information that caused the client harm. If not corrected by this Court, the
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rule applied by the district court will open the door for larger clients and deeper pockets to
easily cherry-pick the attorneys of their smaller, poorer adversaries mid-way through a
dispute or transaction, thereby gaining tremendous undue advantage and imposing on the
injured client an often unrecoverable disadvantage. Laws creating such an opportunistic
loophole for a lawyer to escape all legal liability for wrongdoing will inevitably harm clients,
eliminate trust, and tarnish the reputation of the legal community.
IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON USA
POWER'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE FIDUCIARY DUTY OF
LOYALTY DUE TO LACK OF CAUSATION BECAUSE USA POWER
PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT WILLIAMS/HRO'S BREACH CAUSED USA
POWER TO LOSE THE SALE OF SPRING CANYON AND THE RFP.
USA Power presented evidence that Williams/HRO breached their fiduciary duty of

loyalty by simultaneously and adversely representing PacifiCorp, and the district court
correctly ruled that the issue of breach must be decided by a jury. (R7619-20) The district
court, however, erroneously granted summary judgment to Williams/HRO, ruling, as a matter
of law, that USA Power could not establish the causation element of its claim for breach of
the fiduciary duty of loyalty. (R7620-21) The ruling on causation should be reversed.
In Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), the court
set forth the legal standard for causation in a legal malpractice action based on breach of
fiduciary duty: "But for defendant's breach of fiduciary duty a reasonable likelihood existed
that the [plaintiffs] would have benefitted." JdL at 1291 -92. The court then went on to clarify
that causation is an issue of fact:
Generally, causation "cannot be resolved as a matter of law." "Proximate cause
is an issue of fact. Thus, only if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable
jury could infer causation is summary judgment appropriate."
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In sum, c*[b]ecause proximate cause is an issue of fact, we refuse to take it from
the jury if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer
causation."
Id. at 1292-93 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted). That is the law in Utah.
In this case, USA Power presented evidence from which a jury could reasonably infer
causation, both with regard to the loss of the sale of Spring Canyon to PacifiCorp and with
regard to the loss of the RFP.
USA Power presented multiple facts and inferences establishing that, but for
Williams/HRO's breach of their duty of loyalty, a reasonable likelihood existed that
PacifiCorp would have purchased Spring Canyon for $3 million and a Joint Development
Agreement. That causation evidence includes: (1) prior to PacifiCorp hiring Williams/HRO,
PacifiCorp negotiated with and later reached an oral agreement with USA Power to buy the
Spring Canyon project for $3 million and a Joint Development Agreement (R2210-14,2686,
3259, 4552-53, 4564-68); (2) prior to hiring Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp admitted Spring
Canyon was "the only project that has any possibility of meeting heavy load peaking hours
for a 2005 or even a 2006 commercial date," and approved the purchase of Spring Canyon
for up to $3.5 million (R10394, 10397-98, 10400, 10403, 4813-18); (3) two weeks after
hiring Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp abruptly reneged on its agreement with USA Power, while
Williams actively pursued and then acquired water rights for PacifiCorp's competing project
(R2732,2216,4565,2686; see supra, SOF, Part VIII); (4) water was a critical component of
PacifiCorp's Currant Creek project, and, prior to hiring Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp had not
undertaken any effort to acquire water rights (R6483 at n.7, 6484, 3639, 3072, 4736-39,
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4777-78, 5088X); (5) PacifiCorp never considered any other lawyer besides Williams/HRO
to acquire water rights for Currant Creek, despite the conflict created by Williams/HRO"s
representation of PacifiCorp (see supra SOF, Part VIII at 28-3 0), and charged Williams/HRO
with acquiring water rights for Currant Creek (R4778); (6) PacifiCorp's lawyer gave
Thurgood advice about hiring Williams/HRO and terminating negotiations with USA Power
after PacifiCorp retained Williams/HRO (R2360-65,6458-60); and (7) Williams/HRO used
and/or disclosed confidential information for PacifiCorp's benefit in its development of
Currant Creek (see supra SOF VIII at 30-32).
USA Power also presented multiple facts and inferences establishing that, but for
Williams/HRO's breach, a reasonable likelihood existed USA Power would have been
awarded the RFP contract. That causation evidence includes: (1) before PacifiCorp hired
Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp admitted Spring Canyon was "the only viable project site that
[was] capable of meeting a 2005 online date" and "[a]bsent the USA Power site, Generation
and C & T are unaware of other entities capable of meeting an April 2005 date" (R1039899); (2) before PacifiCorp hired Williams/HRO, PacifiCorp admitted it was at least 2-3 years
behind USA Power in trying to develop a power plant in Mona (R2116); (3) to sufficiently
develop a power project such as Currant Creek in order to submit an RFP bid takes between
18 to 24 months to complete, and PacifiCorp only had 4 months to prepare a bid on a project
on which it had done no development work, including acquiring water rights (R3 721-33,
5379-91); (4) Currant Creek could not be built or operated without water (see supra, SOF,
Part VIII at 29); (5) Panda had no water rights and no options to purchase water rights when
PacifiCorp acquired Panda (R7215-16,3308,5471,4709,4723-24); (6) PacifiCorp had done
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nothing to acquire water rights before it hired Williams/HRO (see supra, SOF, Parts VIIIIX); (7) Williams was a member of USA Power's development team, was involved in every
aspect of the development of Spring Canyon, and had confidential information regarding the
development of a power plant in Mona that would assist PacifiCorp in winning the RFP (see
supra, SOF, Part III); (8) Williams/HRO used and/or disclosed USA Power's confidential
information to assist PacifiCorp in winning the RFP (see supra, SOF, Part VIII); (9)
Williams/HRO were successful in acquiring water rights for Currant Creek in 20% of the
time it took to acquire the water rights for USA Power and that shortened time frame was
essential for PacifiCorp to submit its bid, file an application for a CC&N, and to be awarded
a CC&N to construct Currant Creek (see supra. SOF, Part VIII at 31-32; R2588-91, 2783,
3076); (10) Williams devised the plan for PacifiCorp to acquire water rights for Currant
Creek and determined it was viable (R5839); (11) White and Wangsgard themselves
recognized that Williams "single handedly" secured PacifiCorp \s right to use water at Mona
and securing that right "would not have been possible without her" (R3067, 3065); (12)
PacifiCorp would not have won the RFP and been granted the CC&N to construct Currant
Creek without a firm water supply (R 3072, 3639, 3643, 4739-40, 6483 at n.7, 6484); (13)
only one 550 MW plant could be built in Mona (R2328,2866,3643,3723,3787,6448); (14)
only one power plant was selected in the RFP (R5088X-Y, 3326-28,2275-76); and(15)USA
Power's Spring Canyon bid placed second behind Currant Creek (R2 4265, 5842, 5847,
5337, 4695-96).
This Court should reject the district court's reasoning that the possibility PacifiCorp
could have hired another lawyer to perform the work obtained from Williams/HRO defeats
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a showing of causation because the breaching conduct was thus not "necessary" to USA
Power losing the bid. (R7621) First, that reasoning ignores the evidence that Williams/HRO
had unique skills and knowledge, including knowledge of potential water right sellers, their
selling price, and water right options, that they gained in the course of representing USA
Power. By virtue of her work on USA Power's behalf in Mona, Williams was the only water
attorney anywhere who was capable of providing the specific services to PacifiCorp in the
time frame required to win the RFP. Williams/HRO were able to provide these services to
PacifiCorp much more quickly because, on USA Power's dime, they had already spent the
time ferreting out potential water rights sellers, making contacts, building relationships,
learning pricing information, and becoming well-versed on acquiring water for a power plant
in Mona.70 Again, as Wangsgard and White stated, Williams "saved the day" by "single
handedly" securing PacifiCorp's change application, which "would not have been possible
without her." (R3065-67)
Second, such reasoning defies logic and is bad public policy that this Court should not
endorse in its constitutional role of regulating the legal profession.71 If the mere existence
of other attorneys with the same general qualifications who might have been hired by a
client's competitor defeats a showing of causation, as a matter of law, then virtually no
harmed client will ever again be able to maintain a civil claim for breach of the duty of
loyalty. In almost all circumstances, a defendant lawyer will be able to point to other lawyers

70

R 1994, 2000-05, 2113, 2140-41, 2818-64, 2907, 2913-15, 2921, 2972-3039, 3167-88,
3190-95,3857-67,4554-55
71
USA Power has been unable to find a single authority where such a rule has been accepted
by an appellate court upon facts remotely similar to the instant case.
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who might have provided the work that was performed for the client's adversary. Only in
those rarest of cases where a client can demonstrate the attorney in question has a skill or
specialty that is held only by that attorney, could a claim be maintained. Such a rule would
effectively immunize attorneys from being held liable for damages resulting from breaching
their duty of loyalty to an existing client. Moreover, such a rule would actually encourage
attorney misconduct because it would inform attorneys they are free to discard an existing
client to represent an adversary of that client on the same matter when, as here, that adversary
happens to have more resources, and represents more potential profit. This Court should not
ratify such a rule.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the district court's grant of summary
judgment in PacifiCorp and Williams/HRO's favor and remand this case to the district court
for a trial on the merits of USA Power's claims.
DATED: November 12, 2008

frO^SIC & flECK LLC

PeggylA. Tomsic
Eric K. Schnibbe
J. Ryan Connelly
136 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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1979); Katz v. Pierce, 732 R2d 92 (Utah 1986);
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, 11 R3d 277.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reasonable Assurance of Actual Notice Required for In
Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Graham
v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 46 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments §
265 et seq.
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218.
A.L.R. — Necessity of taking proof as to
liability against defaulting defendant, 8
A.L.R.3d 1070.
Appealability of order setting aside, or refusing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A.L.R.3d
1272.
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and

hearing as to determination of amount of damages, 15 A.L.R.3d 586.
Opening default or default judgment claimed
to have been obtained because of attorney's
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial,
or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 1255.
Failure to give notice of application for default judgment where notice is required only by
custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383.
Failure of party or his attorney to appear at
pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303.
Default judgments against the United States
under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 55 A.L.R. Fed. 190.

Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary
judgment upon all or any part thereof
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be
rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to
the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy
and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall
thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial
controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other
relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed
established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further
affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as
provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations
or denials of the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial. Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against a party failing to file such a response.
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(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to
be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant
to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the
court shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party
the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
(Amended effective November 1, 1997; November 1, 2004.)
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amendment substituted "move for summary judgment" for "move with or without supporting
affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor"
in Subdivisions (a) and (b); in Subdivision (c),
deleted "filed and served" before "in accordance
with" and substituted "Rule 7" for "CJA 4-501";
substituted "If" for "Should it appear to the

satisfaction of the court at any time that" at the
beginning of the first sentence in Subdivision
(g); and made stylistic changes throughout.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 56, F.R.C.R
Cross-References. — Contempt generally,
§§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Affidavit.
—Contents.
—Corporation.
—Experts.
—Extension of time to submit.
—Failure to submit.
—Inconsistency with deposition.
—Necessity of opposing affidavits.
Resting on pleadings.
—Objection.
—Sufficiency.
Hearsay and opinion testimony.
—Superseding pleadings.
—Unpleaded defenses.
—Verified pleading.
—Waiver of right to contest.
—When unavailable.
Exclusive control of facts.
—Who may make.
Affirmative defense.
Answers to interrogatories.
Appeal.
—Adversely affected party.
—Standard of review.
Applicability.
Attorney's fees.
Availability of motion.
Compliance with rule.
Continuance for further discovery.
Cross-motions.
Damages.
Discovery.
Disputed facts.
Effect of denial.
Evidence.
—Admissions of plaintiff.
—Facts considered.
—Improper evidence.
—Proof.
—Unsupported motion.
—Weight of testimony.
Implicit rulings.

Improper party plaintiff.
Issue of fact.
—Contract interpretation.
—Corporate existence.
—Deeds.
—Discovery of medical condition.
—Insurance policy.
—Intent to remove trustee.
—Lease as security.
—Notice.
—Wills.
Judicial attitude.
Motion for new trial.
Motion to dismiss.
Motion to reconsider.
Notice.
—Provision not jurisdictional.
—Waiver of defect.
Parties.
Procedural due process.
Purpose.
Regulatory taking.
Reply memorandum.
Scope.
Summary judgment improper.
—Association fees.
—Damage to insured vehicle.
—Dispersal of interest.
—Easement.
—Exhaustion of remedies.
—Findings by court.
—Foreclosure of trust deeds.
—Fraud or duress.
—Governmental immunity.
—Guardianship.
—Mixed claims.
—Mortgage note.
—Negligence.
—Nonspecific denial of requests for admission.
—Note.
—Procedure.
—Product liability action.
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COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am Jur 2d Courts § 20 et
seq , 56 Am Jur 2d Motions, Rules, and Orders
§ 10, 62B Am Jur 2d Process §§ 114-117,
227-229
C.J.S. — 60 C J S Motions and Orders § 8,
66 C J S Notice § 27 et seq , 71 C J S Pleading
§§ 98, 114, 219, 72 C J S Process §§ 72, 78
A.L.R. — Vacatmg judgment or granting new
trial in civil case, consent as ground of after
expiration of term or time prescribed by statute
or rules of court, 3 A L R 3d 1191
Attorney's inaction as excuse for failure to
timely prosecute action, 15 A L R 3d 674

Validity of service of summons or complaint
on Sunday or holiday, 63 A L R 3d 423
Amendment, after expiration of time for fiimg motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
made in due time, 69 A L R 3d 845
Consequences of prosecution's failure to file
timely brief in appeal by accused, 27 A.L R 4th
213
What constitutes bringing an action to trial
or other activity m case sufficient to avoid
dismissal under state statute or court rule
requiring such activity within stated time, 32
A L R 4th 840

PART III. PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND ORDERS
Rule 7. Pleadings allowed; motions, memoranda, hearings, orders, objection to commissioner's order.
(a) Pleadings. There shall be a complaint and an answer; a reply to a
counterclaim; an answer to a cross-claim, if the answer contains a cross-claim;
a third-party complamt, if a person who was not an original party is summoned
under the provisions of Rule 14; and a third-party answer, if a third-party
complaint is served. No other pleading shall be allowed, except t h a t the court
may order a reply to an answer or a third-party answer.
(b)(1) Motions. An application to the court for an order shall be by motion
which, unless made during a hearing or trial or in proceedings before a court
commissioner, shall be made in accordance with this rule. A motion shall be in
writing and state succinctly and with particularity the relief sought and the
grounds for the relief sought.
(b)(2) Limit on order to show cause. An application to the court for an order
to show cause shall be made only for enforcement of an exiting order or for*
sanctions for violating an existing order. An application for an order to show
cause must be supported by an affidavit sufficient to show cause to believe a
party has violated a court order.
(c) Memoranda.
(c)(1) Memoranda required, exceptions, filing times. All motions, except
uncontested or ex parte motions, shall be accompanied by a supporting
memorandum. Within ten days after service of the motion and supporting
memorandum, a party opposing the motion shall file a memorandum in
opposition. Within five days after service of the memorandum in opposition,
the moving party may file a reply memorandum, which shall be limited to
rebuttal of matters raised in the memorandum in opposition. No other
memoranda will be considered without leave of court. A party may attach a
proposed order to its initial memorandum.
(c)(2) Length. Initial memoranda shall not exceed 10 pages of argument
without leave of the court. Reply memoranda shall not exceed 5 pages of
argument without leave of the court. The court may permit a party to file an
over-length memorandum upon ex parte application and a showing of good
cause.
(c)(3) Content.
(c)(3)(A) A memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no
genuine issue exists. Each fact shall be separately stated and numbered and
supported by citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery
materials. Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed
admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless controverted by the
responding party.
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(c)(3)(B) A memorandum opposing a motion for summary judgment shall
contain a verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that is
controverted, and may contain a separate statement of additional facts in
dispute. For each of the moving party's facts that is controverted, the opposing
party shall provide an explanation of the grounds for any dispute, supported by
citation to relevant materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials. For
any additional facts set forth in the opposing memorandum, each fact shall be
separately stated and numbered and supported by citation to supporting
materials, such as affidavits or discovery materials.
(c)(3)(C) A memorandum with more than 10 pages of argument shall contain
a table of contents and a table of authorities with page references.
(c)(3)(D) A party may attach as exhibits to a memorandum relevant portions
of documents cited in the memorandum, such as affidavits or discovery
materials.
(d) Request to submit for decision. When briefing is complete, either party
may file a "Request to Submit for Decision." The request to submit for decision
shall state the date on which the motion was served, the date the opposing
memorandum, if any, was served, the date the reply memorandum, if any, was
served, and whether a hearing has been requested. If no party files a request,
the motion will not be submitted for decision.
(e) Hearings. The court may hold a hearing on any motion. A party may
request a hearing in the motion, in a memorandum or in the request to submit
for decision. A request for hearing shall be separately identified in the caption
of the document containing the request. The court shall grant a request for a
hearing on a motion under Rule 56 or a motion that would dispose of the action
or any claim or defense in the action unless the court finds that the motion or
opposition to the motion is frivolous or the issue has been authoritatively
decided.
(f) Orders.
(f)(1) An order includes every direction of the court, including a minute
order entered in writing, not included in a judgment. An order for the payment
of money may be enforced in the same manner as if it were a judgment. Except
as otherwise provided by these rules, any order made without notice to the
adverse party may be vacated or modified by the judge who made it with or
without notice. Orders shall state whether they are entered upon trial,
stipulation, motion or the court's initiative.
(f)(2) Unless the court approves the proposed order submitted with an
initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing
party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other
parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision. Objections to
the proposed order shall be filed within five days after service. The party
preparing the order shall file the proposed order upon being served with an
objection or upon expiration of the time to object.
(f)(3) Unless otherwise directed by the court, all orders shall be prepared as
separate documents and shall not incorporate any matter by reference.
(g) Objection to court commissioner's recommendation. A recommendation of
a court commissioner is the order of the court until modified by the court. A
party may object to the recommendation by filing an objection in the same
manner as filing a motion within ten days after the recommendation is made
in open court or, if the court commissioner takes the matter under advisement,
ten days after the minute entry of the recommendation is served. A party may
respond to the objection in the same manner as responding to a motion.
(Amended effective November 1, 2003; April 1, 2004; November 1, 2005; April
1, 2008.)
Advisory Committee Note. — The practice
for courtesy copies varies by judge and so is not

regulated by rule. Each party should ascertain
whether the judge wants a courtesy copy of that
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party's motion, memoranda and supporting
documents and, if so, when and where to deliver them.
Paragraph (f) applies to all orders, not just
orders upon motion.
Amendment Notes. — The 2004 amendment inserted "or in proceedings before a court
commissioner" in Subdivision (b); substituted
the first paragraph in Subdivision (c)(2) for a
list of maximum lengths for different types of
memoranda; in Subdivision (f)(2), substituted
"serve upon the other parties" for "file" in the
first sentence and added the last sentence; in
Subdivision (g), substituted "recommendation"
for "recommended order" several times and
substituted "made in open court" for "entered"
and added the clause beginning "or, if" in the
second sentence; and added the second paragraph of the Advisory Committee Note.
The 2005 amendment added Subdivision
(f)(3).
The 2008 amendment added Subdivision
(b)(2) and redesignated former Subdivision (b)
as Subdivision (b)(1).
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 7, F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Amendment of pleadings to conform to evidence, motion for,
U.R.C.P. 15(b).
Commencement of action, U.R.C.P. 3.
Consolidation of defenses made by motion,
U.R.C.P. 12(g).
Counterclaim and cross-claim, U.R.C.P. 13.
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Defenses and objections, U.R.C.P. 12.
Denial of motion, pleading after, U.R.C.P.
12(i).
Directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, motion for, U.R.C.P. 50.
Dismissal of actions, U.R.C.P. 41.
Eminent domain proceedings, contents of
complaint in, § 78-34-6.
Evidence in support of motion, U.R.C.P.
43(b).
Execution and proceedings supplemental
thereto, U.R.C.P. 69A et seq.
Extraordinary relief, U.R.C.P. 65B.
Forcible entry or detainer, proof required,
§ 78-36-9.
Form of pleadings, U.R.C.P. 10.
"Judgment" defined, U.R.C.P. 54(a).
One form of action, U.R.C.P. 2.
Partition of property, complaint to set forth
interests of all parties, § 78-39-2.
Pleading special matters, U.R.C.P. 9.
Relief from judgment or order, U.R.CJP. 60.
Requirements of signature, U.R.C.P. 11.
Service and filing of motions, pleadings and
other papers, U.R.C.P. 5. .
Special forms of writs abolished, U.R.C.P.
65B(a).
Supreme Court, rulemaking power of, § 782-4.
Temporary restraining orders, setting aside,
U.R.C.P. 65A.
Time for service of written motions, U.R.C.P.
6(d).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Memorandum opposing summary judgment.
Motions.
—Amendments.
Complaint.
Prayer for relief.
—New trial.
Particularization.
—Setting aside conditional order.
Orders.
—Correction.
—Necessity.
—Submission to court.
Reply memorandum.
Cited.
Memorandum opposing summary judgment.
Failure of memorandum opposing summary
judgment to set forth disputed facts in numbered sentences in a separate section as required by former R. Jud. Admin. 4-501(2)(B)
was harmless, as the disputed facts were
clearly provided in the body of the memorandum with applicable record references. Salt
Lake County v. Metro W. Ready Mix, Inc., 2004
UT 23, 496 Utah Adv. Rep. 6, 89 R3d 155.

properly denied the opportunity to amend their
complaint because they never filed an actual
motion, but merely cited Rule 15 without articulating any reasons why leave to amend their
136-page, 725-paragraph complaint was merited. Coroles v. Sabey, 2003 UT App 339, 485
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 79 P.3d 974.
Prayer for relief.
Although a trial court may deny a motion to
amend the complaint for a movant's failure to
present a written motion and a proposed
amended complaint, that rule does not apply to
the prayer for relief because, under Rule 54(c),
the prayer does not limit the relief which the
court may grant. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills
Hosp., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
—New trial.

—Amendments.

Particularization.
Only purpose for requiring particularization
of grounds for motion for new trial is to inform
court and other party of theories upon which
new trial is sought; where defendant filed affidavit with motions setting forth theories, and
judgment had been on pleadings, court and
parties were sufficiently advised as to grounds
for motion. Howard v. Howard, 11 Utah 2d 149,
356 P.2d 275 (1960).

Complaint.
Investors who lost money in a failed investment venture and whose multi-count complaint
stemming from their losses was dismissed were

—Setting aside conditional order.
Where court on own initiative lowered from
$2,000 to $1,000 value of building as found by
jury and entered conditional order granting

Motions.

Tab 3

§ 13-24-2
§ 13-24-2.

COMMERCE & TRADE
Definitions

As used in this chapter, unless the context requires otherwise:
(1) "Improper m e a n s " includes theft, bribery, misrepresentation, breach or
inducement of a breach of a duty to maintain secrecy, or espionage through
electromc or other means.
(2) "Misappropriation" means:
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a person who knows or has
reason to know that the trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another without express or
implied consent by a person who:
(i) used improper means to acquire knowledge of the trade secret; or
(ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or had reason to know that his
knowledge of the trade secret was:
(A) derived from or through a person who had utilized improper
means to acquire it;
(B) acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty to maintain its
secrecy or limit its use; or
(C) derived from or through a person who owed a duty to the person
seeking relief to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(lii) before a material change of his position, knew or had reason to
know that it was a trade secret and that knowledge of it had been acquired
by accident or mistake.
(3) "Person" means a natural person, corporation, business trust, estate,
trust, partnership, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or commercial entity.
(4) "Trade secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure
or use; and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
Laws 1989, c 60, § 2.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Uniform Law
This section is similar to § 1 of the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act See Volume 14 Uniform

Laws Annotated, Master Edition, or ULA Database on Westlaw

Cross References
Protected administrative records, see Jud Admm , Rule 4-202 02
Protected records, see § 63-2-304
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Tab 4

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

USA POWER/ LLC; USA POWER
PARTNERS, LLC; and SPRING CANYON
ENERGY, LLC,
Plaintiffs,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CASE NO.

050903412

:

vs.

:

PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS, and
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP,

:

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court for hearings on September 24, 2007
and

October

2,

2007,

in

connection

with

the

following Motions:

PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment; PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment with respect to the Claim for Intentional Interference
with Existing Contractual Relations; Defendants Jody L. Williams and
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP's (Ms. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen are
collectively referred to as "HRO") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:
Confidential Information; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Loyalty Claim; HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Against USA
Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, for Lack of Standing and
Speculative Damages; USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of
Michael G. Jenkins and Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit
of Jody L. Williams; and USA Power's Motion for Leave to File
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Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic.

At the conclusion of these

hearings, the Court took the matter under advisement to further consider
the

parties'

written

submissions,

relevant legal authority.

counsels'

oral

argument

and

the

Being now fully informed, the Court rules as

stated herein,
LEGAL ANALYSIS
PacifiCorp/s Motion for Summary Judgment
The
settled.

standard

for

determining

Motions

for

Summary

Judgment

is

Summary Judgment is proper only upon a showing "that there is

no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a Judgment as a matter of law."

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c).

Initially, defendant as the moving party has the burden of presenting
evidence demonstrating that no genuine issue of material facts exist and
that Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate.
Once

the moving party has met

its burden,

Utah R. Civ. P. 56(e) .

the nonmoving

party

by

affidavits or as otherwise provided in Rule 56 must set forth specific
facts showing that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial.
The nonmoving party is required to produce more than just conclusory
assertions or theories that an issue of material fact exists to establish
genuine triable issues in order to survive summary judgment. Shaw Res.
Ltd., L.L.C., v. Pruitt, Gushee & Bachtell , 2006 UT App 313, 142 P.3d
560; Orvis v. Johnson, 2006 UT App 394, 146 P.3d 886.

In substance, the

Court is required to examine the factual record and reasonable inferences
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drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party and only
grant summary judgment when reasonable minds could not differ on the
facts to be determined

from the evidence presented.

Olympus Hills

Shopping Ctr. v. Smith's Food & Drug Ctrs., 889 P.2d 445

(Utah App.

1994).
Violation of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
In its Motion for Summary Judgment, PacificCorp first argues that
it is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' First Count for
violation

of

the Utah Uniform

Trade

Secrets Act

(uthe Act")-

In

assessing whether a violation of the Act has occurred, the Court must,
as threshold matter, determine whether the plaintiffs had a trade secret
which PacificCorp misappropriated. Utah Med. Prods., Inc. v. Clinical
Innovations Assocs.,

Inc.,

79

F.Supp.2d

1290,

1311

(D. Utah

(internal citations omitted).
The Act defines the term "Trade secret" to mean:
Information, including a formula, pattern, compilation,
program, device, method, technique, or process, that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means by,
other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use; and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4).

1999)

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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The burden of establishing the existence of a trade secret is the
plaintiffs'

and

there

is

no

presumption

in

plaintiffs'

favor.

MicrobioloQical Research Corp. V. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981); Utah
Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations Assocs., Inc., supra.
The essential elements of a claim for misappropriation of trade
secrets un^^r the Uniform Trade Secrets Act require a plaintiff to prove
(1) the existence of a trade secret, (2) communication of the trade
secrets to PacifiCorp under an express duty not to disclose or use it,
and (3) PacifiCorp's use of the trade secret information that injures
plaintiffs. Water & Energy Svs. Tech., Inc. v. Keil, 974 P. 2d 821 (Utah
1999) . Elements (1) and (2) are the focus of this Decision.
In its Motion, PacifiCorp contends they are entitled to Summary
Judgment because the information plaintiffs claim were trade secrets were
actually

known

within

the

industry,

general

public

or

readily

ascertainable by PacifiCorp by independent proper means based upon
PacifiCorp's knowledge and experience in the industry.

Significantly,

PacifiCorp further asserts that based upon the undisputed material facts,
plaintiffs have produced no evidence that PacifiCorp ever used or
misappropriated any of plaintiffs' claimed trade secrets.

Plaintiffs

counter that the trade secrets which PacifiCorp misappropriated consisted
of a combination of details, including tests and evaluations which were
site specific and which formed the Spring Canyon "vision".

Plaintiffs

contend that PacifiCorp stole their Spring Canyon Power Plant trade

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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secrets in order to build the competing Currant Creek Power Plant, which
is a replica of the Spring Canyon Power Plant in the same Mona location.
At the outset, it is important to note that Rule 7 of the Utah R.
Civ. P. requires that with respect to Summary Judgment Motions, that:
"Each fact set forth in the moving party's memorandum is deemed admitted
for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
the

responding party."

Memorandum

Rule

7(c)(3)(A).

Throughout plaintiffs'

in opposition, as noted by PacifiCorp, plaintiffs have

employed the practice contrary to Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of arguing about the
implication of the facts asserted instead of "specifically controverting"
them with the factual record.
engage

in

the

tedious

This practice has required the Court to

exercise

of

separating

throughout plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition.

fact

from argument

In many instances as

referenced hereinafter, plaintiffs' failure to "specifically controvert"
defendants' undisputed
admitted.

facts

results

in those

facts being deemed

Those facts deemed admitted identified hereinafter are

incorporated into this Decision by this reference. The Court finds that
PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11
which are not "specifically controverted" are thus deemed admitted.
These undisputed facts identify Panda Energy's development of a power
plant in Mona, next to PacifiCorp's transmission station, PacifiCorp's
knowledge of Panda's development before ever meeting plaintiffs' and
PacifiCorp's ultimate purchase of Panda's assets necessary for the

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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development of the Currant Creek Power plant in Mona.

With respect to

Panda, it is undisputed that Panda initially had the idea to build a
combined cycle power plant in Mona, started its development efforts in
late 2000, secured options to purchase 240 acres of land next to
PacifiCorp's Mona transmission station, undertaken meteorological and
other assessments pivotal to PacifiCorp's development of Currant Creek
and

the publication of Panda's development in the

Deseret

News

demonstrate the vision and concepts underlying the Currant Creek Power
Plant in Mona was no secret and was not a trade secret of plaintiffs as
defined under the Trade Secrets Act.
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29, which identify PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone
& Webster's design, engineering and construction of the Currant Creek
Power Plant are not "specifically controverted", thus deemed admitted.
Again, at their core, plaintiffs' responses to PacifiCorp's undisputed
facts argues theories and implications of the facts without "specifically
controverting" the facts.

With respect to Shaw/Stone & Webster, it is

undisputed that they built a sister plant to the Currant Creek Power
Plant

(Apex 1) , and that the Currant Creek Power Plant represents

PacifiCorp's and Shaw/Stone & Webster's own work. That the Currant Creek
Power Plant and Apex 1 Power Plant with all of their component parts and
technologies are well understood and widely utilized in the electric
power plant

industry.

Significantly, plaintiffs concede in their
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response to PacifiCorp's Undisputed Fact No. 24 that

"The surface

characteristics and actual function of the proposed power plant is not
a trade secret—it was (and is) visible to the public." The Court finds
the undisputed material facts establish that the design, engineering and
construction of the Currant Creek Power Plant was not based upon nor
utilized any information from or about USA Power, USA Power Partners,
Spring Canyon Energy or the Spring Canyon Energy project (Undisputed Fact
No. 29).
The Court finds that PacifiCorp's Undisputed Facts Nos. 13 and 17,
which identify Spring Canyon's public filings and application for an air
permit, are not "specifically controverted" and thus deemed admitted.
These undisputed material facts demonstrate that plaintiffs' concept,
vision and claimed confidential information were of public record, and
were disclosed to PacifiCorp by the public record.
information

contained

therein

being

generally

Consequently, the
known

and

readily

ascertainable from the public record by PacifiCorp and other persons in
the field cannot possibly constitute trade secrets as defined by Utah
Code Ann., § 13-24-2(4).
The Court finds from the undisputed material facts set forth herein,
in plaintiffs' Memorandum in opposition, and plaintiffs' oral argument,
that plaintiffs have not defined with sufficient particularity or
precision what constitutes the trade secrets which PacifiCorp allegedly
misappropriated.

Instead, plaintiffs allude to the trade secrets as
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consisting of their "project concept," "vision," "formula," and "test
data" for the Spring Canyon Power Plant.

However, these vague and

conclusory assertions fall short of actually describing those specific
features of the power plant development, including specific features of
the data and formula which were not generally known and not readily
ascertainable by PacifiCorp.

Further, with respect to each item or

document which plaintiffs purport to be trade secrets, including the
documents plaintiffs claim were not part of their public filings, there
is no aspect of this information which plaintiffs make any effort to
demonstrate

specifically

that

PacifiCorp

could

not

have

readily

ascertained either through public information, the plaintiffs' filings
with the Utah Division of Air Quality, knowledge generally known in the
industry,

the

independent

analysis

and

evaluations

performed

by

Shaw/Stone & Webster, and PacifiCorp's prior knowledge and purchase of
the Panda assets. Plaintiffs' identifying and labeling of documents they
claim contain trade secret information, including the economic and
technical viability of their project, which at oral argument was stated
to be the essence of their trade secrets, is insufficient.

See, Utah

Med. Prods., v. Clinical Innovations, supra.
Plaintiffs, as an essential element of their misappropriation of
trade secrets cause of action, are required to establish a genuine issue
of material fact that PacifiCorp used or misappropriated their claimed
trade secrets information.

Utah Code Ann., § 13-24-2, states that a

USA POWER V. PACIFICORP
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defendant misappropriates a trade secret when it uses or discloses
another's trade secret without that party's express or implied consent.
This Court acknowledges plaintiffs' general proposition that it may be
rare

to

have

a

" smoking

gun"

misappropriation of trade secrets.

or

direct

evidence

Sokol Crystal

Communications Corp., 15 F.3d 1427 (7th Cir. 1994) .

of

use

or

Prods., v. DSC
Plaintiffs also

claim that they are only required to ^construct a web of. . .circumstantial
evidence from which the trier of fact may draw inferences which convince
him that it is more probable than not that what the plaintiffs allege
happened did in fact take place."

Citing Eden Hannon & Co. v. Sumitomo

Trust & Banking Co. . 914 F.2d 556 (4 th Cir. 1990).

It should be noted

that the holding in the Eden Hannon case has nothing to do with
authorizing plaintiffs to construct a web of circumstantial evidence from
which a jury may draw inferences which convince a jury that it is more
probable than not that defendants used plaintiffs' trade secrets.

The

Court in Eden Hannon expressly stated that: "Since our disposition of
this case does not depend on knowing whether Sumitomo

(defendant)

actually used this information, we will not dwell on this point."
dicta relied upon by plaintiffs cited in

The

Eden Hannon is found in

Greenberg v. Croydon Plastics Co., et al. , 378 F.Supp. 806 (E.D. Pa.
1974), a case with remarkably distinguishing facts which will not be
addressed here. Although the parties have not referred to and I have not
discovered any Utah cases that hold in a trade secrets cause of action,
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a plaintiff is only required to construct a web of circumstantial
evidence from which the jury may draw inferences which convince them that
it is more probable than not that PacifiCorp used plaintiffs' trade
secrets, for the purpose of this Motion and Decision the Court assumes
this to be an accurate statement of Utah law.
Plaintiffs' web of circumstantial evidence consists primarily of (1)
PacifiCorp's access to the claimed trade secrets and the significant
similarities between the Spring Canyon Power Plant and Currant Creek; (2)
that in response to an observation regarding the similarities of the two
projects, PacifiCorp stated (Thurgood), "We learned a lot from you guys";
(3) that without trade secret information, PacifiCorp could not have
developed Currant Creek in four months; (4) PacifiCorp deleted emails and
lost a key notebook relating to plaintiffs and PacifiCorp; (5) that
PacifiCorp never planned or tested a dry-cooled plant and could have only
made the decision for dry-cooling after receiving plaintiffs' dry-cooling
data; (6) PacifiCorp's abrupt stoppage of negotiations regarding purchase
of Spring Canyon assets; (7) that Mona has only a finite amount of room
for large scale power plants; (8) that plaintiffs had the only site
developed that could meet PacifiCorp's 2005 need for electricity; (9) an
internal memo from PacifiCorp

(Ian Andrews) to "stress dry-cooling

experience and experience with inlet chillers"; (10) that PacifiCorp
committed

to

the

Currant

Creek

project

without

any

preliminary

engineering; and (11) the retention of Jody Williams, plaintiffs' lawyer.
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iiV'iujii;iai.il. ureeK .and suggest that because of PacifiCorp's access to thei r
trade secrets and the significant similarities, a "power/full""" inference
of misappropriation
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from the Gimilaritie::; of I he two project,':! in M'n' present case i»t!i:ciuse I,:he
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that

PacifiCorp's

deletion

of

emails,
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Plaintiffs' suggestion
a
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economic
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decision based upon the availability of water, and that the dry-cooling
and wet-cooling technologies are widely recognized and understood in the
industry. The fact that an internal memo from PacifiCorp (Andrews) notes
"stress dry-cooling experience and experience with inlet chillers,''
technologies common and known in the industry, cannot reasonably support
an inference of misappropriation.
plaintiffs

have

failed

Finally, as determined hereinafter,

to produce

any

evidence

that

Williams/HRO

disclosed any confidential information.
Plaintiffs have not provided any evidence, direct or circumstantial,
that

specifically

misappropriated

identifies any trade secrets

by

PacifiCorp.

This

includes

that were used or
the

trade

secrets

plaintiffs claim were not publicly disclosed, including plaintiffs'
performance curve data intended to show the megawatt output at different
air temperatures actually disclosed in plaintiffs' public application for
an

air

permit,

plaintiffs'

energy

penalty

and

water

balances

calculations, both of which are readily ascertainable by PacifiCorp's
engineers and performed by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, and plaintiffs'
pro formas which contain projections of profitability of a non-regulated
entity which fails to consider PacifiCorp's structured specified rate of
return on i£s capitol investments as a highly regulated entity.

It is

important to note that the design, development, and construction analyses
prepared for PacifiCorp by Shaw/Stone & Webster/Burns, independently,
without any evidence ot reliance or use of plaintiffs' claimed trade

Il | j I! \ (:«e I I W E R

V.

i:i,„! "I'.'TP 1 n ) R P
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for Summary Judgment :ii s granted.
Nex t, P a c :i f i c Co rp s e ek s S umma ry Ji i dgme n t a s t o t h e p ] a i n t i f f s'
Second Count, for Breach of Contract, and Thd i: d Count, for Breach of the
Implied Covenar

of c->od Faith and Fad i: Dealing.

Both of these Counts
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are

premised

on

the
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and

Non-Disclosure

Agreement

("Confidentiality Agreement").
After carefully considering the parties' respective legal arguments,
the Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any specific
evidence from which a jury could draw a reasonable inference that
PacificCorp used any of the plaintiffs' confidential information.
plaintiffs'

suggestion

that

PacificCorp

u

must

have"

used

The

their

confidential information in order to develop Currant Creek in a short
time frame simply overlooks or ignores the undisputed facts referenced
hereinbefore.
As indicated hereinbefore, PacifiCorp's acquisition of Panda's
project assets was clearly instrumental to the time frame because it
provided a foundation for the development of Currant Creek. In addition,
PacifiCorp's involvement of Shaw/Stone & Webster, with its existing
database of information and experience, also created advantages and
assisted PacificCorp in moving the project forward more quickly.

Since

the plaintiffs have failed to present any evidence that PacificCorp used
its confidential information, in breach of the Confidentiality Agreement
and the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, PacifiCorp's Motion for
Summary Judgment as to Counts Two and Three is granted.
Finally,

the Court

determines

that unjust

enrichment

is not

available to plaintiffs because of the existence of the enforceable
written Confidentiality Agreement.
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PacifiCorp seeks Summary Judgment on this claim, arguing that

Thurgood,

who

was

then

PacifiCorp's

Director

of

Resource

Development, specifically inquired of Ms. Williams whether she had a
conflict of interest in representing PacificCorp and whether there was
any reason that she could not represent PacifiCorp in acquiring water for
Currant Creek.

According to Mr. Thurgood's deposition testimony, Ms.

Williams indicated that her work for the plaintiffs was complete and that
she was free to represent PacifiCorp. Based on these facts, PacificCorp
argues that no reasonable jury could find that by engaging Ms. Williams,
PacifiCorp intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs' contractual
relationship with HRO.
establish

the

PacifiCorp adds that the plaintiffs also cannot

"improper

purpose"

element

of

their

intentional

interference claim.
The Court determines that the plaintiffs have not presented any
actual evidence that in engaging HRO, PacifiCorp acted with the requisite
intent necessary to establish a claim of intentional interference.
Indeed, there is no evidence which would suggest that in engaging HRO,
PacifiCorp had any purpose other than to simply acquire water rights for
its Currant Creek power plant. In addition, the uncontroverted evidence
is that Ms. Williams specifically informed Mr. Thurgood that her work was
complete and that there would be no conflict of interest.

At the same

time, the undisputed evidence demonstrates that Mr. Thurgood was informed
by USA Power that it had already acquired the necessary water rights.
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turned to Ms. Williams, as it had done in the past, to acquire the water
it needed. These facts demonstrate that PacifiCorp engaged Ms. Williams,
its water lawyer, for the legitimate purpose of acquiring water relative
to its planned development of a power plant.
Based on the undisputed facts, the Court determines that PacifiCorp
is entitled to Summary Judgment on the plaintiffs' Sixth Count as a
matter of law.

Therefore, PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (Claim for Intentional Interference with Existing Contractual
Relations) is granted.
HRO's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re; Confidential Information
The plaintiffs have alleged two causes of action against HRO: Breach
of Fiduciary Duty and Breach of Duty of Confidentiality.

HRO's Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment concerning confidentiality asserts that the
plaintiffs have failed to show that HRO breached its fiduciary duties to
the plaintiffs by obtaining and communicating or using the plaintiffs'
confidential information to their detriment.

In making this argument,

HRO primarily relies on Shaw Res. Ltd., L.L.C., v. Pruitt, Gushee &
Bachtell. 142 P.3d 560, 565 (UT App. 2006).
In Shaw Resources, the plaintiffs asserted that their former counsel
obtained certain confidential maps showing possible gas formations and
confidential drilling locations and thereafter sought to develop that
area, in competition with the plaintiffs.

The Utah Court of Appeals

affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court stated:

PAfJR
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The Court also cannot determine whether this information was

indeed virtually identical to the information previously provided to
PacifiCorp by the plaintiffs themselves, as HRO claims.
Notwithstanding

the factual disputes

surrounding

the type of

information allegedly acquired by Ms. Williams, the dipositive issue for
the purpose of this Motion is whether the plaintiffs have presented
actual evidence that HRO communicated their confidential information to
PacifiCorp. Shaw Resources, 142 P.3d at 567.
simultaneous representation

The Court finds that

(assuming such occurred in this case),

without more, is not sufficient alone to support an inference that an
attorney has improperly used and/or disclosed confidential information.
Further, the plaintiffs' reliance on legal authority to the contrary
(including cases which suggest that simultaneous representation actually
gives rise to a presumption) is unpersuasive. Therefore, the plaintiffs'
suggested

inferences

confidential

that

information

HRO must
simply

have used

by

virtue

or disclosed

of

the

their

simultaneous

representation or the fact that both the plaintiffs and PacifiCorp sought
to

acquire

water

rights

or

that

they

had

similar

projects

is

insufficient.
Further, the plaintiffs have not identified any evidence which
would

support

a

reasonable

confidential information.

inference

that

HRO

used

or disclosed

Rather, the plaintiffs have provided mere
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unclear which of these Rules applies, the Court will not engage in an
either-or analysis, but instead rules that there are genuine issues of
material fact which preclude it from determining, as a matter of law,
whether HRO did or did not breach its obligations to the plaintiffs.
However, the Court determines that the dispositive issue presented
by this Motion is not whether HRO breached its duties to the plaintiffs,
but rather whether the plaintiffs can establish the element of causation.
Under Kilpatrick, 990 P.2d at 1291 and Shaw Resources, 142 P.2d at 569,
in order to establish the element of causation, plaintiffs must present
evidence that but for HRO's breach of its obligations, the plaintiffs
would have been benefitted. The Court finds that the plaintiffs have not
presented any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer causation
and actual damages as claimed by plaintiffs.
Instead, the plaintiffs merely hypothesize without any evidence to
support that if HRO had not represented PacifiCorp with respect to
Currant Creek, PacifiCorp would have certainly purchased their Spring
Canyon assets and signed a Joint Development Agreement with USA Power,
LLC. The plaintiffs alternative scenario is that if HRO had not assisted
PacifiCorp in securing water, PacifiCorp would have accepted their bid
on the RFP and entered into a power purchase agreement with plaintiffs.
Finally, plaintiffs claim that PacifiCorp terminated its negotiations
with

plaintiffs

"as

a

direct

result

of

HRO's

representation

of

PacifiCorp". As HRO points out, there is a complete absence of evidence
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HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment for Lack of Standing
and Speculative Damages
HRO/Williams, by this Motion, seeks an Order dismissing all claims
asserted by USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, for lack of
standing and alternatively, for speculative damages. The law is settled
in Utah that to establish standing, USA Power Partners and USA Power,
LLC, need only demonstrate "some distinct and palpable injury that gives
[them] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal dispute" to establish
standing. Sierra Club v. Utah Air Quality Bd. , 148 P.3d 975 (Utah 2006) .
The Court finds that USA Power, LLC, and USA Power Partners, LLC, have
stated a distinct and palpable injury that gives both a personal stake
in the outcome of the case, particularly in the form of attorney fees
related to the remedy of disgorgement. Accordingly, HRO/Williams' Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment dismissing plaintiffs' claims for lack of
standing is denied.

HRO/Williams' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

dismissing plaintiffs' claims alternatively as speculative damages has
been rendered moot based upon decisions in favor of HRO/Williams' Motions
for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Confidential Information and Re: Loyalty
Claim.
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins and
Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jodv L. Williams
USA Power's Motion to Strike the Jenkins' Affidavit and paragraphs
7 and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams is denied in
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Attorneys for Defendant PacifiCorp

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
USA POWER, LLC; USA POWER
PARTNERS. LLC; and SPRING
CANYON ENERGY, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

PACIFICORP; JODY L. WILLIAMS and
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP,
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING:
1. PACIFICORP'S MOTION FOR
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
(CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL
INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS)
2. PACIFICORP'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 050903412
Judge Tyrone E. Medley

Defendant PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (claim for intentional
interference with existing contractual relations) and Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing before the court on September 24, 2007. PacifiCorp was represented by P. Bruce Badger
and Peter W. Billings of Fabian & Clendenin. Plaintiffs were represented by Peggy Tomsic of
Tomsic & Peck and J. Chapman Petersen of Suroveil, Marklc, Isaacs & Levy. The Court, having
heard argument of counsel and having fully considered the parties' motion papers and being
otherwise fully apprised, and having entered its Memorandum Decision on October 15, 2007,
hereby enters the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision entered October 15, 2007,
1.

PacifiCorp's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (claim for intentional

interference with existing contractual relations) is granted. Accordingly, the Sixth Count of the
Second Amended Complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
2.

PacifiCorp's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Accordingly, the First

Count (Violation of the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act), Second Count (Breach of Contract),
Third Count (Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing), and Seventh
Count (Unjust Enrichment) of the Second Amended Complaint are dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this *^77

davof
day
of

UCf

2007.

as to fo

Peggy \jp5|*nsic
Tomsic & Peck
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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On the / y g day of October, 2007,1 hereby certify that I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the Proposed ORDER GRANTING: (1) PACIFICORP'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT (CLAIM FOR INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH EXISTING
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS) AND (2) PACIFICORP'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT as

follows:
Via Hand Delivery
Peggy A. Tomsic
Kristopher S. Kaufman
TOMSIC & PECK
136 East South Temple, Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
Via U.S. Mail
Thomas R. Karrenberg
Scott A. Call
Anderson & Karrenberg
50 West Broadway, Suite 700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams
and Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP
J. Chapman Petersen
Robert Surovell
Surovell, Markle, Isaacs & Levy
4010 University Drive, Suite 200
Fairfax, Virginia 22030
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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ANDERSON & KARRENBERG
Thomas R. Karrenberg (#3726)
Scott A. Call (#0544)
Stephen P. Horvat (#6249)
Jennifer R. Eshelman (#9155)
700 Chase Tower
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone:
(801) 534-1700
Facsimile:
(801) 364-7697
tkarrenberg@aklawfirm. com

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 2 5 2007

H*"

IKE COUNTY
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants Jody L. Williams and Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

USA POWER, LLC, USA POWER
PARTNERS, LLC and SPRING CANYON
ENERGY, LLC,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
PACIFICORP, JODY L. WILLIAMS and
HOLME, ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP,
Defendants.

;
;)
;)
)
])

ORDER RE: HOLME ROBERTS &
OWEN, LLP AND JODY L. WILLIAMS'
MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND RELATED MOTIONS

]
> Civil No. 050903412
;
]) The Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
]

Defendants Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment RE: Confidential Information, Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE:
Loyalty Claim and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against USA Power, LLC and USA Power
Partners, LLC for Lack of Standing and Speculative Damages came on for hearing before the Court

on September 24, 2007 and October 2, 2007. Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams
were represented by Thomas R. Karrenberg, Scott A. Call and Stephen P. Horvat of Anderson &
Karrenberg. Plaintiffs were represented by Peggy A. Tomsic of Tomsic & Peck and J. Chapman
Petersen of Surovell, Markle, Isaacs & Levy. The Court, having carefully reviewed and considered
the various pleadings and papers submitted by the parties with respect to those motions, and USA
Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins and Paragraphs 7 and 8 of the
Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams and USA Power's Motion for Leave to File
Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A. Tomsic, and having rendered its Memorandum Decision on
October 15, 2007, hereby enters the following order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
For the reasons set forth in the Memorandum Decision dated October 15, 2007,
1.

Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment RE: Confidential Information is granted. The Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief in the
Second Amended Complaint entitled "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" to the extent that it is premised
upon using or disclosing confidential or proprietary information gained from USA Power and
Plaintiffs' Fifth Claim for Relief in the Second Amended Complaint for "Breach of Duty of
Confidentiality" are hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment RE: Loyalty Claim is granted. The Plaintiffs' Fourth Claim for Relief in the Second
Amended Complaint for "Breach of Fiduciary Duty" is hereby dismissed with prejudice, with the
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exception of Plaintiffs' claim for disgorgement of fees from Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody
L. Williams.
3.

USA Power's Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Michael G. Jenkins and Paragraphs 7

and 8 of the Supplemental Affidavit of Jody L. Williams is denied.
4.

Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment for Lack of Standing and Speculative Damages is denied as to standing. The motion to
dismiss the Plaintiffs' claims as speculative damages is rendered moot based upon the Court's
decisions granting Holme, Roberts & Owen, LLP and Jody L. Williams' Motions for Partial
Summary Judgment RE: Confidential Information and RE: Loyalty Claim.
5.

USA Power's Motion for Leave to File the Supplemental Affidavit of Peggy A.

Tomsic is granted.
DATED this *J5

day of October, 2007
BY THE COURT:

t
Honorable Tyrone E. Medley
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:
T0MSI^& PECK
:-•:
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

yj*^

day of October, 2007, I did cause a true and

correct copy of the foregoing ORDER REGARDING HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, LLP AND
JODY

L.

WILLIAMS'

MOTIONS

FOR

PARTIAL

SUMMARY

JUDGMENT

AND

RELATED MOTIONS to be served via hand-delivery or first class mail, postage prepaid, as
specified below, upon the following:
Hand-Delivery
Peggy A. Tomsic
Tomsic & Peck
136 East South Temple
Suite 800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
P. Bruce Badger
Fabian & Clendenin
215 South State Street
Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
First Class Mail
J. Chapman Petersen
Surovell Markle Isaacs & Levy, PLC
4010 University Drive
Suite 200
Fairfax,/Virginia 22030
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Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
United States District Court,D. Utah,Central Division.
HAMMERTON, INC., a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,
v.
Robert HEISTERMAN, individually and dba Kahm
Design, and Kahm Industries, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company, Defendants.
No. 2.06-CV-00806 TS.
May 9, 2008.
Jerome Romero, Lewis M. Francis, Jones Waldo
Holbrook & McDonough, Salt Lake City, UT, for
Plaintiff.
Kyle W. Grimshaw, Robert S. Rapp, Madson &
Austin, Salt Lake City, UT, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER ON
DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
TED STEWART, District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff Hammerton, Inc., and Defendants
Robert Heisterman and Kahm Industries, LLC
("Kahm Design"), are competing manufacturers of
high-end "rustic" light fixtures. In its Amended
Complaint, Plaintiff alleges four causes of action
against Defendants: (1) unfair competition under
the Lanham Act
; (2) unfair competition under
Utah common law; (3) trade secret misappropriation; and (4) design patent infringement. The
Court previously granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Plaintiffs design patent claim.
Defendants now move for summary judgment on
Plaintiffs remaining claims.
FN1.15U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Currently before the Court are Defendants' three
motions for summary judgment, styled as follows:
(1) Motion for Summary Judgment RE Nonin-
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fringement of Trade Dress (the "Unfair Competition Motion"); (2) Motion for Summary Judgment
RE Claims of Trade Secret Misappropriation (the
"Trade Secret Motion"); and (3) Motion for Summary Judgment RE: "Trademark Infringement" (the
"Trademark Motion"). As both Parties agree that
Plaintiff does not assert a claim for trademark infringement, the Trademark Motion will be denied
as moot.
The Court heard oral argument on the Unfair Competition Motion and the Trade Secret Motion at a
hearing held on March 10, 2008, and took the matter under advisement. After ruling on Defendants'
Consolidated Motion to Strike and Exclude-filed by
Defendants in connection with their summary judgment motions-the Court requested supplemental
briefing on the Unfair Competition Motion. Having
carefully considered the Parties' memoranda, the
applicable law, and the record before it, the Court
will grant the Unfair Competition Motion and deny
the Trade Secret Motion.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party
can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matFN2
ter of law.
In considering whether genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines
whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence
presented.
The Court is required to construe all
facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
FN2.Se*?Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
FN3.See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
All U.S. 242, 249 (1986); Clifton v. Craig,
924 F.2d 182, 183 (10th Cir.1991).
FN A.See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
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(1986); Wright v. Southwestern Bell Tel
Co., 925 F.2d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 1991).
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not properly identified the combination or combinations of design elements that comprise its alleged
trade dress or trade dresses.

II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff began manufacturing its handmade rustic
light fixtures and other furniture in 1996 under the
FN5
name "Mountain Moose Design."
According to
Plaintiffs President, Bill Shott, "the market for
[Plaintiffs] light fixture designs is quite small, given their unique styling, as well as the high price of
such
hand-crafted
products."
Nonetheless,
Plaintiff has enjoyed considerable business success,
garnering nearly $6 million of revenue in 2006.
Likewise, Plaintiffs product base, which now contains six different lines of light fixtures, has significantly expanded since its original 1996 catalog.
FN5.Docket No. 146 Ex. 4, at U 6.

Plaintiff also claims that Defendants have misappropriated its customer list, which, according to
Plaintiff, is a trade secret protected under the Utah
Uniform Trade Secrets Act. On July 27, 2006, Mr.
Shott emailed a copy of Plaintiffs customer list for
the Rocky Mountain region to David Holbrook,
Plaintiffs long-time sales representative. The list
contained some 535 customers along with their
contact information. Shortly after receiving the list,
Mr. Holbrook terminated his relationship with
Plaintiff and began representing Defendants.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants misappropriated
this list as evidenced by the customer names common to both Plaintiffs customer list and Defendants' customer list.

FN6.Docket No. 147 Ex. 7, at \ 13.
Defendant Heisterman is a former employee of
Plaintiff. He worked for approximately two years in
Plaintiffs product development department before
leaving sometime in early 2000. Around March
2000, Defendant Heisterman formed Kahm Design
and began producing competing products shortly
thereafter. Plaintiff and Defendants compete in the
same market for high-end "rustic" light fixtures.
Defendants manufacture a number of products that
are very similar to those manufactured by Plaintiff.
*2 Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated §§
43(a) and 43(c) of the Lanham Act, as well as Utah
common law, by "knocking-off' Plaintiffs light
fixture designs. According to Plaintiff, Defendants
manufacture products for customers straight out of
Plaintiffs catalog at a significant discount below
Plaintiffs prices. Plaintiff claims trade dress rights
in a number of products allegedly copied, manufactured, and sold by Defendants. Accordingly,
Plaintiff produced a list during discovery containing some 50 products from five different product
lines that Defendants have allegedly infringed.
However, as explained in detail below, Plaintiff has

III. DISCUSSION
Defendants assert they are entitled to summary
judgment on each of Plaintiffs three remaining
claims: (1) unfair competition under the Lanham
Act; (2) unfair competition under Utah common
law; and (3) trade secret misappropriation.
A. Lanham Act Claims
According to Plaintiff, its cause of action for unfair
competition under the Lanham Act is actually two
separate claims: (1) trade dress infringement under
§ 43(a); and (2) dilution by tarnishment under §
43(c). The Court will address each in turn.
L Trade Dress Infringement
Section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act provides a federal
FN 7
cause of action for trade dress infringement.
Although trade dress protection was originally limited
to product packaging, it has since been extended to
"the design of a product."
"The trade dress of a
product is its overall image and appearance, and
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may include features such as size, shape, color or
color combinations, texture, graphics, and even particular sales techniques."
Additionally, a
plaintiff may seek trade dress rights in a line or
grouping of products "by establishing that the
'overall look' in each separate product is
• , + ,«FN10
consistent.
FN7. General Motors Corp. v. Urban Gorilla, LLC, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th
Cir.2007).
FN8. Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros.,
Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000).
FN9. Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc.,
304 F.3d 964, 977 (10th Cir.2002).
FN 10. Yurman Design, Inc. v. PAJ, Inc.,
262 F.3d 101, 116 (2d Cir.2001) (quoting
Walt Disney Co. v. Good Times Home
Video Corp., 830 F.Supp. 762. 766
(S.D.N.Y.1993)); see also Rose Art Indus.,
Inc. v. Swanson, 235 F.3d 165, 173 (3d
Cir.2000) ("In presenting a case for trade
dress infringement, a plaintiff can group
together any number of products in any
way it sees fit, as long as the products have
a consistent overall look.").
To recover for trade dress infringement under §
43(a), "a plaintiff must show: (1) The trade dress is
inherently distinctive or has become distinctive
through secondary meaning; (2) There is a likelihood of confusion among consumers as to the
source of the competing products; and (3) The trade
dress is nonfunctional."
Because product
designs cannot be inherently distinctive, a plaintiff
seeking protection for product design trade dress
must prove that the design has acquired secondary
meaning.
FN11. Urban Gorilla, 500 F.3d at 1227.
FN 12. Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 212,
216.

*3 However, before reaching the issues of secondary meaning, likelihood of confusion, and functionality, a plaintiff asserting trade dress rights in a
product design "must articulate the design elements
that compose the trade dress."
The "focus on
the overall look of a product [or products] does not
permit a plaintiff to dispense with an articulation of
the specific elements which comprise its distinct
FN14
dress."
The jury cannot make determinations
regarding secondary meaning, likelihood of confusion, and functionality, "without knowing precisely
what
the
plaintiff
is
trying
to
protect."
Moreover, "courts will ... be unable
to shape narrowly-tailored relief if they do not
know what distinctive combination of ingredients
deserves protection."
Consequently, a trade
dress plaintiffs failure to identify the specific elements of its trade dress entitles the defendant to
judgment as a matter of law on a trade dress
claim.FN17
FN13. Yurman Design, 262 F.3d at 116.
Although the Yurman Design case dealt
with a plaintiff asserting trade dress protection in an entire line of products, the requirement of listing the design elements
that constitute the claimed trade dress applies with equal force to product design
trade dress claims in individual products.
See J. Thomas McCarthy, 1 McCarthy on
Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 8:3
(4th ed. 1992) ("[I]t will not do to solely
identify in litigation such combination as
'the trade dress.' Rather, the discrete elements which make up that combination
should be separated out and identified in a
list. Only then can the court and the parties
coherently define exactly what the trade
dress consists of and determine whether
that trade dress is valid and if what the accused is doing is an infringement.");
Tumblebus Inc. v. Cranmer, 399 F.3d 754,
768 (6th Cir.2005) ("To recover for tradedress infringement under § 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, a party must first identify
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what particular elements or attributes comprise the protectable trade dress ")
FN 14 Yurman Design 262 F 3d at 117
(quoting Landscape Forms Inc v
Columbia Cascade Co 113 F 3d 373, 381
(2d Cir 1997)) (emphasis removed)
(internal quotation marks omitted)

FN18DocketNo 91 Ex l , a t 3
Plaintiff also provided a list of its allegedly infringed products and the corresponding products of
Defendants that allegedly infringed thereon
At the close of discovery, Plaintiffs list was limited
to a set of individual products Plaintiff did not
modify its response to Interrogatory No 2 within
the discovery period, or at any time for that matter

FN15/J
FN 19 Docket No 180, at Ex 9
FN 16 Id (quoting Landscape Forms 113
F 3d at 381)
FN17 Id at 118
In this case, Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiffs trade dress infringement
claim because Plaintiff has failed to properly articulate the design elements that comprise its alleged
trade dress Despite two rounds of briefing and a
hearing on the Unfair Competition Motion, the
Court still does not know what Plaintiffs alleged
trade dress or trade dresses look like In fact, the record shows that Plaintiffs trade dress claims have
substantially evolved during the history of the case
with the most significant changes coming after the
close of discovery
During the discovery period, Plaintiff answered
interrogatory ("Interrogatory No 2") asking it
"identify the design features, design elements,
other aspects of [its products] that compose
define the asserted trade dress rights" as follows

an
to
or
or

The non-functional ornamental designs and
shapes of Hammerton's said lighting fixtures In
addition, other design elements which distinguish
Hammerton's products are the combination of 1)
the fact that they are individually sculpted from
metal, rather than being cast m a mold and mass
produced, like Hammerton's other competitors, 2)
how the Hammerton metals are distressed, 3) the
way that Hammerton creates its unique bark textureJVI and 4)} the Hammerton hand-modeled fin,FN18
ish

On October 3, 2007, two days after the close of discovery, Plaintiff supplemented its list of infringed
products to apparently include all of its products
with a "Hammerton metal pine cone," a
"Hammerton metal pine bough," or a "Hammerton
metal bark-like texture and/or wood-like
finish "FN20Then in its opposition to the Unfair
Competition Motion filed on January 18, 2008,
Plaintiff appeared to assert trade dress rights in its
entire "Timber Creek" and "Chateau" product lines
Plaintiff stated that its "Timber Creek collection is
characterized by the use of metal simulated pine
bark, pine cones, pine boughs, and a wood-like
modeled finish on its metal products" and that the
Chateau line "involves the use of certain types of
metal scroll-work, curved arms, twisted supports,
faux rivet details^ along with hammered and distressed finishes "
FN20 Docket No 180, at Ex 7
FN21 Docket No 143, at 8-9
*4 In an Order dated March 27, 2008, the Court
ruled that it would disregard the post-discovery
changes to Plaintiffs trade dress claims for purposes of the Unfair Competition Motion
^More
specifically, the Court precluded Plaintiff from relying on the broad definitions of its alleged trade
dress that were revealed after the close of discovery-including those proffered in Plaintiffs opposition memorandum-because Plaintiffs failure to
timely disclose them during the discovery period
was unjustified and extremely prejudicial to De-
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fendants.
FN22.Docket No. 212.
In light of this decision, the Court provided
Plaintiff with an opportunity to file a supplemental
memorandum on the Unfair Competition Motion.
However, instead of outlining its trade dress claims
based on an articulation of a combination of design
elements constituting the alleged trade dress, which
was properly disclosed during the discovery period,
Plaintiffs supplemental memorandum merely attempts to avert the Court's March 27 Order.
Despite the clear language in its opposition memorandum to the contrary,
Plaintiff claims that it
has not asserted trade dress rights in the entire Timber Creek and Chateau product lines. Plaintiff states
that it "has always claimed that [Defendants are]
knocking off particular light fixture designs" and,
accordingly, it revealed the products at issue during
the discovery period.
Plaintiff further asserts
that it simply "grouped" the infringed products disclosed during the discovery period "for purposes of
reference and analysis" in its opposition memorFN25
andum.
According to Plaintiff, "[t]his grouping did not change the nature of [Plaintiffs] unfair
competition claims, or add to the number of light
fixtures at issue, but only served
to better identify
FN 9 6
the product for analysis."
FN23..W. at 7 ("Hammerton's Timber
Creek and Chateau Product Lines Have
Protectible [sic] Trade Dress Elements.").
FN24.Docket No. 222, at 7.
FN25 Jrf. at 6-7.
FN26.M at 8.
The Court cannot accept Plaintiffs argument, which
turns the discovery process on its head. The design
elements that make up Plaintiffs alleged trade dress
or trade dresses are matters of fact that, by definition, have been within Plaintiffs knowledge from
the inception of the case. Accordingly, Plaintiff was

obligated to disclose its alleged trade dress, including an articulation of the combination of design elements that constitutes that trade dress, during discovery pursuant to Defendants' discovery requests.
Despite the supplemental briefing opportunity,
Plaintiff has not shown the Court any disclosure
made during the discovery period where Plaintiff
articulated the combinations of design elements
upon which Plaintiff relies in its opposition memorandum. In fact, other than Plaintiffs response to Interrogatory No. 2, Plaintiff has not pointed to any
disclosure made during the discovery period that articulates a combination of design features comprising its alleged trade dress.
FN27. In its supplemental memorandum,
Plaintiff states in conclusory fashion:
"Moreover, there were numerous depositions after [Plaintiffs response to Interrogatory No. 2] which further fleshed out the
trade dress elements and particular product
designs at issue "Id. at 7. However,
Plaintiff offers no citation to the record to
support this statement. The Court is "not
obligated to comb the record in order to
make
[Plaintiffs]
arguments
for
[it]." Mitchell v. City of Moore, 218 F.3d
1190, 1199 (10th Cir.2000).
In "grouping" its infringed products in its opposition memorandum, Plaintiff was, in reality, articulating two new combinations of design features
(i.e., two new trade dresses) that were not disclosed
during discovery. Plaintiff cannot wait until after
the close of discovery, indeed until filing its opposition to summary judgment, to disclose the combination of design elements that comprise its trade
dress claims. Doing so deprived Defendants of the
opportunity to conduct discovery with respect to the
specific elements of each trade dress and whether
their combination has acquired secondary meaning,
is nonfunctional, and is likely to be confused with
Defendants' products. If the Court were to accept
Plaintiffs argument, no defendant would ever be
able to properly prepare a defense against a product
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design trade dress claim because a trade dress
plaintiff could simply wait until after the close of
discovery to reveal the combination of design elements that make up its trade dress Therefore, as
already stated by the Court m its March 27 Order,
Plaintiff cannot rely on the trade dress definitions
stated in its opposition brief
*5 As noted above, Plaintiff makes no attempt m its
supplemental memorandum to identify an articulation of a combination of design elements, properly
disclosed during discovery, that constitutes its
claimed trade dress
Furthermore, Plaintiff has
completely abandoned the list of design elements
contained in its response to Interrogatory No 2 as a
possible definition At no point in either its opposition memorandum or its supplemental memorandum, which was submitted after the Court's
March 27 Order, does Plaintiff offer the response to
Interrogatory No 2 as a definition for its alleged
trade dress As Plaintiff does not rely on the response to Interrogatory No 2 as the working definition of its trade dress, neither will the Court Accordingly, m the absence of any properly disclosed
identification of the combination of design elements that comprise Plaintiffs alleged trade dress
or trade dresses, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs trade dress infringement claim
FN28 This problem is exacerbated because it is unclear whether Plaintiff (1)
claims separate trade dress rights m each
of the allegedly-infringed products disclosed by Plaintiff during discovery or (2)
claims a trade dress that is embodied in
multiple products Assuming the former,
Plaintiff must articulate the design elements that constitute the distinct trade
dress for each individual product Plaintiff
has not done so Assuming the latter,
Plaintiff must articulate the combination of
design elements that make up the claimed
dress and show that each product m the
grouping or product line embodies that
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dress (z e that each product has a consistent overall look) Plaintiff has done
neither
Notably, even if Plaintiff had opted to rely on the
list of design elements set forth in its response to
Interrogatory No 2, that list does not describe a
trade dress entitled to protection under § 43(a) of
the Lanham Act Plaintiffs response reads as follows
The non-functional ornamental designs and
shapes of Hammerton's said lighting fixtures In
addition, other design elements which distinguish
Hammerton's products are the combination of 1)
the fact that they are individually sculpted from
metal, rather than being cast in a mold and mass
produced, like Hammerton's other competitors, 2)
how the Hammerton metals are distressed, 3) the
way that Hammerton creates its unique bark textureM and 4) the Hammerton hand-modeled fin, FN29
ish

FN29 Docket No 91 Ex 1, at 3
The first three of the four elements in this combination appear to claim the processes by which
Plaintiff produces its light fixtures However, §
43(a) of the Lanham Act does not offer protection
for manufacturing processes, which are the exclusive province of patent law Moreover, to the extent
these elements might refer to the appearance created by Plaintiffs manufacturing processes,
Plaintiff has not specified what that appearance is
Plaintiff has submitted its catalogs, which contain
pictures of the products on its list of infringed
FN30
products
However, these pictures show a
number of distressed metals and finishes that are
very different in appearance Additionally, the majority of the allegedly infringed products do not
contain both a distressed metal element and a bark
texturing element and, thus, do not embody the
same "overall look" (z e the claimed trade dress)
Simply stated, even looking at pictures of the allegedly infringed products, the Court cannot discern
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what the trade dress vaguely described m Plaintiffs
response to Interrogatory No 2 looks like And, remarkably, Plaintiff has made no attempt to point it
out Without knowledge of what Plaintiffs alleged
trade dress looks like, the Court cannot even begin
to determine whether it might be entitled to protection under the Lanham Act
FN30 Docket No 146 Ex 4, at Exs A-E
*6 In conclusion, it appears to the Court that much
of the confusion surrounding Plaintiffs trade dress
claims stems from a fundamental misunderstanding
of the protection afforded under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act Section 43(a) does not protect manufacturers from having their products copied by competitors "The Lanham Act does not exist to reward
manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular device, that is the purpose of the patent law
and its period of exclusivity "
Rather, "the underlying purpose of the Lanham Act is protecting
consumers and manufacturers from deceptive representations of affiliation and origin "
"Accordingly, trade dress protection is directly tied to the
combination of specific features (i e, the trade
dress) embedded in a product that identifies the
source of the product to the consuming public
Without a careful identification of the combination
of design features that compnse the trade dress, and
a showing that the trade dress has obtained secondary meaning and is nonfunctional, trade dress law
could easily be used to achieve patent-like protection for products without regard to the requirements
and limitations of patent law
This potential
for misuse of trade dress law is of particular concern in product design cases, as "product design almost invariably serves purposes other than source
TN34
identification"
Thus, "courts have exercised
particular 'caution' when extending protection to
product designs "
FN31 Traffix Devices, Inc v Marketing
Displays, Inc, 532 U S 23, 35 (2001)
FN32 Landscape Forms, 113 F3dat375.

FN33 See Quahtex Co v Jacobson Prods
Co 514 U S 159, 164-65(1995)
FN34 WaUMaU Stores 529 U S at 213
FN35 Landscape Forms 113 F 3d at 380
(quoting Jeffrey Milstew \ Gieger,
Lcmloi Roth Inc, 58 F 3d 27, 32 (2d
Cir 1995))
In bringing its trade dress infringement claim,
Plaintiff seeks to prevent Defendants from
"knocking off its products-relief that is simply not
afforded under the Lanham Act As highlighted in
Plaintiffs supplemental memorandum, "Plaintiff
has always claimed that [Defendants are] knocking
off particular light fixture designs "
This focus
is illustrated by the following statement, made by
Plaintiffs counsel at the March 10, 2008 Hearing
FN36 Docket No 222, at 7
Now [Defendants' counsel] raises some issues
and tries to say there is no way you can figure out
how to enjoin us from doing what we're doing I
think it's pretty clear that we can craft such an injunction, which is stop knocking off products out
of their catalog We've given specific product
numbers and we've shown where they have
knocked off those specific product numbers It's
not a question of trying to define this in this
amorphous way, you can't have something with
scrollwork, you can't have something with
hammered finishes You just can't go into our
catalog and build the things out of our catalog at
a discount for other customers
FN37 Transcript of March 10, 2008 Hearing, at 40 16-41 2 (emphasis added)
However, Plaintiff is not entitled under the Lanham
Act to prevent Defendants from copying its
products without carefully articulating the combination of design elements in those products that is
nonfunctional and has achieved secondary meaning
As noted above, Plaintiff has completely failed to
properly identify the combination of design ele-
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ments that constitute its trade dress.
*7 Therefore, for each of the reasons stated above,
the Court will grant the Unfair Competition Motion
with respect to Plaintiffs trade dress infringement
claims under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
FN38. In its supplemental memorandum,
Plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its
March 27, 2008 ruling with respect to the
Declaration of Michele King and Plaintiffs
pre-2000 sales data. In light of the above
disposition of Plaintiffs trade dress infringement claims, those issues are now
moot. Accordingly, the Court declines to
reconsider its March 27, 2008 Order.
2. Dilution by Tarnishment
In addition to its claims for trade dress infringement
under § 43(a), Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to
injunctive relief under § 43(c) for dilution by tarnishment because Defendants are allegedly flooding the market with products that are of inferior
quality.
A plaintiff is entitled to injunctive relief under §
43(c) for dilution by tarnishment of its mark only
FN39
where the mark is "famous."
A mark is
"famous" for purposes of § 43(c) "if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the
United States as a designation of source of the
A

'

*+U

11

»

F N 4 0

goods or services of the mark s owner.
FN39.15U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1).
FN40.M at§ 1125(c)(2).
As stated above, Plaintiff has failed to show that its
alleged trade dress is entitled to protection under
the Lanham Act. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs § 43(c)
claim. Moreover, even if Plaintiff had properly
defined its alleged trade dress, Plaintiff has offered
no evidence to show that its trade dress is widely
recognized by the general public. Rather, Plaintiff
admits that "the market for [its] light fixture

products is quite small, given their unique styling,
and the pric
price of such high-end hand-crafted fix1
6
„FN4
tures."^
*'141
" Accordingly, the Court will grant the
Unfair Competition Motion with respect to
Plaintiffs claim for dilution by tarnishment under §
43(c) of the Lanham Act.
FN41.Docket No. 143, at xi If 13.
B. Common Law Unfair Competition
Plaintiff also asserts a common law unfair competition claim against Defendants, claiming that Defendants have passed off their goods in the marketplace as those of Plaintiff and that in so doing Defendants have misappropriated Plaintiffs good will.
The Supreme Court has made clear that state laws
are preempted by federal patent law to the extent
that they purport to grant "patent-like protection to
intellectual creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter of federal
law." FN4'"Importantly, federal patent law leaves
room for states to "protect businesses in the use of
their trademarks, labels, or distinctive dress in the
packaging of goods so as to prevent others, by imitating such markings, from misleading purchasers as
to the source of the goods."
Thus, state unfair
competition laws, which protect "against copying
of nonfunctional aspects of consumer products
which have acquired secondary meaning such that
they operate as a designation of source," are not
P]s^44
preempted.
However, where a state law
provides protection to product design features regardless of whether they operate as a designation of
source, that law conflicts with federal patent law
FN45
and is preempted.
FN42. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989).
FN43. Id. at 154 (quoting Sears Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 232
(1964)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
FN44J<£ at 158 (emphasis added).

© 2008 Thomson ReutersAVest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

Page 9

Slip Copy
Slip Copy, 2008 WL 2004327 (D.Utah)

¥N45.See Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1365
(Fed.Cir.1999) ("If under the rubric of
'trade dress' protection, state law should
purport to give [the plaintiff] the right to
exclude others from using a feature that
confers a significant non-reputation-related
market advantage over its competitors, the
state law cause of action would conflict
with federal patent law principles and be
preempted.").
The Court finds that Defendants are also entitled to
summary judgment on Plaintiffs common law unfair competition claim. Plaintiffs common law unfair competition claim is based entirely on Defendant's alleged copying of Plaintiffs light fixtures.
However, as detailed above, Plaintiff has failed to
properly identify the combination of design features
embodied in its products that operates as a designation of source-/.e., its alleged trade dress. Without a
clear understanding of what Plaintiffs alleged trade
dress is, no jury can reasonably find that the alleged
trade dress does in fact operate as a designation of
source such that its imitation could mislead purchasers as to the source of Plaintiffs products. And,
if a jury cannot reasonably find that Plaintiffs alleged trade dress actually operates as a designation
of source, then Plaintiff cannot recover for unfair
competition under Utah common law. To conclude
otherwise would require the Court to assume that
Utah common law protects against copying product
designs without regard to whether they operate as a
designation of source, which it cannot do without
being preempted by federal patent law. Accordingly, the Court will grant the Unfair Competition
Motion with respect to Plaintiffs action for common law unfair competition.
C. Trade Secret Misappropriation
*8 Under the Utah Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the
"UTSA"), a plaintiff may seek damages and injunctive relief for "actual or threatened" misapproFN46
priation of its trade secret.
Analysis under the

UTSA takes place in two steps. First, the finder of
fact must determine whether the information in
question constitutes a trade secret entitled to protection. Second, the finder of fact must determine
whether the trade secret was misappropriated.
FN46.Utah Code Ann. §§ 13-24-3(1),
13-24-4(1).
1. Existence of a Trade Secret
Plaintiff claims that its customer list is entitled to
protection as a trade secret under the UTSA. Defendants contend that Plaintiff disclosed its customer list to Mr. Holbrook, Plaintiffs sales representative, without any confidentiality obligations and,
therefore, cannot claim trade secret protection.
The threshold issue in any trade secret misappropriation case under the UTSA is "whether, in fact,
there
is
a
trade
secret
to
be
FN47
misappropriated."
Whether certain information
"constitutes a trade secret is a question of
fact."FN48According to the UTSA,
FN47. Medspring Group, Inc. v. Feng, 368
F.Supp.2d 1270, 1276 (D.Utah 2005)
(quoting Novell, Inc. v. Timpanogos Research Group, Inc., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d 1197,
1212 (Utah Dist.Ct.1998)).
FN48. Envirotech Corp. v. Callahan, SI2
P.2d 487, 494 (Utah Ct.App.1994).
"Trade Secret" means information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, devise, method, technique, or process that:
(a) derives independent economic value, actual or
potential, from not being generally known to, and
not being readily ascertainable by proper means
by, other persons who can obtain economic value
from its disclosure or use; and
(b) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its
secrecy.FN49
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FN49.Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4)(a)-(b).
Customer lists constitute trade secrets "where the
customers are not known in the trade or are discoverable
only
by
extraordinary
T
efforts."
However, "where the customers are
readily ascertainable outside the [owner's] business
as prospective users or consumers of the [owner's]
services or products, trade secret protection will not
attach."
FN50. Microbiological Research Corp. v.
Muna, 625 P.2d 690, 700 (Utah 1981)
(quoting Leo Silfen, Inc. v. Cream, 278
N.E.2d 636, 639-41 (N.Y.I972)).
FN51.A* (quoting Leo Silfen, 278 N.E.2d
at 639-41).
Additionally, even where customer lists would otherwise constitute trade secrets, the owner must
make reasonable efforts to maintain their
secrecy.FN52 For example, in Medspring Group,
Inc. v. Feng,
the court denied a motion for
preliminary injunction in part because Plaintiff disclosed alleged trade secret information to an unrelated third-party who was not subject to a nonFN54
disclosure agreement.
However, the presence
of an express confidentiality or non-disclosure
agreement is not necessarily required for a trade
secret owner's efforts to be "reasonable under the
circumstances."
In fact, Utah courts expressly
allow a trade secret misappropriation action to proceed where the secret was conveyed to the defendant under an "implied agreement limiting disclos„ FN56
ure.
FN52.Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4)(b).
FN53. Medspring Group, Inc. v. Feng, 368
F.Supp.2d 1270 (D.Utah 2005).
FN54. M a t 1278.
FN55.&eUtah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(4)(b);
Marshall v. Gipson Steel, Inc., 806 So.2d
266, 272 (Miss.2002) (holding that Missis-
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sippi Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which
contains nearly identical language to the
UTSA, does not require a non-disclosure
agreement "per se" in order to satisfy the
reasonable secrecy efforts requirement);
Southwest Why, Inc. v. Nutrition 101, Inc.,
117 F.Supp.2d 770, 779 (C.D.I11.2000)
("[A] restrictive covenant or confidentiality agreement is not a prerequisite to recovery under the [Illinois Trade Secrets
Act].")FN56. Water & Energy Sys. Tech. v. Keil,
974 P.2d 821, 822 (Utah 1999).
The Court finds that there is an issue of material
fact regarding whether Plaintiffs customer list constitutes a trade secret. According to Mr. Shott,
Plaintiffs President, Plaintiff compiled its customer
list over some ten years at great expense to the
company and has taken the following steps to maintain its secrecy: (1) assigning a password to the
electronic file containing the list, (2) allowing only
a few employees in the sales department to access
it, and (3) requiring key employees to sign confidentiality agreements.
Mr. Shott further indicates that he disclosed a portion of Plaintiffs customer list to Mr. Holbrook, Plaintiffs sales representative for the Rocky Mountain region, pursuant to
a relationship of trust with Mr. Holbrook.
According to Plaintiff, Mr. Holbrook was acting as
Plaintiffs agent at the time and, therefore, had a fiduciary duty to not disclose or otherwise use the
customer list to injure Plaintiff. While Defendants
have produced evidence that Plaintiffs list was disclosed to Mr. Holbrook in the absence of any express indication of a duty to maintain the list's confidentiality, a jury could reasonably conclude that
an agency relationship existed and that Plaintiff actions in disclosing the customer list to Mr. Holbrook were, therefore, reasonably calculated to
maintain the list's secrecy.
FN57.Docket No. 147 Ex. 7, at f t 31-33.
FN58Jtf. a t t 36.
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*9 Defendants offer evidence that at least part of
Plaintiffs list is comprised of contacts given to it
by Mr. Holbrook. However, there is no evidence as
to how many of the contacts were attributable to
Mr. Holbrook. In the absence of this information,
the fact that Mr. Holbrook provided some customer
information that may have been included in
Plaintiffs list does not entitle Defendants to judgment as a matter of law that Plaintiffs list is not a
trade seciet or that Plaintiff is not the rightful owner of the list.
Additionally, Defendants offer lay opinion testimony that industry practice was for manufacturers
to disclose their customer lists to independent sales
representatives like Mr. Holbrook without any duty
of confidentiality in order to allow the sales representatives to freely market the manufacturers'
products. Plaintiff offers no evidence concerning
industry practice. Nonetheless, a jury could reasonably decide to reject Defendants' industry practice
evidence in favor of Plaintiffs agency theory, concluding that Plaintiffs relationship with Mr. Holbrook did not conform to industry practices. To decide otherwise would require the Court to weigh
facts and determine issues of credibility, which it
cannot do at the summary judgment stage.
2. Misappropriation
Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiffs trade secret misappropriation claim because Plaintiff has offered no evidence that Defendants used Plaintiffs customer list.
Plaintiff argues that there is sufficient evidence of
access and similarity to preclude summary judgment.
The UTSA defines trade secret misappropriation as
follows:
(a) acquisition of a trade secret of another by a
person who knows or has reason to know that the
trade secret was acquired by improper means; or
(b) disclosure or use of a trade secret of another
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without express or implied consent by a person
who:

(ii) at the time of disclosure or use, knew or
had reason to know that his knowledge of the
trade secret was:
(A) derived from or through a person who
had utilized improper means to acquire it;
(B) acquired under circumstances giving rise
to a duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use;
or
(C) derived from or through a person who
owed a duty to the person seeking relief to
maintain its secrecy or limit its use.
FN59.Utah Code Ann. § 13-24-2(2)(a), (b).
In the absence of direct evidence, courts generally
allow use of circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation of trade secrets because "requiring
direct evidence would foreclose most trade-secret
claims from reaching the jury [as] corporations
rarely keep direct evidence of their use ready for
FN60
another party to discover."
Thus, a plaintiff
may prove use of its trade secrets by showing (1)
access by the defendant to the trade secret and (2)
similarity in the respective designs or products of
FN61
the defendant and the trade secret owner.
For
example, in Leggett & Piatt v. Hickory Springs
Manufacturing Co.,
the Federal Circuit reversed the lower court's grant of summary judgment
on a trade secret misappropriation claim under the
Illinois Trade Secrets Act for not considering access and similarity evidence.
In that case, the
access and similarity evidence consisted of the defendant's hiring of the plaintiffs former employee
as a consultant and expert testimony regarding the
technical similarity of the parties' products.
FN60.ifee Srratienko v. Cordis Corp., 429
F.3d 592, 600-01 (6th Cin2005) (collecting
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cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits standing
for the proposition that circumstantial
evidence may be used to prove misappropriation).
FN61.Mat600.
FN 62. Leggett & Piatt, Inc. v. Hickory
Springs Mfg. Co., 285 F.3d 1353
(Fed.Cir.2002).

tomers on Defendants' current customer list are
found on the customer list provided by Plaintiff to
FN69
Mr. Holbrook.
From this, Plaintiff argues that
a reasonable jury could infer that Mr. Holbrook disclosed Plaintiffs list to Defendants and that Defendants used that list in building their own customer list. The Court agrees that there is sufficient
evidence of access and similarity for the issue of
whether Defendants used Plaintiffs customer list to
be decided by a jury.
FN68.Docket No. 147 Ex. 7, at % 40.

FN63./J. at 1361-62.

FN69.&*?Docket No. 174, at Exs. NN and
OO.

FN64. M a t 1361.
*10 Although not specifically addressing the access
and similarity method of proof, the Supreme Court
of Utah implicitly recognized the possibility of using circumstantial evidence to prove misappropriation in the case of Water & Energy Systems TechFN65
nology v. Keil.
In Keil, an employer sued its
former employee for trade secret misappropriation,
alleging that the employee, who had "access to the
[plaintiff employer's] formulae and prices," was using the employer's alleged trade secrets in his new
job.
The court analyzed whether the employer
was entitled to a preliminary injunction based on
the similarity of the new employer's formulae and
prices to the plaintiff employer's formulae and
prices, ultimately concluding that not enough evidence of similarity was present to justify the issun
.
. .
FN67
r
ance of a preliminary injunction.

Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has produced
no evidence that Defendants knew or should have
known that Mr. Holbrook owed a duty to Plaintiff
to maintain the secrecy of Plaintiffs customer list
and to limit its use. However, in light of the
proffered evidence that Mr. Holbrook terminated
his relationship with Plaintiff and began representing Defendants shortly after receiving Plaintiffs
customer list, a jury could reasonably conclude that
Defendants knew or should have known that Mr.
Holbrook owed a duty to Plaintiff to maintain the
secrecy of the list by virtue of his recent representation of Plaintiff.
Consequently, as issues of fact remain regarding
whether Plaintiffs customer list constitutes a trade
secret protectable under the UTSA and whether Defendants misappropriated that list, the Court will
deny the Trade Secret Motion.

FN65. 974 P.2d 821 (Utah 1999).
D. Plaintiffs Motions to Strike

FN66.Id. at 821-22.
FN67. Id. at 823.
The Court finds that there remains an issue of material fact as to whether Defendants misappropriated Plaintiffs customer list. According to Mr.
Shott, shortly after Mr. Holbrook received
Plaintiffs customer list, he terminated his relationpxjzro

ship and began to represent Defendants.
Additionally, Plaintiff argues that some 27% of the cus-

In connection with the briefing on Defendants' summary judgment motions, Plaintiff filed a number of
motions to strike: (1) Motion to Strike Declaration
of Rick Vincent; (2) Motion to Strike Declaration
of Phil Corallo; (3) Motion to Strike Declaration of
Michalene E. Winkelspecht; (4) Motion to Strike
Declaration of Charles Hart; and (5) Motion to
Strike Declaration of Dan Parrish.
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None of the Declarations that are the subject of
Plaintiffs Motions to Strike affects the Court's disposition of either the Unfair Competition Motion or
the Trade Secret Motion. Accordingly, the Court
will deny each of Plaintiff s Motions to Strike.
IV. CONCLUSION
*11 For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Unfair Competition Motion
[Docket No. 102] is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that the Trade Secret Motion [Docket
No. 100] is DENIED. It is further
ORDERED that the Trademark Motion [Docket
No. 104] is DENIED AS MOOT. It is further
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motions to Strike
[Docket Nos. 118, 135, 137, 139, and 141] are
DENIED.
D.Utah,2008.
Hammerton, Inc. v. Heisterman
Slip Copy, 2008 WL 2004327 (D.Utah)
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